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3ABSTRACT
The core argument of this work is that the individualist conceptions of agency and 
responsibility inherent in the contemporary ethical structure of international relations 
are highly problematic, serve political purposes which are often unacknowledged, and 
have led to the establishment of an international institutional regime which is limited 
in the kind of justice it can bring to international affairs. Cosmopolitan liberalism has 
led to the privileging of the discourse of rights over that of responsibility, through its 
emphasis on legality and the role of the individual as the agent and subject of ethics; 
this has culminated in the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The ICC, described by its supporters as the missing link in human rights enforcement, 
is a result of changing conceptions of agency and responsibility beyond borders –
normative discourse has moved from state to individual, from politics and ethics to 
law, and from peace to justice, but I argue that it has not yet moved beyond the 
dichotomy of cosmopolitan and communitarian thinking. I contend that neither of 
these two positions can offer us a satisfactory way forward, so new thinking is 
required. The core of the thesis therefore explores alternative views of agency and 
responsibility – concepts which are central to international political theory, but not 
systematically theorized within the discipline. I outline models of agency as sociality 
and responsibility as a social practice, arguing that these models both better describe 
the way we talk about and experience our social lives, and also offer significant 
possibilities to broaden the scope of international justice and enable human 
flourishing. I end the research by considering the implications of these more nuanced 
accounts of agency and responsibility for ongoing theorising and practice.
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7CHAPTER 1: AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The concept of responsibility is gaining political currency in contemporary 
international relations. After fifty years of focus on individual rights, politicians from 
left and right, international institutions, NGOs and powerful economic actors are 
starting to talk about social obligations and community. Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and 
George W Bush all fought their first election campaigns as party leaders on issues of 
responsibility. When Clinton launched his 1991-92 Presidential campaign he 
expressed his position as follows: 
The Reagan-Bush years have exalted private gain over public obligation, 
special interest over the common good, wealth and fame over work and 
family. The 1980s ushered in a gilded age of greed and selfishness, of 
irresponsibility and excess, and of neglect … To turn America around, 
we've got to have a new approach, founded on our most sacred principles 
as a nation, with a vision for the future. We need a new covenant, a 
solemn agreement between the people and their government to provide 
opportunity for everybody, inspire responsibility throughout our society 
and restore a sense of community to our great nation. (Clinton, 1991)
After winning the Presidency, he stated in his inaugural address that: ‘[w]e must do 
what America does best: offer more opportunity to all and demand responsibility 
from all. Let us all take more responsibility, not only for ourselves and our families 
but for our communities and our country’ (Clinton, 1993). Fellow adherent to the 
‘Third Way’, Tony Blair, has made responsibility a feature of his politics throughout 
his premiership. In his first speech as Prime Minister to the Labour Party conference, 
Blair declared: ‘A decent society is not based on rights; it is based on duty....Our duty 
to one another...To all should be given opportunity; from all, responsibility 
demanded’ (Blair, 1997). In 2000, he addressed the Global Ethics Foundation and 
argued that: 
… you can’t build a community on opportunity or rights alone. They need 
to be matched by responsibility and duty. That is the bargain or covenant 
at the heart of modern civil society. Frankly, I don’t think you can make 
the case for Government, for spending taxpayers’ money on public 
8services or social exclusion – in other words for acting as a community –
without this covenant of opportunities and responsibilities together. 
(Blair, 2000)
Five years later, he told a meeting of faith-based organizations:
The only society that works today is … one founded on mutual respect, 
on a recognition that we have a responsibility collectively and 
individually, to help each other on the basis of each other's equal worth. A 
selfish society is a contradiction in terms … At the heart of my politics 
has always been the value of community, the belief that we are not merely 
individuals struggling in isolation from each other, but members of a 
community who depend on each other, who benefit from each other's 
help, who owe obligations to each other. From that everything stems: 
solidarity, social justice, equality, freedom. (Blair, 2005)
Finally, in January 2006, Blair located responsibility and respect at the centre of his 
third term agenda: 
Respect is a way of describing the very possibility of life in a community. 
It is about the consideration that others are due. It is about the duty I have 
to respect the rights that you hold dear. And vice-versa. It is about our 
reciprocal belonging to a society, the covenant that we have with one 
another … ultimately, the change [to bring about increased respect] has to 
come from within the community, from individuals exercising a sense of 
responsibility.  Rights have to be paired with responsibilities. (Blair, 
2006)
George W. Bush, who stood for President in 2000, also ran on a platform of 
responsibility. In his acceptance speech, he stated:
A hundred years from now, this must not be remembered as an age rich in 
possessions and poor in ideals. Instead, we must usher in an era of 
responsibility … In a responsibility era, each of us has important tasks --
work that only we can do. Each of us is responsible ... To love and guide 
our children, and help a neighbor in need. Synagogues, churches and 
mosques are responsible ... Not only to worship but to serve. Corporations 
are responsible ... To treat their workers fairly, and leave the air and 
waters clean. Our nation's leaders are responsible ... To confront 
problems, not pass them on to others. And to lead this nation to a 
responsibility era, a president himself must be responsible. (Bush, 2000) 
9Like Blair, Bush has returned to the theme of responsibility frequently during his time 
in office, and mentioned the concept seven times during the 2006 State of the Union 
speech, referring to Congressional, governmental, public and personal 
responsibilities. However, both Bush and Blair have faced questions about their own 
responsibility. Each has accepted responsibility for the mistaken intelligence they 
used to justify invading Iraq in 2003, see Blair (2004) and Bush (2005), but they have 
denied responsibility for atrocities which have happened on their watch. Expressing a 
view shared by many opponents of the Iraq War, in an article entitled ‘Blair put us in 
the firing line: The war on Iraq made the attack on London inevitable’, published in 
the Guardian newspaper on 9th July 2005, Faisal Bodi suggests that Tony Blair was 
in large part responsible for the 7/7 bombings in London: ‘it should not be forgotten 
that the bloody trail of blame leads straight to 10 Downing Street’. Bush has been 
accused of having ultimate responsibility, as Commander-in-Chief, for the torture and 
murder of Iraqi prisoners by members of the US military and intelligence services at 
Abu Ghraib prison, and for the alleged torture of terror suspects who have been 
‘rendered’ abroad by the CIA for questioning. Governmental responsibility for these 
acts has been extensively discussed (see, for instance, Hersh (2004); Hirsh et al 
(2005); Marty (2006)).
Responsibility is also gaining currency among non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and international institutions which are pushing to redefine state sovereignty 
as incorporating a notion of state responsibility. In 1994, we witnessed genocide in 
Rwanda despite widespread conviction after the Second World War that such acts 
would never again be allowed to happen. A significant amount of research has been 
done to establish who was responsible for what took place (see, as an exemplar of this 
research, the 1999 Human Rights Watch report ‘Leave None to Tell the Story: 
Genocide in Rwanda’) and shame at the failure of the international community to take 
action to prevent or put an end to the genocide led to the establishment of an 
international commission to investigate whether international consensus could be 
reached on who has the responsibility to intervene in situations of crisis. The report of 
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the commission is titled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) and the basic principles 
it endorses are:
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility 
for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal 
war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect. (ICISS, 2001: xi)
The report argues that the international community of states has responsibilities to 
prevent conflict and crises that put people at risk; to react with measures such as 
sanctions, prosecution or military intervention in situations of compelling human 
need; and to rebuild once the crisis is over (ICISS, 2001: xi). The UN General 
Assembly voted to support a (somewhat watered down) version of these principles on 
16th September 2005 (Resolution 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome). 
Despite opposition from powerful states, including the US, China, India, and Russia, 
the Responsibility to Protect principles are working their way into international 
discourse. Debates on responsibility for the atrocities currently taking place in the 
Darfur region of Sudan are not, for the most part, about who is causing the suffering, 
but who has the responsibility to try to alleviate it. The US, opposed to the R2P as it 
favours analysis of each situation in context rather than the application of general 
rules, is pushing for action on the basis of international responsibility: ‘I believe 
there's genocide taking place, and I believe we have a responsibility to work together 
to bring some security to the poor folks that are being harassed and raped and 
murdered in the far reaches of Darfur’ (Bush, 2006). 
Another innovation in international responsibility has come from the work of the 
InterAction council, an international organization formed in 1983 by Helmut Schmidt 
and Takeo Fukuda, to ‘mobilize the experience, energy and international contacts of a 
group of statesmen who have held the highest office in their own countries’ (Source: 
InterAction Council website, 2006). Members of the council ‘jointly develop 
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recommendations on, and practical solutions for, the political, economic and social 
problems confronting humanity’ (Source: InterAction Council website, 2006). In 
response to the growing dissatisfaction with the progress of the human rights regime, 
they published, in 1997, ‘A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities’ which 
states that: 
… recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world and implies obligations or responsibilities 
… the exclusive insistence on rights can result in conflict, division, and 
endless dispute, and the neglect of human responsibilities can lead to 
lawlessness and chaos … the rule of law and the promotion of human 
rights depend on the readiness of men and women to act justly … all 
people, to the best of their knowledge and ability, have a responsibility to 
foster a better social order, both at home and globally, a goal which 
cannot be achieved by laws, prescriptions, and conventions alone. 
(InterAction Council, 1997)
The Declaration also states that ‘human aspirations for progress and improvement can 
only be realized by agreed values and standards applying to all people and institutions 
at all times’ and ‘global problems demand global solutions which can only be 
achieved through ideas, values, and norms respected by all cultures and societies’ and 
the Council has been trying, with only limited success, to promote such universal 
values. Their Universal Declaration was accepted by many Asian countries, but the 
majority of Western governments remain reluctant to sign on to the ideals presented. 
Having failed to achieve universal support in the UN General Assembly for their 
universal proposals, Council members have since been engaging in public speeches 
and an educational campaign to ‘promote the concept of responsibility to all groups’ 
(InterAction Council website, 2006). 
Responsibility is also a key theme of campaigns for global economic justice. The 
Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) at Davos in January 2005 was 
entitled: "Taking Responsibility for Tough Choices", and the Founder and Executive 
Chairman of the WEF, Professor Klaus Schwab, concluded the Meeting by urging 
participants to exercise “self responsibility, global responsibility … and responsibility 
12
to the next generation. Then we will improve the state of the world.” (Schwab, 2005). 
The business world has started to rise to this challenge by exercising ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility’. At 29th March 2006, more than 2500 firms from 90 countries, 
including 106 of the world’s 500 largest companies had joined the Global Compact, a 
UN project set up in 2000 to ‘promote responsible corporate citizenship so that 
business can be part of the solution to the challenges of globalization … [to realize 
the vision of] a more sustainable and inclusive global economy’ (Source: UN Global 
Compact website, 2006a).
This new interest in responsibility has arisen at the same time as concern over 
whether the human rights regime is sufficient to bring about domestic or international 
peace and justice. Although the NGO community continues to promote the protection 
of human rights, academic debate has exposed the weakness of the foundations of this 
regime and the political interests it may serve (this literature is discussed in Chapter 
2), and many states have failed to live up to the human rights principles that they 
espouse. Amnesty International (2004) reported that human rights are under their 
most sustained attack in 50 years, due to violence by armed groups and to the 
responses to these groups by governments. The Amnesty Secretary-General, Irene 
Kahn, wrote in her Forward to the 2005 report that a ‘lethal combination of 
indifference, erosion and impunity … marks the human rights landscape today. 
Human rights are not only a promise unfulfilled, they are a promise betrayed’ 
(Amnesty International, 2005). The 2006 Human Rights Watch World Report singles 
out advanced liberal states such as the US, the UK, Canada, the member states of the 
European Union for special condemnation on their human rights record, alongside 
more usual suspects including Burma, China, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and 
Zimbabwe.
The idea of human rights is premised on a liberal idea, deeply rooted in Western 
philosophy, that people are by nature rational, autonomous individuals, who need 
protection from arbitrary state interference to give them sufficient freedom to decide 
on their own interests, desires and moral values (or their own ‘idea of the Good’ in 
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the vocabulary of liberal theory) and to design their lives in such a way as to achieve 
these. This position relies on people having ‘agency’ as individuals. Agency is a 
philosophical concept that describes a person’s capacity not just to perform simple, 
involuntary acts such as blinking or sneezing, but to perform action which is directed 
at achieving some goal, such as selecting and reading a particular book, going for a 
run or writing a thesis. In performing such actions, the agent is seen as exercising her 
free will or volition and (frequently though not necessarily) her rationality by 
choosing between options, forming an intention or plan of action, then acting as she 
intends to. This capacity for agency – for control over ourselves and over our 
environment – is seen as separating us from animals, and it is the basis upon which 
we are held responsible. Conventional understandings of the idea of responsibility 
suggest that we can be held causally and morally responsible for our actions and their 
consequences as long as our actions were freely chosen – as long as we ‘could have 
done otherwise’. As I question both the concept of causation and that of volition 
within this work, I use the broad term ‘responsibility’ to cover all that we may be 
held accountable or answerable for. 
Ideas of agency and responsibility are central to ethics, yet not systematically 
theorized in normative International Relations (NB: following convention, I use 
‘International Relations’, capital I & R, to signify the academic discipline and 
‘international relations’, small i & r, to signify the practice). The main conflicts 
between international political theorists can be seen to concern agency – in terms of 
where the power to act lies in the international sphere: with individuals, communities, 
states or other actors such as firms, and how this power comes about – and 
responsibility. Are we responsible, and if so to what extent, for our blood relations, 
our fellow citizens, all of humanity? What are we responsible to – a set of universal 
principles, a God, our community, our conscience? What is the content of our 
responsibilities? Are we only responsible for outcomes we have intentionally caused, 
or for any situation our attitudes, action or inaction have helped to bring about? Are 
we responsible for guaranteeing physical security and political freedom to others, or 
also for ensuring that their economic and social needs are met? What responsibilities 
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do states and the international community have for the welfare of the individuals who 
inhabit them? 
Rather than addressing these questions, much normative international theory and 
practice in the twentieth century has been concerned to justify an ethics based on 
rights. The liberalism of the nineteenth century combined with a resurgent 
cosmopolitanism in the twentieth century to put the individual and her human rights 
at the centre of our international ethical architecture. As the twenty-first century 
began, an International Criminal Court (ICC) took shape, charged with trying 
individuals for international crimes in order to defend the human rights of their 
victims. In a speech to accept the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001, Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General of the UN, outlined his view of the importance of the individual:
In the 21st Century I believe the mission of the United Nations will be 
defined by a new, more profound, awareness of the sanctity and dignity of 
every human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us to 
look beyond the framework of States, and beneath the surface of nations 
or communities. We must focus, as never before, on improving the 
conditions of the individual men and women who give the state or nation 
its richness and character … What is not always recognized is that "we 
the peoples" are made up of individuals whose claims to the most 
fundamental rights have too often been sacrificed in the supposed 
interests of the state or the nation. (Annan, 2001) 
However, as documented at the start of this chapter, the human rights regime has not 
achieved all that its supporters hoped that it could, and responsibility or social 
obligation is increasingly seen as a necessary correction to an excessive focus on the 
individual. But such a correction is in danger of being framed in ‘communitarian’ 
terms, a position which privileges the state over the individual, the unsavoury ethical 
implications of which led to the rise of cosmopolitan liberalism in the first place. 
These two principal positions in international political thought – cosmopolitanism 
and communitarianism (Brown, 1992) – do not offer a way to resolve the issues 
raised, so new thinking is required.
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This work is a qualitative study of the concepts of agency and responsibility, 
responding to the lack of explicit consideration of these notions in contemporary 
international political theory (IPT). I aim to develop an original theoretical viewpoint 
by critically analysing assumptions about agency and responsibility within 
mainstream IPT, and supplementing my analysis with insights from select literature 
within the fields of philosophy, sociology and social psychology. The objective of the 
research is to provide a more nuanced account of agency and responsibility in the 
international sphere, and to think through the implications of such an account for 
ongoing theorising and practice.
1.1 Summary of the Argument
The core argument I advance is that the individualist conceptions of agency and 
responsibility inherent in liberal and cosmopolitan liberal thought are highly 
problematic, serve political purposes which are often unacknowledged, and have led 
to the establishment of an international institutional regime which is limited in the 
kind of justice it can bring to international affairs. I outline alternative views of 
agency and responsibility – agency as sociality and a social practice model of 
responsibility – which both better describe the way we talk about and experience our 
social lives, and offer significant possibilities to broaden the scope of international 
justice and, through this, enable human flourishing.
I begin my argument, in the three chapters which make up Part One, by critiquing the 
concept of the individual agent in cosmopolitan liberalism, and the impoverished 
view of responsibility which follows from this. Chapter 2 focuses on the conception 
of agency in liberalism: a conception which sees agency as a natural property of 
individuals. Liberalism portrays the individual as an autonomous, rational and 
volitional being, who causes events in the world around her, for which she can be 
held responsible, but who is not herself caused. From this image of the individual as a 
sovereign being comes a normative commitment that sees the goal of human life to be 
the individual pursuit of our own projects and interests, free from the interference of 
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others. To protect individuals from interference, liberals developed the idea of rights 
– first natural, then human – as a device to prevent the state from impinging 
unnecessarily on the freedom of its citizens. 
Liberal individualism and cosmopolitan universalism came together in the twentieth 
century as liberal theorists extended their philosophy beyond state borders. 
Cosmopolitanism adds to liberalism a concern with the welfare of all human beings, 
whereas liberalism previously had been mostly concerned with the welfare of the 
citizens within the liberal state. This brought about a drive for liberal international 
institutions and regulation, to protect human freedom where domestic liberal regimes 
were absent. 
Cosmopolitan liberalism is opposed by communitarian thought, which emphasizes 
the role of the community in constituting the self. Communitarians argue that humans 
are social animals rather than autonomous beings, and that our values, ideas of the 
Good and identities are generated by society rather than being formed prior to it. 
Communitarians therefore see the community as having moral value independent of 
its members. They support the rights of groups to self-determine, and, in order to 
protect these rights, discourage intervention by the new liberal international regime 
into the affairs of sovereign states and the communities they are said to represent.
I criticize the ontology of the cosmopolitan liberal position (its conception of the 
nature of the individual) using insights from communitarianism, philosophy and 
social psychology, arguing that there is good reason to doubt that humans behave as 
autonomous agents, separable from their social contexts. It appears that being an 
individual in the liberal sense is not a natural status of human beings, but a political 
one, and I outline the history of the individual in Western political and economic 
practice. The rise of individualism accompanied the rise of the capitalist economy, 
and the separation of the individual from her communal support structures serves the 
interests of capital by making everyone vulnerable to the demands of the market. This 
link between individualism and economics is often ignored within cosmopolitan 
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liberal theory, but has significant effects, not least of which are the vast economic
inequalities sanctioned by placing a priority on individual freedom. 
I end the chapter by considering whether communitarianism can offer us a 
satisfactory alternative to cosmopolitan liberalism, given the drawbacks of that 
position. I conclude that it cannot. Communitarianism reifies and essentialises the 
community in the same way that cosmopolitan liberalism reifies and essentialises the 
individual: each views their central concept (the community or the individual) as 
sovereign and autonomous, so emphasizes the separateness of people and their 
societies. Communitarianism also implies a depressing determinism in contrast to the 
unrealistic voluntarism of liberals, and gives no clear account of how the cultures and 
societies which do the work in communitarian theory are themselves created and 
maintained. Both of these theoretical positions seek to generate ethics by making 
foundational claims, that is, by claiming to know the truth about the human condition. 
In fact, neither position describes our experience of the world very accurately, and 
neither can account for the appeal of the key insights of the other. Both positions tend 
towards a static view of the world, because they make claims to objective, 
unchanging truths. They are set up in structural opposition to each other, and neither 
can offer a convincing conception of human agency which incorporates both our 
intuitions about free will, and the inherent sociality and dynamism of human life.
Before exploring how the structural impasse can be overcome, which I do in Chapter 
5, I use Chapter 3 to critique the conception of responsibility that follows from 
cosmopolitan liberal individualist agency. Responsibility under liberalism is 
generally thought of in terms of ascribing blame for actions taken by intentional 
agents in the past. Forward-looking or ex ante responsibility on this account is mostly 
concerned with the protection of rights and tends to be institutionalised, in order to 
give the sovereign, independent individual maximal freedom to pursue her own 
conception of the Good, and, as such, is negative and relatively undemanding. All 
that is required is that we obey some simple rules in our public behaviour and do not 
trespass unnecessarily on the freedoms of others – we have no responsibility to make 
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positive contributions to their welfare. The tool used to regulate liberal systems of 
responsibility and provide rules of behaviour is the law, which is valued as a neutral, 
independent arbiter between interests and used to identify rights and enforce the 
conditions necessary to ensure the broadest possible freedom for the individual agent: 
limited state interference, property rights and freedom of contract. The law is also 
used to control individual behaviour via the criminal code, as the assumption of 
individualist agency (i.e. that individuals are the causal locus of behaviour) leads to 
the view that any socially problematic behaviour arises from the actions of (deviant) 
individuals: i.e. that individuals are responsible for suffering or harm. 
I discuss the relationship between liberalism and the law at some length, and argue 
that the liberal conception of law as an apolitical expression of a universal moral 
code, coupled with liberal individualist ontology, has significant political and 
economic implications. Responsibility is generally backwards-looking or ex post and 
is equated with blame under a legal or liability conception, and free will or 
intentionality is required to be proven before responsibility is assigned. Much 
perceived harm does not result from the intentional and informed actions of 
individuals – for example, poverty, environmental damage and societal disadvantage 
due to gender or race structures – so responsibility either remains unassigned or is 
assumed to lie with the individuals who are suffering. 
Despite the drawbacks of the use of exclusively legal means to regulate responsibility 
in liberalism, cosmopolitans have been keen to increase the legalization of obligation 
at an international level, and here too the focus is on rights. Since 1945, the individual 
has increased in importance significantly in international law and practice. Prior to 
the Second World War, international relations concerned the relationships between 
states. Now, individuals feature both as bearers of rights which are in need of 
protection, and as the agents responsible for international harms, defined as crimes. I 
document the development of international human rights and criminal law through 
the twentieth century, which culminated in the creation of an International Criminal 
Court (ICC), but argue that these changes, as may be expected given the difficult 
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relationship of liberalism and law to politics domestically, do not represent the 
improvement to the normative landscape of international relations that their advocates 
claim them to be. The shift in assumptions from state civil agency in the international 
sphere to individual criminal agency leads to an unjust conception of the international 
agent, and is founded on the idea of a universal moral code which is highly disputed. 
I argue that the new system of international law may in fact have pernicious effects: it 
does not succeed in separating law and responsibility from politics and economics, 
and, by legitimating violence in pursuit of supposedly universal goals, it allows for 
much greater suffering than it can prevent. 
I conclude Chapter 3 by noting that the rights model of responsibility itself is also 
limiting: it is predicated on universal values which do not seem to exist, given the 
lack of respect for human rights shown by many states within the West as well as 
outside it, and the obligations it imposes on states are far from clear.
Nevertheless, the human rights regime remains the focus of international ethical 
innovation, and the ICC is seen as the missing link in the enforcement of these rights. 
In Chapter 4, I examine whether the problems of a liberal conception of 
responsibility, i.e. one limited to the neutral, legal enforcement of rights and the 
prosecution of individuals for harm, are evident in this new institution. I find that the 
conception of agency in the Rome Statute, which established the Court, is internally 
contradictory and that the ICC (inevitably) fails in its goal to separate law from 
politics.
The individual is held responsible for international crime by the ICC, with the 
perpetrators seen in classic cosmopolitan liberal terms. They are intentional and 
rational, and exercise sovereignty over their desires and actions – rarely, if ever, 
acting out of duress or necessity. They may be under the command of others, often 
within a military or political structure, but obedience to superior orders can only be 
offered as an excuse for their behaviour in very limited circumstances. Any official 
role they hold within state or organizational structures is judged to be irrelevant to 
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their individual responsibility for their actions. This model of the perpetrator as a pre-
social criminal (i.e. an agent whose actions are not at all influenced by her social role 
or context) is entirely in contrast to the model victim of international crime. Victims 
are implied by the Rome Statute to be necessarily socially located. Genocide and 
crimes against humanity as defined in the Statute cannot be carried out against 
individuals – they must be aimed against groups or civilian populations. Something 
about the connections between people – their shared culture, history, religion or 
ethnicity – is seen as relevant to their status as victims; a seeming recognition of the 
importance of community to the individual. This confused conception of the person 
as both pre-social criminal and socially embedded victim shows that the ICC has not 
been able to overcome the impasse between cosmopolitan and communitarian 
positions on agency outlined in Chapter 2. 
The ICC is founded on the assumption that there are universal standards which apply 
to human behaviour, yet little evidence of any such standards can be found when 
looking at the formation of the Court. The ICC and the law it applies are the result of 
negotiations between states and as such are inherently political. The politics of 
international criminal law can be seen in the positions taken on the crime of 
aggression, command responsibility and capital punishment by the parties present at 
the Rome Conference at which the Statute was written. There were very different 
views on these issues, and compromises were reached by bargaining and trade-off 
rather than through reference to universal moral standards. The politics of the Court 
can also be seen in the positioning of the Court in relation to the United Nations 
Security Council (the Council retains its role in determining aggression and can 
prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction by passing positive resolutions in 
specific cases) and in the opposition of the US to the Court.
The internally contradictory conception of agency and denial of politics in the Rome 
Statute have worrying implications in the context of the goals of the ICC. The Statute 
narrows our focus onto individual action and this serves to exclude consideration of 
the causes of much harm in international relations, and may even confer legitimacy 
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onto ‘normal’ international violence which is not framed as the intolerable or 
‘atrocious’ action of deviant individuals. Pitting the pre-social criminal against the 
socially embedded victim tempts us to understand the conflicts in which atrocity 
takes place in simplistic terms of good and evil. Finally, the facilitating conditions for 
atrocity – be they attitudes within civilian populations, or practices such as 
nationalism and war – are not included within the legal discourse of liberal 
international responsibility. 
The ICC has been set up to prosecute sovereign individuals for inherently social 
crimes, suggesting that the conception of agency within the doctrine is fundamentally 
flawed. The legalised and individualised conception of responsibility within its 
founding Statute limits the scope of international justice to exclude consideration of 
the most serious and widespread suffering in contemporary international relations. 
The foundational assumptions of cosmopolitan liberalism – individualist agency and 
privatised, legalised responsibility – neither fit with the way we experience the world, 
nor offer much hope of achieving justice in any substantial way. As 
communitarianism was shown in Chapters 2 and 3 to be similarly lacking in appeal, I 
endeavour, in Part Two of the thesis, to rethink agency and responsibility using 
theories which reject both cosmopolitan liberal and communitarian foundations, and 
to offer more appealing and functional accounts of both concepts.
Chapter 5 deals with the question of how far agency is possible if we admit that 
structures such as community and culture do have some effect upon individuals. The 
impasse between cosmopolitan liberal and communitarian thought can be seen in 
terms of the ‘agency-structure’ debate in sociology and International Relations. 
Cosmopolitan liberals argue that individual agents are largely free from the effects of 
social and material structures, whereas communitarians see structures as determining 
many aspects of individual lives. To explore how to get past this impasse, I look at 
how the relationship between agent and structure has been theorised outside IPT. I 
document the three ways in which these phenomena can be seen to relate causally: 
structures can be argued to cause agents, agents to cause structures, or structures and 
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agents to simultaneously cause each other. This last position has been the most 
influential in recent theorising, with the sociological concept of ‘structuration’ being 
imported into IR by constructivists. The main argument here is that ideational or 
normative structures shape interests and identities, which cause or condition the 
action of agents. However, these structures – composed of norms, beliefs and ideas –
are themselves caused by the knowledgeable actions of agents. 
Looking at agency and structure in this manner offers us a useful way to think about 
the individual and the community. However, it is not without drawbacks. The 
constructivist account still sees agents and structures as more static than dynamic. In 
fact, both agents and structures seem to vary across contexts, and some interesting 
arguments have been made recently suggesting that agency is becoming increasingly 
important in the contemporary world as the structures of the sovereign state system 
are being weakened by globalisation. The constructivist view also lacks sufficient 
consideration of the role of power: agents are not equal, and powerful agents tend to 
recreate the structures that benefit them. Post-structuralist theorists investigate the 
effects of power by looking at agency and discourse, and reject the ontological 
arguments and claims to firm foundations which lead us to stalemate when 
conceptualising individual and community in traditional approaches. I argue that 
these and other post-positivist approaches offer us significant possibilities when 
theorising in international ethics, and I look at post-structuralism, constitutive theory 
and pragmatism in turn. 
Post-structuralist ethics rejects the idea that individuals are autonomous, but also 
rejects what it sees as the politically loaded and dangerous communitarian notion that 
our identities are necessarily tied to territorially located communities. The spatial
location of identity leads us to see our responsibilities to each other in terms of 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, and politics defined by national borders encourages the 
‘cleansing’ from territories of those who are different from us. 
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Constitutive theory advances our understanding of agency by identifying the 
structural ‘practices’ which constitute it and arguing that ethical codes are embedded 
in each such practice. Agency, on this model, is not an attribute of individuals, but a 
condition which arises within social practices such as the family. Like post-
structuralism, constitutive theory recognises that agency is created rather than 
discovered, and helps us understand how it is created by offering an account of the 
roles and practices through which we live our social lives. 
Pragmatism explicitly rejects foundational ethics and asks which ethical practices are 
useful to us – which help us to understand and act in our world – rather than which 
are ‘true’. It sees Western individualism as just a culture, and asserts that the best way 
to reduce cruelty and suffering is not to appeal to universal values but to encourage 
people to see strangers or enemies as ‘human’ (i.e. to afford them a moral status) via 
a process of education of the sentiments. Pragmatism also rejects territorial borders as 
contingent, and encourages us to use the agency afforded to us by our shared 
vocabularies and practices to critique our current societies and structures. 
All of these theories offer a nuanced account of agency, but they also all imply that 
agents and structures are different or distinct entities. To bring the individual together 
with the collective and dissolve the dichotomy, I outline a view of ‘agency as 
sociality’. This position concentrates not on the subjective or the objective but on the 
inter-subjective: on the relations we have with each other rather than the relations we 
have with independent structures. As such, it explains both our experiences of free 
will and the importance of collective life or sociality to agency. Individual agency is 
assigned through a collective practice whereby we discursively identify each other as 
autonomous, so that we can hold one another as accountable for our actions, and 
thereby enable and coordinate our complex social lives. However, these actions are 
not caused by sovereign individual agents, but by people who are profoundly 
mutually susceptible to each other. The ‘agency as sociality’ view recognises that 
humans seek status within their social relationships, so are sensitive to the reactions 
of others when acting. It overcomes the distinction between caused and free action by 
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seeing that those actions which we identify as free are precisely those actions which 
we feel could have been (causally) influenced by the evaluations of others (as 
opposed to actions we feel we could have had no influence over, such as actions 
‘caused’ by a phobia). Our freedom is enabled not by our capabilities as individuals, 
but by the way others treat us: agency can only come about and be exercised within 
‘discourse-friendly’ relationships (i.e. relationships in which we causally influence 
each other through discourse rather than through manipulation, threat, intimidation or 
coercion). The social structures spoken of in other approaches are creations of these 
relationships in the same way that individual agency is: both are inter-subjectively 
constituted by human interaction rather than really-existing ontological phenomena. 
This approach rejects the foundationalism, ontology and tendency to dichotomise and 
reify seen in traditional approaches, plus it can reconcile our experiences of free will 
and social influence within the same explanatory framework. It also moves beyond 
the territoriality of communitarianism: the collective action which brings about both 
agency and structure is not tied to any particular place. Relationships occur between 
people who share common activities and experiences, just as much as they do 
between people who live within particular sets of borders. 
Once agency has been re-conceptualised as sociality, we can see responsibility in new 
ways. In Chapter 6, I set out a ‘social practice’ model of responsibility (SPM), which 
follows from the view of agency established in Chapter 5. Agency as sociality 
suggests that we discursively recognise each other as agents in order to hold one 
another accountable, or responsible, for our behaviour, as this is the best way to co-
ordinate our actions, manage each other’s expectations and live socially. 
Responsibility is therefore necessary and integral to agency, and ascriptions of 
agency are necessary and integral to social life. The discussion in this chapter is 
necessarily abstract, as the position needs to be set out in some detail before the 
implications for international political theory and international relations can be 
explored in the remainder of the thesis.
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The social or inter-subjective nature of responsibility has been noted in recent work 
on the concept, and the theorists I use to build the SPM (Barry Barnes, Phillip Pettit 
and Marion Smiley) all recognise that responsibility ascriptions are not objective or 
neutral determinations of the causes of an action, but socially functional ways to 
express what we think of others within personal relationships. We use the discourse 
of responsibility to reflect our attitudes to others, and, through this, attempt to 
influence their behaviour. The influence comes about as we ask others to account for 
their behaviour – to justify it and make it intelligible to us with reference to 
collectively developed ethical standards. We signal whether they have been 
successful in doing so by approving or disapproving of their actions, so affecting their 
status within their relationship to us. The judge and the judged are both part of this 
process, and the idea of ‘response’ inherent in the concept of responsibility is brought 
to the fore. We only tend to hold people responsible when we perceive them to be 
responsive, or open to the non-coercive influence of others, and not because they are 
ruled entirely by their own independent wills. 
The standards to which we hold each other within the practice of responsibility are 
not objective: they are internal to the group, arise from social interaction and are the 
subject of constant debate and potential revision. As such, the judgments we make 
within the practice – of causal contribution and of blame – are influenced by politics, 
by the configuration of social power facing the judge, judged and victim, and by our 
determination of where the boundaries of relevant moral communities lie. Our 
perceptions of all of these factors can alter as we participate in the practice of 
responsibility, which accounts for the dynamism and social change that neither 
cosmopolitan liberalism nor communitarianism can adequately explain. 
The SPM differs markedly from the legalised and rights-based conception of 
responsibility in cosmopolitan liberalism. Instead of reducing the burden on 
individuals by making responsibility a matter of abiding by relatively simple moral 
rules which have been written into law, the SPM sees living with responsibility, or 
living ethically, as central to human social life. It asks that we consider whose lives 
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we affect and how, by virtue of the social processes in which we participate, 
including the increasing number of processes (such as international commerce) which 
reach across territorial borders. It also rejects the liberal notion of a harmony of 
interests, so broadens the concept of justice beyond responsibility for deviance, to 
include harms brought about by the effects of normal social and economic 
relationships. To do so, it rejects the idea that responsibility is necessarily connected 
to blame, and incorporates the prospective or ex ante responsibility that is assigned to 
social roles, assumed by agents or allocated on the basis of resources, as well as the 
ex post or ‘liability’ responsibility that the law is mainly concerned to regulate. 
I argue that the social practice model has three significant advantages over traditional 
conceptions of responsibility. Firstly, it rejects the dichotomy between individual and 
community that led to the impasse described in Chapter 2. Both agency and structure 
arise within inter-subjective relationships, and both vary across contexts. The 
collectives that constitute agency and responsibility are not tied to particular 
territories, so religion, gender, race, interest, attitude, experience or activity based 
groups are all possible sources of our agency and responsibility alongside more 
traditional national or local groups. Also, the specific content of these practices, 
because it comes about through dynamic social interaction, is constantly evolving. 
The recognition of dynamism in the practice is the second strength of the model. 
Rather than being defined according to a universal moral code, responsibilities can 
change as situations change – something we observe happening in international 
relations all the time, as we rethink the ethical roles of the sovereign state, the UN, 
the multinational corporation, and so on. The third strength derives from the 
dynamism and flexibility of the model, as well as the rejection of the ideas that causes 
can always be found for harm and that responsibility equates to blame: the SPM 
opens up the possibilities for justice by allowing us to create responsibility for 
situations which trouble us. Situations which many judge to be ethically unacceptable 
(and I recognise that there may not be agreement over these judgments, as there is no 
universal standard of justice) do not always result from the failure of agents to obey 
the law or to respect each others rights, or from malicious intent, so ex ante 
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responsibility needs to be assumed by actors with the resources to assist instead of 
relying on an objective code to discover ex post responsibility linked to wrong-doing. 
As well as considering responsibility for deviant acts such as atrocity and war crimes 
within the SPM, we can also consider responsibility for the background conditions 
which facilitate these acts (by seeing responsibility as layered or shared), as well as 
for economic harm or social disadvantage which results from the normal workings of 
society.
There are two principal challenges to this model of responsibility. The first is that by 
dismissing an objective or metaphysical conception of responsibility, it collapses into 
relativism. It is certainly the case that the SPM does not allow us to label the actions 
of others as absolutely right or wrong, but we can judge actions in reference to their 
congruence to our collectively defined ethics. I also note that the universalist 
foundations of cosmopolitan liberalism are far from universally assented to, so of 
limited practical use. The second challenge to the SPM is that it abandons the notion 
that responsibility can be found that is equal to every harm. There is no natural 
harmony of interests or moral equilibrium, on this view, and bad things can happen to 
good people. I argue that the SPM can offer hope here – because responsibility is 
recognised to be created rather than discovered, so it can be created to cover those 
harms for which it seems to be lacking. I conclude that the model can answer its 
critics and offer us a more convincing explanation for how we use the concept of 
responsibility than either communitarianism or cosmopolitan liberalism.
In Chapter 7, I broaden the conception of agency to include collective agents or 
groups, and explore the implications of the SPM for collective responsibility. We 
often ascribe responsibility to groups in our everyday discourse: to the US and its 
coalition partners or to Al Qa’eda for civilian deaths in Iraq, to Nike for the working 
conditions of the people who manufacture its trainers, to the Janjaweed or the 
Sudanese government for atrocities in Darfur. We also talk about practices such as 
capitalism, nationalism and war as having responsibility for suffering or inequality 
that result from their exercise. These agents are very different from the sovereign 
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individual envisaged as the archetypal agent within cosmopolitan liberalism, yet their 
effects on individual welfare make them imperative to consider in any discussion of 
responsibility.
A great deal of work has been done on collective responsibility in political theory and 
International Relations recently, concentrating, for the most part, on the responsibility 
of formal organisations such as the UN. I argue that this work is valuable in taking us 
beyond a limited view of agency, but does not expand the debate far enough, because 
it accords responsibility to groups on the basis of their sharing characteristics such as 
deliberative capacities with individuals. The conception of agency as sociality, and 
the social practice model of responsibility that follows from it, suggest that agency is 
inherently collective (it is constructed and exercised inter-subjectively) and allow us 
to look to informal as well as formal groups when considering the location of 
responsibility.
Both the cosmopolitan liberal and communitarian conceptions of responsibility are 
focussed on the individual and her relationship to her state. The SPM suggests that 
we cast our net wider, and consider the impact of formal institutions such as NGOs 
and firms in international relations, as well as informal collectives such as ethnic 
groups and the international community. I work through the example of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) to show the SPM in action. Transnational corporate power 
has increased significantly in recent decades, and judgments of the correct social role 
of the firm have also shifted. The concept of CSR has been developed, which requires 
that firms attempt not just to maximise profit, but also to care for the environment and 
promote social justice. I use statistics from a variety of sources to show that the 
attitudes of the public, governments and firms towards corporate responsibility have 
changed, along with the purchasing patterns of consumers and the behaviour of some 
of the world’s largest companies. The discourse and practice of corporate 
responsibility is demonstrated to be dynamic and creative, in line with the conception 
of responsibility in the SPM.
29
I move on to look at the responsibility of informal groups, and use the violence which 
accompanied the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia through the 1990s to explore 
whether and how collectives such as ethnic groups and the international community 
should be held responsible. I argue that the SPM frees us from seeing direct and 
demonstrable causal contribution as a requirement of responsibility ascription, so 
encourages us to think about the facilitating conditions of harm. Attitudes held by 
individuals who do not take part in violence can still influence the process, as they 
structure the behavioural context faced by those who do act. Racist attitudes such as 
those displayed by the Serbs and Croats generated a context in which violence against 
the ethnic ‘other’ was more acceptable, and could even have been a way to gain status 
within the group. Those who committed violent acts did so in light of communicative 
support they received from other members of their groups, therefore, if we are 
interested in understanding the conflict, and in preventing similar atrocities in future, 
we must think about the contribution made by, and the responsibility of, many more 
actors than just the murderers, the rapists and the terrorists. 
I also consider the responsibility of the international community, and the practices of 
nationalism and war, for the violence in the former Yugoslavia. I argue that the recent 
conceptualisation of the international community as an actor in its own right is
another demonstration of the SPM in action. ‘Coalitions of the willing’ taking it upon 
themselves to enforce UN resolutions and the developing practice of humanitarian 
intervention show that responsibility in international relations is being reassessed. 
The persistence of the practices of nationalism and war in the community show that 
we still have some way to go before situations such as the ugly breakdown of 
Yugoslavia can be avoided.
I finish the chapter by looking at the main objections to the idea of holding informal 
groups responsible, and argue that, despite the criticisms which can be levelled at this 
approach, seeing responsibility in terms of the SPM enables us to bring all of the 
actors which impact upon individual welfare into the discourse and practice of 
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responsibility. It acknowledges that groups act as a force-multiplier of human agency 
– enabling greater harm and greater good than individuals could achieve alone. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, and in it I start to outline the broader implications of 
the rethinking of agency and responsibility which I undertook in Part Two. I note that 
my research lends considerable support to post-positivist approaches in IPT, but 
pushes these positions further by rejecting the dichotomy of agent and structure. I 
also note that, because agency and responsibility are internal to practices, we cannot 
make generalisations outside those practices in terms of holding specific agents 
responsible for particular acts or outcomes. However, if we are interested to know 
how the social practice model of responsibility can work best to co-ordinate our 
social lives, there are two general implications for our current practices which can be 
identified, one regarding agency and one responsibility. The key implication of the
SPM for agency is that ethical agency is about much more than simply following 
rules or laws. Responsibility is a necessary component of our socially constructed 
agency – holding people to account is the reason why we identify each other as 
autonomous agents – so to best participate in the practice of responsibility, our ethical 
considerations should extend out to our whole lives. The SPM encourages this, but 
also makes it more difficult for individuals to do, by removing the foundationalism of 
cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism, leaving us with no universal 
morality or objective set of rules to use to guide our behaviour. The implication of 
this is that our agency needs to change: to better cope with the demands upon us, we 
need to develop ethical character in preference to searching for moral rules. I argue 
that the ‘virtue ethics’ approach best promotes the type of ethical agency best suite to 
sensitive participation in the social practice of responsibility. This normative tradition 
takes a ‘whole person, whole life’ approach to ethics instead of subordinating 
responsibility and separating it from the pursuit of self-interest. It encourages us to 
develop sophisticated ethical skills including the faculty of practical reason, to best 
meet the demands on us as inherently social agents. 
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The second implication of my research is to do with the nature of responsibility. In 
the current international ethical architecture, responsibility is legalised. Systems of 
obligation are governed by legal institutions such as the ICC, and cosmopolitan 
liberals support the increasing legalisation of the system in order to solve the 
‘problem’ of politics (as politics, particularly the politics of sovereign statehood, is 
seen as having a tendency to turn violent). The SPM implies that this view of 
responsibility is limiting: legalising responsibility, conceiving of it principally in ex 
post terms (but transferring ex ante responsibility to institutions to ‘free’ the 
individual), and looking for deviant individuals to blame for discreet acts of harm 
narrows the opportunities we have for alleviating suffering. I argue that liberal 
institutions and the law can play important roles in society but that they cannot work 
alone. Without universal values to refer to, and in a world in which the causes of 
harm are ever more difficult to trace, I argue that politics and the idea of political 
responsibility need to be rehabilitated. Politics, or the negotiation between different 
views of responsibility and how to live socially, is necessary to ethics under the SPM. 
The model suggests that, because agency is necessarily social in character, and 
because acting together multiplies the effects of each person’s agency, so 
responsibility (though not necessarily blame) should be accepted for the suffering that 
our communities facilitate, through attitudes, action or inaction. Collectives must act 
together to organise social relationships justly, and to do this they need to manage the 
relationships of power inherent within social life and engage in discourse with each 
other to persuade, compromise, develop common understandings of accountability 
and co-ordinate action. The law can structure our social relationships and our 
responsibilities, but political action enables a richer practice of responsibility which 
ultimately broadens the scope of harms that we are able to confront. 
The social practice model of responsibility and the conceptualisation of agency as 
sociality challenge mainstream views of the individual and her relationship to her 
communities. They suggest that we may be responsible for, and able to influence, 
much more harm than we currently accept. However, these views also suggest 
imaginative ways to broaden our discourses of responsibility to approach problems 
32
previously seen as structural and therefore not open to change. I end the thesis by 
arguing that the new focus on responsibility in international political life is having 
real and seemingly beneficial effects in international relations, and as such should be 
encouraged. 
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CHAPTER 2: COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM AND 
INDIVIDUAL AGENCY
This chapter and the next examine the theoretical background of cosmopolitan 
liberalism, an ethical position which has been ascendant in international political 
theory since 1945. While the position is relatively broad and encompassing, its core 
principles can be seen in the work of Brian Barry (1995; 1998; 1999; 2001), Charles 
Beitz (1999a; 1999b), Simon Caney (2001; 2005a; 2005b), Thomas Franck (1999), 
David Held (1995; 1999; 2002 [with Anthony McGrew]; 2003a; 2003b; 2004), 
Martha Nussbaum (1993; 1996; 2000), Onora O’Neill (1986; 1991; 1996; 2000), 
Thomas Pogge (1992; 1999; 2002; 2005), Peter Singer (1972) and Iris Marion Young 
(2000; 2004; 2006) to name some of the most well-known, as well as in the 
justification for innovations in international practice documented in Chapter 3. This 
chapter focuses on the conception of agency within the doctrine, and argues that this 
conception is highly problematic: the principal features of cosmopolitan liberal 
agency, which focus on the individual as sovereign, result in the position being 
caught in a structural opposition with opposing insights from communitarian 
theorists. The chapter concludes with the observation that neither cosmopolitan nor 
communitarian theories can provide a workable account of agency upon which to 
build conceptions of responsibility.
Two ideal-types of agent feature in international political theory: the state and the 
individual. In the first section of this chapter I outline the tenets of cosmopolitanism 
and liberalism, which have combined to privilege the individual as the main focus of 
moral concern and value in international theory and practice. The second section 
details the resurgence of theories which value the community or the state, and the 
final section critiques both positions to show that international political theory located 
in the ‘cosmopolitan-communitarian’ debate offers only dichotomous and 
unsatisfactory conceptions of human agency. The majority of the argument in the 
chapter concerns cosmopolitan liberalism, because cosmopolitan liberal principles 
seem to be driving much of the theory and, in particular, the practice in contemporary 
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IPT. The key values of this position: the individual, her freedom, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law, are enshrined within post-1945 international society, with 
an ever increasing number of international institutions and NGOs being set up to 
support and promote them. Interrogating these principles and analyzing their effects 
therefore seems wise.
Before getting to the substance of the discussion, some qualification is necessary. 
Following Brown (1992), I characterise international political theory as susceptible to 
being subdivided under two approximate headings: ‘cosmopolitan liberalism’ 
(‘cosmopolitanism’ in Brown) and ‘communitarianism’. The key difference between 
the two approaches concerns their conflicting views of the sources of moral value in 
the world, which stem from their opposing insights about the nature of the self 
(Brown, 1992: 12-13 and Cochran, 1999: 8-11)). Using these terms and organizing 
my initial discussion around a comparison between, and ultimately rejection of, these 
positions could be challenged on two grounds. Firstly, I could be said to be using a 
restrictive definition of IPT, and secondly, to be simplifying the two positions to the 
point where I can be accused of creating straw men.
International Relations is a discipline rich in theory and theorists, few of whom would 
recognize themselves as participating in a debate between cosmopolitan liberalism 
and communitarianism. Those whose focus is on trying to explain international 
relations – empirical theorists – are certainly not overtly engaged in the debate I 
concentrate on (although, following post-positivist reasoning, particularly Cox 
(1981), they cannot claim their type of theory to be entirely value-free), which is why 
I use the term international political theory rather than International Relations theory.  
The use of IPT indicates that my concern is with theorizing the political relationships 
between individuals and groups, and the assumptions and normative commitments 
which underlie them, both within and across existing territorial borders. However, 
even those theorists who share this concern – international ethicists, or normative 
international theorists – might object to being pigeon-holed into one or other box in 
the cosmopolitan liberal/ communitarian debate. Post-positivist ethical theorists, 
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whose work I draw on substantially in Chapter 5, are the group most difficult to fit 
into either box. If they acknowledge the debate at all, many are specifically working 
to find a way beyond the impasse that has been reached within it rather than 
endorsing one side or the other (see, for instance, Cochran (1999) and Hutchings 
(1999)). 
I am not concerned, in this thesis, to prove or disprove the utility of dividing 
international political theories according to their views of the sources of moral worth 
and the nature of the self, or to argue that these views are central to the work of all 
international political theorists, but I do think that exploring IPT through this division 
(and through the agency-structure debate which it maps neatly onto) helps us to 
understand why theorists take such divergent positions on international ethical 
questions, and why we should look systematically at the different conceptions of 
agency and responsibility within IPT.
In order to explore IPT in this way, it is necessary to simplify the debate into two 
sides, and to simplify each side. In this chapter, I set out cosmopolitan liberalism and 
communitarianism using broad generalizations to explain and critique the key 
normative commitments on each side. In fact, the theorists I discuss as representing 
the two schools of thought often recognise the drawbacks to their positions that I 
outline through the thesis, and work explicitly to overcome them. The work of each 
theorist I reference is more nuanced and sophisticated than my brief sketch of their 
positions can do justice to. However, my aim is not to provide a comprehensive 
account of their work. I want instead to establish fairly swiftly that positions which 
tend towards privileging the individual, as well as those which favour the community, 
are highly problematic with regards to their inherent assumptions about agency, 
before going on to explore a new concept of agency in much more detail. 
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2:1 The Rise of the Individual
The rise of the individual as an international agent has characterized post 1945 
international relations and international theory. In principle, individuals no longer 
need to rely on their state to protect their interests: a comprehensive system of human 
rights has been established which the individual can demand not due to their status as 
citizen of a particular state but due to their identity as a human being. Concern for 
individual suffering caused by grave human rights abuses has motivated wars – in 
Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo and Iraq – as well as an abundance of law. Yet focus on the 
individual is relatively new. This section outlines the twin roots of such a focus: 
liberalism and cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism is the older of these two doctrines, derived from the Greek 
kosmopolites or ‘citizen of the world’. The Stoics rejected the Aristotelian view that 
man’s primary ethical identity was as a citizen of a particular polis, and saw instead 
all humans as belonging or potentially belonging to a single moral community. This 
rejection of the significance of particularistic attachments defines cosmopolitan 
thought, which has developed and divided in a variety of ways in the two thousand 
years since the Stoics began to write. All strands of cosmopolitanism see the 
individual as the agent of concern, but they do not concur on what the individual is or 
what it means to focus ethics upon the individual. Liberalism, which developed in the 
European Enlightenment alongside a resurgent cosmopolitanism, provides the 
dominant mainstream interpretation of the individual in contemporary IPT, seeing her 
as volitional, rational and autonomous. Conceptions of responsibility which follow 
from cosmopolitan liberal agency are the subject of Chapter 3.
Although cosmopolitanism can be traced back further than liberalism in terms of 
etymology, it makes sense to begin our analysis of the individual agent by looking at 
liberal theory. Modern cosmopolitan liberalism can be seen as a logical development 
of liberal ideology beyond the borders of political community, so I concentrate first 
upon liberalism within the polis. 
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‘Liberalism’ can indicate a political tradition (the most influential such tradition in 
the West, and the foundation of our political institutions), a political theory or a 
philosophical position. Philosophical liberalism provides the foundation for the 
political theories which take its name. A central and defining characteristic of liberal 
philosophy is a conception of the person as an autonomous, rational and volitional 
being: a sovereign individual, a moral agent. Standard liberal accounts of agency see 
the individual as ‘possess[ing] internal powers and capacities, which, through their 
exercise, make her an active entity constantly intervening in the course of events 
ongoing around her’ (Barnes, 2000: 25). An agent can cause changes in the world 
around her, but her actions are not themselves caused. She generates actions using the 
internal capacities of rationality and intentionality or will, and thus acts freely and 
without interference, as a sovereign body. Responsibility follows from free agency, as 
the agent is not forced to act in any particular way, and could by implication act 
otherwise if she chose to do so. As her actions were voluntary, she can be held not 
just causally responsible but also morally responsible (subject to ascriptions of moral 
praise or blame) for the consequences of her actions. Liberal notions of free agency 
owe a great deal to the work of Kant, who saw the possession of reason as the 
differentiator between human beings and the natural world. Through reason, humans 
could transcend the laws of cause and effect and effectively become ‘uncaused 
causes’. ‘Our blame is based on a law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause 
that irrespective of all … empirical conditions could have determined the agent to act 
otherwise’ (Kant, 1781: 477, cited in Barnes, 2000: 9). 
The individual in liberalism is valued not just for her agency, but for her 
perfectibility. Liberal ethics follow Mill in seeing individuality as a normative good, 
because ‘it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, 
well-developed human beings’ (Mill, 1991: 71). The human ideal can only be 
achieved on this view by effort on the part of the individual: the individual must be 
self-determining, and human life a project. It follows that the central concept and 
primary good promoted within liberal political theory is liberty or freedom, as the 
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individual cannot hope to self-determine if her actions are constrained by a state: ‘The 
a priori assumption is in favour of freedom’ (Mill, 1991: 472). The principal task of
liberalism as political theory becomes to justify authority, particularly the authority of 
the state and of law, because any exercise of authority limits freedom, and any limit 
on freedom limits the individual’s ability to author her life and pursue her interests.
Conceptions of what freedom actually is vary within the liberal tradition. Theorists 
such as Isaiah Berlin (2002) saw liberty as negative – freedom was attained when a 
person was not prevented from doing something by someone else. By contrast, 
Kantian liberals such as Dworkin (1988) and Raz (1986) conceive of liberty as 
positive: they argue that we are only free if we are acting rationally and 
autonomously. ‘Running throughout liberal political theory is an ideal of a free 
person as one whose actions are in some sense her own. Such a person is not subject 
to compulsions, critically reflects on her ideals and so does not unreflectively follow 
custom and does not ignore her long-term interests for short term pleasures’ (Gaus 
and Courtland, 2003: 2). This view of liberty as positive links back into the 
philosophical idea of human perfectibility: Kant saw the self as valuable only if it was 
self determining in a specific way: ‘not simply doing what one wills but what one 
should will’ (Hutchings, 1999: 124), that is, progressing towards the human ideal. 
The idea of rights, claimed to be grounded in natural law, arose in liberal political 
theory as a way to protect the individual from imposition by the state and to support 
the pursuit of her chosen ends by guaranteeing to her the widest possible range of 
freedoms. The primary role of the state in liberalism is to guarantee these rights to its 
citizens, and any obligation the individual has to the state rests on its success in doing 
this.
These three ideas: the individual, freedom and rights, have been tremendously 
influential in Western political practice. Gaus and Courtland see the dominant liberal 
ethic of the twentieth century as the view that ‘the good life is necessarily a freely 
chosen one in which a person develops his unique capacities as part of a plan of life’ 
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(Gaus and Courtland, 2003: 5). Support for such self-determining individuals can be 
seen in the commitment to democracy, civil and political rights and the rule of law 
within the domestic politics of European and North American states, evident since the 
European Enlightenment. 
Despite the progress of liberalism as a domestic political philosophy in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the international realm was still dominated by a ‘morality of 
states’, in which states were seen as the key actors (Beitz, 1999a: 63-66). This 
morality of states ‘base[d] the principles of international ethics on the principle of 
state sovereignty’ so supported non-intervention in the affairs of other states on the 
basis of states’ rights to autonomy (Nardin, 1983, cited in Hutchings, 1999: 31). By 
the twentieth century, this view was being questioned, with its foundation on the 
principle of sovereignty found particularly problematic; it is in opposition to this view 
of international ethics that both liberal internationalism and cosmopolitan liberalism 
developed. A morality of states is based upon the institution, state sovereignty, which 
is seen as causing many of the problems that an international ethics should address, 
such as human rights violations and poverty, with the prohibition upon intervention 
simply supporting the status quo distribution of power.
The first significant extension of liberalism beyond state borders came when British 
and American political theorists responded to the carnage of the First World War by 
proposing a liberal internationalist order. This programme for peace was outlined 
most clearly within Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ speech, in which he advocated global 
support for sovereignty and national self-determination for all peoples under liberal, 
democratic, constitutional regimes, an international institutional structure which 
would manage international affairs through law rather than war, and the removal of 
all economic barriers to free trade. Wilson’s position was not a wholesale rejection of 
the morality of states, but an updating of it in line with the principles of liberalism 
which had taken hold in domestic societies.  The liberal faith in progress and human 
perfectibility led theorists to believe that war could be eliminated, particularly 
through democracy and free trade. War was seen as unnatural, as a belief in a 
40
fundamental harmony of interests underlies both domestic and international 
liberalism. War was only started by unaccountable and unrepresentative governments, 
and was therefore preventable if the (naturally peace-loving) ‘people’ had direct 
control over government. This justified the normative value placed on national self-
determination in liberal internationalism. War was also seen as unlikely if trade was 
free – as people became bound together in an international market, the cost of war 
would mean that fighting would be futile (see especially Angell, 1910).
Like free trade and democracy, human rights were also seen as linked to peace. 
Liberal internationalists thought that ‘states which treat their own citizens ethically 
and allow them meaningful participation in the political process are … less likely to 
behave aggressively internationally’ (Burchill, 2001a: 42). Where liberal 
internationalism differs from the cosmopolitan liberalism which followed it is in its 
conception of the rights of peoples rather than people. Liberal internationalists argued 
that the principal rights that we should be concerned with in international affairs are 
the rights of collectives – of peoples – to sovereignty and self-determination. They 
did support individual human rights, but held that freedom was best served by 
guaranteeing to groups the space to determine their own national projects.
The moral horror of the Second World War forced liberal theorists to reconsider their 
beliefs. Some, such as E. H. Carr (2001b), turned to realism. They saw the liberal 
internationalist project as too ambitious – as utopian. Others – mostly activists and 
politicians such as Eleanor Roosevelt, rather than the liberal internationalist 
academics whose principles were now under attack – believed that their previous 
position, based as it was on only a partial reworking of the morality of states, was not 
ambitious enough. They rejected the state as a moral agent of concern entirely, and 
drew up an ethics centred on the individual. This new position marks the coming 
together of the cosmopolitan rejection of particularistic attachments and the liberal 
commitment to the absolute priority of the individual, and it can be seen most clearly 
in the post Second World War focus on human rights. The concept of human rights 
was made concrete in the 1948 Universal Declaration and the Preamble to the 
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Declaration states that human rights should be protected by the rule of law. The 
human rights regime suggests that there may be some actions, such as torture, slavery 
and arbitrary detention, that are prohibited regardless of their status in domestic law, 
and regardless of the official status of the perpetrator. They are afforded to all human 
beings qua human beings, not due to their membership of any particular political 
community. The purpose of these rights is to guarantee to all individuals some basic 
protection from the actions of their states and, ideally, the freedom to formulate their 
own values and ideas of the Good.
Evident here is the liberal conception of the individual as a volitional and normatively 
valuable agent who must be protected from arbitrary action from the state in order to 
be able to live according to her own goals and values. What cosmopolitanism brings 
to the picture is a new conception of the ethical value of foreigners – those who live 
outside the boundaries of the liberal state. Brown (2006 forthcoming) distinguishes 
between pluralist liberals (analogous to pre-1945 liberal internationalists) and 
cosmopolitan liberals as follows: pluralist liberals regard the right to govern oneself –
the right of self-determination – as one of the most basic and important rights, so 
argue that the duties we have to our fellow citizens are qualitatively different to those 
we have towards the rest of the world. Cosmopolitan liberals see the identity every 
individual has as a citizen of the world (or simply as a human being) as prior to any 
national identity, so argue that normative action should be concerned to increase the 
political and civil rights of all people.
Like liberalism, cosmopolitanism is a political tradition, a political theory and a 
philosophy, with great variety to be found in each strand. As a tradition, 
cosmopolitanism can simply mean: ‘an attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality. 
A cosmopolitan [in the eighteenth century] was someone who was not subservient to 
a particular religion of political authority, someone who was not biased by particular 
loyalties or cultural prejudice’ (Kleingeld & Brown, 2002: 4). This tradition of 
questioning the culture and framework of loyalties into which you were born tends to 
be premised on a view that such detachment is possible – a philosophical 
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cosmopolitanism. The philosophical or normative version of cosmopolitanism is 
associated with three different sorts of claims: ‘First, the claim that all human beings 
share a common moral identity; secondly, the claim that there are universal 
(cosmopolitan) standards of normative judgment; thirdly, the claim that there should 
be a cosmopolitan political order’ (Hutchings, 1999: 35). The third claim is the 
starting point for cosmopolitan political theorists, who range from those who promote 
the creation of a world state – the most important contemporary work here is that on 
cosmopolitan democracy by David Held (1995, 1999, 2002, 2003a, 2003b & 2004) –
to Kantian-inspired proposals for limited global bodies, a federal system or an 
‘enlightened’ sovereign state system (see Beitz (1999a); Pogge (2002); O’Neill 
(2000)).
The combination of liberal individualism and cosmopolitanism universalism has been 
very influential in contemporary international political theory and practice. In Chapter 
3, I document how the conception of the individual as agent and source of moral 
value has significantly affected international relations practice, culminating in the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court. Despite the challenge from 
communitarianism detailed in the following section of this chapter (or perhaps 
because it does not offer a sufficient challenge), much debate in contemporary IPT is 
debate between different positions taken by cosmopolitan liberals. 
2:2 The Resurgence of Community
The principal school of thought in international political theory that opposes 
cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitan liberalism is communitarianism (Brown, 1992). 
Modern communitarianism began as a reaction to liberalism in the domestic sphere, 
specifically to John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) and its central assertion that the 
proper role of government is to secure and distribute liberties to individuals to enable 
them to pursue their own ideas of the Good. This was seen by theorists such as 
Michael Walzer (1983; 1994), Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), Michael Sandel (1982) and 
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Charles Taylor (1989) as devaluing the role of the community in individual ethical 
life. Theorists in this tradition1 differ significantly from cosmopolitans in their 
ontology, their methodology and their normative philosophy (Bell, 1993. See also 
Caney (1992) and Cochran (1999) for similar distinctions). 
The key ontological impasse between cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism 
concerns the nature of the self. As discussed above, cosmopolitan liberals see the 
individual as a moral agent, as objectively morally valuable, and as sharing a moral 
identity with the rest of humanity. Great value is placed in the autonomy of the 
individual and her ability to choose her own ideas of the Good, unencumbered by 
social attachments (Cochran, 1999). Communitarians see this conception of the self 
as overly individualistic, as it suggests that individuals can have an identity (if not an 
existence) prior to society. By contrast, communitarian theorists see the self as 
substantially social, as constituted by the social matrix of which it is a part rather than 
in any way ontologically prior to society (Cochran, 1999). Communal attachments 
are not freely chosen but central to our identities, and our most meaningful and 
rewarding identities are as citizens rather than as men (Linklater, 1982). Our 
communities offer the institutions, decision-making procedures, benefits, obligations, 
historical narratives and, most importantly, conceptions of the Good necessary to a 
flourishing (political) life (Brown, 2000a). Man on this view is very much a social 
animal: he is ‘not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self-sufficient 
outside a polis.’ (Taylor, 1985: 190). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there is a great deal of variation within 
cosmopolitanism and liberalism. Not all theorists in these traditions subscribe to the 
view that the self is ontologically prior to society, and indeed Rawls explicitly 
discusses the role of socialisation in forming the self in Part III of Theory of Justice. 
However, as the next section will discuss, cosmopolitan liberals do seem to assume a 
position of judgment exists prior to society or social attachments, even if that position 
                                                
1 It should be noted that many of those whose work is described by others as communitarian do not 
recognise it as such themselves. Sandel (1982) sees himself as a republican and Walzer and Taylor 
both describe themselves as liberals (Guttman, 1992).
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is only possible in a thought experiment such as Rawls’ original position. This 
position would be literally unthinkable unless the self could be divorced from its 
social setting. 
Communitarians and cosmopolitans differ in the method by which they see moral 
judgments as being made. For the communitarian, moral judgements can only be 
made within community, as tradition and social context are necessary for moral and 
political reasoning. The role of the community, or polis, extends beyond constituting 
the identity of agents – it also provides them with the space in which morality makes 
sense. Communitarians take issue with the liberal position that individuals are free to 
choose their moral outlook, as societal moral codes seem to assert a strong influence 
on most people, regardless of their preferences, which cannot be explained without 
reference to the communal space in which our moral judgments are made and 
interpreted. They argue that human beings need values in order to make moral 
judgments, and those values are grounded in culture. This cultural particularism 
contrasts with the universalism of cosmopolitan liberalism, which argues that cross-
cultural standards of normative judgement and single, universal meanings of moral 
concepts such as justice can be identified – an Archimedean point can be found. See, 
for instance, the work of Brian Barry: ‘I continue to believe in the possibility of 
putting forward a universally valid case in favour of liberal egalitarian principles’ 
(Barry, 1995: 3); and Simon Caney, who sets out a General Argument for Moral 
Universalism to support the ideas that ‘moral principles should apply to all if persons 
are similar in morally relevant ways and that persons throughout the world share 
common morally relevant properties’ (Caney, 2005a: 57). For the cosmopolitan 
liberal, moral reasoning should be stripped of social context in order to approach 
truth, not buried within it. Of course, moral judgements can only be made across 
plural conceptions of the Good if moral identity precedes society, taking us back to 
the ontological individualism just outlined.
Cosmopolitanism is an absolutist doctrine, believing in single answers to moral 
questions across all human societies. Communitarianism is more relativist. It holds 
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that making moral judgements across communal boundaries is difficult if not 
impossible due to the lack of common culture and values. For the communitarian, 
‘the principles by which social, economic and political arrangements are legitimized 
are always grounded in concrete practices, traditions and communities’ (Hutchings, 
1999: 42), therefore cross-border critique, based on claims to universal or objective 
standards, is to be discouraged.
If the polis is indeed necessary to constitute the self, to enable moral agency, to 
provide the conditions for flourishing and to ground communal ethics, it follows that 
political arrangements, both domestic and international, should support not just 
individuals but also their communities. This is the normative position of the 
communitarian. In contrast to cosmopolitan liberalism, she sees the state as an 
institution necessary to the good life and intrinsically morally valuable rather than as 
a potential threat to individual freedom. This moral validity stems from the perceived 
link between state and culture, community or nation (Hutchings, 1999: 45) and as 
such provides a strong challenge to cosmopolitan positions which advocate the 
abolition of the sovereign state, or at the very least the recognition of it as valuable 
only in so far as it benefits individuals. Boundaries play very different roles in the 
philosophy of each position. For the cosmopolitan liberal, the bounded community is 
an obstacle to universal moral emancipation and the doctrines of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention prevent justice being achieved. For the communitarian, the 
bounded community is a guardian of common (sometimes liberal) values, and the 
guarantor of rights and responsibilities grounded in social contract.2 State boundaries 
are politically and morally significant.
Despite supporting state sovereignty, communitarianism is not just a morality of 
states by another name. The morality of states view holds that states have rights of 
sovereignty and non-intervention for instrumental reasons – to enable order in the 
                                                
2 There are distinct elements of liberal internationalism in much communitarianism, in particular that 
of Michael Walzer (2000)
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system. Communitarians see these rights as attaching to states because of the intrinsic 
value of the state in constituting the identities and values of individuals within it.
The rise of the communitarian challenge in the 1980s has muddied the theoretical 
waters somewhat. Not all liberals are cosmopolitans, despite the shared Kantian roots 
and common assumptions of each position. Some remain convinced, with pre-1945 
liberals, that freedom is best protected by supporting the liberal internationalist 
principles of sovereignty and national self-determination. Theorists such as Walzer 
(1992) describe themselves as liberal, but advocate distinctively communitarian 
positions. In fact, it seems that John Rawls, the theorist who inspired the resurgence 
of thinking about community, is a communitarian himself in his views on 
international ethics. Beitz argues that social liberalism, a ‘progressive, internationalist 
descendant’ of the morality of states view and closely resembling what I have 
described as communitarianism, is best represented by Rawls’ 1999 Law of Peoples
(Beitz, 1999b: 518). According to Beitz, Rawls and other social liberals take the 
position that ‘state-level societies have the primary responsibility for the well-being 
of their own people, while the international community serves to establish and 
maintain background conditions in which just domestic societies can develop and 
flourish’ (Beitz, 1999b: 518). The agents of international justice are therefore states. 
‘Social liberalism holds that the problem of international justice is one of fairness to 
societies (or peoples) whereas cosmopolitan liberalism holds that it is fairness to 
persons’ (Beitz, 1999b: 515). The Law of Peoples does seem to be more a 
communitarian work than a cosmopolitan one, and Rawls has been heavily criticised 
for not following through on what theorists such as Beitz (1999b) and Allen 
Buchanan (2000) see as the logic of his own position. However, a judgment of the 
extent to which Walzer and Rawls are liberals rather than communitarians is not my 
concern here. I am focussing on the cosmopolitan liberal position as this seems to be 
the direction in which liberal political theory is moving, but I fully acknowledge that 
liberal theorists differ in their views of the international, with some being much closer
to communitarianism than cosmopolitanism. In the next section, I will outline some 
of the problems with cosmopolitan liberalism, but note that communitarian positions 
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cannot offer us solutions to them. Both cosmopolitan liberalism and 
communitarianism rely on ultimately unsatisfactory conceptions of agency.
2:3 Challenges to Cosmopolitan Liberalism
This chapter concerns conceptions of agency within liberalism and cosmopolitanism, 
so, rather than documenting the whole range of the critiques of these doctrines from 
within political theory, I will examine only those challenges which relate to the 
individualist account of agency outlined in section 2:1 above. There are three 
principal challenges to such a view. The first deals with the ontology of the 
individual: do we have good reasons to believe that individuals have the 
characteristics and capacities upon which cosmopolitan liberals ground their ethics? I 
argue that we do not, leading to the second challenge, which disputes the portrayal of 
the individual as a natural category and traces its political and economic heritage and 
effects. This challenge exposes the tensions within cosmopolitan liberalism over the 
redistribution of wealth. The final challenge examines the epistemology of agency 
and argues that both cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism fail to generate 
workable accounts of agency from the foundations they rely upon.
2:3:1 The Ontology of Individualism
Cosmopolitan liberal ethics are grounded on a particular conception of agency: a 
supposedly neutral conception of the individual, sovereign or autonomous, rational 
and volitional by nature; an ‘uncaused cause’. However, there are significant 
problems with this model. It requires that agents have preferences and identities 
which are formed prior to social interaction and that any social attachments they have 
are freely chosen rather than in any way constitutive: i.e., that the self is 
‘unencumbered’ (Sandel, 1984). This position has been roundly criticised by the 
communitarian theorists discussed above (in particular, MacIntyre (1981); Sandel
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(1982); Taylor (1985 & 1989)), who argue that there is no such thing as the pre-social 
agent – we achieve agency only through participation in social institutions and in the 
enactment of social roles. The individual, on this view, cannot exist before society: 
our identities stem from our embeddedness in social relations and our psychological 
attachments to those close to us, and are not established prior to them. 
Mervyn Frost argues a similar point while setting out his ‘constitutive theory’ (Frost, 
1996). According to Frost, we are constituted as free individuals only through 
participation in social institutions, which are grounded in certain norms. The 
individual is constituted through a variety of institutions, starting with the family. 
Within the family we are constituted by care – the love we have for our family and 
them for us – and by membership. Beyond the family, our individuality is more fully 
developed within civil society, through which we can realise our ends due to the 
institution of private property. Being able to own and sell goods gives us a way to 
differentiate ourselves from the group which is lacking within the family. At a higher 
level still, we are constituted as individuals within states. Citizenship is argued by 
Frost to be imperative to the sense of self (evidenced by the number of times through 
history it has been fought for by those denied it) so it is simply not possible to be a 
free individual without citizenship (Frost, 1996: 137-159). The individual cannot 
exist before society, for it is society that makes her.  
The liberal model also requires a dualism which is difficult, if not impossible, to 
sustain. To accept it, we must see the ‘natural world’ as a deterministic arena of cause 
and effect, but the human world as non-natural, and characterised by volitional or 
intentional action outside the realm of causal laws. In some mysterious way, human 
beings must have the power to act, at times, outside the causal rules which govern the 
natural world. 
The sovereign individuals of liberal theory behave independently, calculating costs 
and benefits in any situation and making decisions according to their personal 
preferences. However, we do not seem to behave as isolated individuals with any 
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frequency. Experiments in the field of social psychology show the effects of the 
influence of other actors and of social constructs such as role and authority upon 
individuals (Asch (1956); Crutchfield (1954); Milgram (1974); Zimbardo et al
(1973)). Pressures to conform and to obey lead to individuals behaving in surprising 
and highly irrational ways, entirely contrary to the predictions of individualistic 
approaches such as rational choice theory. This behaviour, which conforms to social 
rules or norms such as obeying authority, suggests not just that individuals are 
substantially affected by outside forces, but that they possess some form of collective 
agency. There is nothing in the world that individuals can relate to independently as a 
norm or a rule, so no way to explain people interpreting and applying these rules in 
strikingly similar ways. The only way to explain this is to assume some sort of 
collective practice – a shared sense of what the rules mean. For these rules to endure 
(which they clearly do), we must be constantly aware of how others are interpreting 
and acting upon them and adjust our own behaviour accordingly – we must be social
in our behaviour, not individual. Barnes argues that widespread behaviour in 
correspondence with norms can only be explained if agents have a ‘prior non-rational 
inclination towards agreement and co-ordination’ (Barnes, 2000: 56); and because of 
this possess the collective agency to form and maintain social practices: ‘… specific, 
visible instances of rule use, wherein fellow members, predisposed to act in co-
ordination, sustain, through their collective agency in relation to rules, an ongoing 
agreement in their practice as they apply them.’ (Barnes, 2000: 135)  Some readers 
may be uncomfortable with talk of prior inclinations and predispositions, as it 
suggests biological explanations for aspects of behaviour. This is true – but then so 
does Kantian rationalism: rational capacity is judged to be a hard-wired element of 
the human being – part of our nature – by theories which are grounded upon it.
Instances of collective action such as demonstrations and strikes are particularly 
problematic for individualist theories. Perhaps the most well-known failure of hyper-
individualist rational choice theory is its inability to explain why people vote. 
According to the theory, the costs of voting (such as taking time off from 
employment and spending money to get to the polling centre, as well as risking being 
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picked for jury duty) far outweigh any potential rewards (which would occur only if 
the individual cast the deciding vote). The theory must therefore predict that 
individuals will ‘free ride’ and let others decide the election. Calling collective 
actions irrational does not get us very far, and in fact many such actions seem to be 
highly rational if individuals are not calculating based on their own costs and 
benefits, but those of the group.
There is good reason therefore to doubt that we can exist as agents prior to 
interaction, or that we calculate actions or act independently in the majority of 
situations we find ourselves in. To what extent is this damaging to cosmopolitan 
liberalism? Opinions differ. Most liberal theorists do not subscribe to this ontological 
individualism. Rather, their theories are methodologically individualist, asserting that 
‘facts about society and social phenomena are to be explained solely in terms of facts 
about individuals’ or normatively individualist, holding that individuals should be the 
referent objects of morality (Lukes, 1968: 120). Is this enough to avoid the criticisms 
outlined above? I argue that it is not, in either case.
Methodological individualism must be based on individualist ontology, and, because 
of this, has very limited explanatory power. Steven Lukes (1968) shows that 
methodological individualist arguments must assume that there are non-social facts 
about individuals available to use to explain social phenomena. Using social facts to 
explain social phenomena defeats the purpose of the approach. Lukes goes on to 
argue that the only facts available to explain social phenomena in a non-trivial way 
are actually social facts. Non-social facts about, for instance, the drives and appetites 
postulated by Thomas Hobbes and Sigmund Freud, or genetics, or the central nervous 
system, or the functions of the brain, cannot generate plausible theories for explaining 
social and historical phenomena. Only by introducing facts which presuppose social 
context, such as co-operation and power, can explanations become more convincing. 
The choice appears to be between a commitment to the ontological priority of 
individuals which can only generate implausible explanations for society, or a 
rejection of methodological individualism. 
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Normative or political individualism seems at first to stand on firmer ground, as 
liberals such as John Rawls (1993) have tried to move the debate away from 
presenting liberalism as a comprehensive moral or philosophical doctrine and back to 
seeing it as a political theory. Rawls argues that liberal political institutions founded 
on a conception of justice as fairness are the best practical way to mediate between 
different interests in modern societies, as they allow the maximum freedom to all 
citizens to live their own ways of life. Liberalism can therefore be supported by an 
‘overlapping consensus’ between many different reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, or belief systems. As this support is based on political interest rather than 
epistemology, Rawls believes it escapes the criticism detailed above. However, I 
disagree: liberal political theory, like liberal philosophy, must still justify the value it 
places on freedom, and this justification cannot (at least presently) be found in an 
overlapping consensus.
All liberals and cosmopolitans can agree that the individual is the referent point of 
ethics and therefore that social practices and institutions should be judged according 
to their effects on the individuals affected by them. To operationalise this position, its 
advocates need to present criteria for judgement. What we find is that the individual 
who is normatively valued is the unencumbered individual or self, and that judgement 
of practices and institutions is based on the effects that they have on liberty. Without 
a liberal philosophy it is difficult to justify liberalism as a normative or political 
theory – liberal philosophy, with its individualist ontology, tells us why freedom is 
important. And if freedom is to be valued, then the individual must exist prior to 
society in order that she can have the freedom to choose and pursue her own 
conception of the Good. It is necessary to normative individualism that the individual 
and society can be separated (demonstrated by Rawls’ use of the metaphorical 
‘original position’, where unencumbered selves are divided away from their 
communities – Rawls (1971 & 1999)) both to make freedom meaningful as a concept, 
and also to make the judgment of institutions a rational endeavour. The normative 
position assumes that social arrangements can be altered if found wanting, so 
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supposes that the arrangements are ontologically distinct from the individuals whose 
interests they must support. 
It may be the case that cosmopolitan liberalism does not require a conception of self 
that is entirely prior to its ends and values, but it must see individuals as prior to 
communities or interaction, and it must retain a commitment to choice to support the 
commitment to freedom. Liberals cannot see ‘individualised personalities as simply 
social artefacts of a particular, Western, culture’ if their normative position is to have 
any force (Gaus & Courtland, 2003: 7). Some level of ontological individualism, with 
all its attendant criticisms, is a requirement.
Cosmopolitan liberalism is founded upon a supposedly neutral and universal 
conception of the individual agent, a conception that hides assumptions about which 
individuals are most valued. The idea of an individual prior to society implies a kind 
of universal human identity that transcends national, ethnic, gender and religious 
identities. However, feminist critics charge that the conception of the individual at the 
heart of the principal application of cosmopolitan liberal principles to international 
politics, the human rights regime, is gendered: the archetypal rights holder is male, 
head of his family, and the principal wage earner (see, in particular, Elshtain (1981 &
1987)). The roots of this characterization of the rights holder can be traced back to the 
Classical Greek distinction between the private and the public realm. The rights 
outlined in the 1948 Universal Declaration are designed to protect the individual from 
arbitrary state interference while he acts in his public capacity as a citizen of the 
polity or a unit of labour, without impinging upon his activities in the private sphere. 
As women traditionally have been confined to the private sphere, where the 
protection they need is from other individuals rather than the state, their experiences 
of violation (justified by family, religion or culture) are not covered by the human 
rights regime. Despite a great deal of work in recent years to ‘correct’ the regime and 
extend equal protections to women, critics such as MacKinnon (1993) and 
Coomaraswamy (1994) note that rights language has no resonance to many women as 
they are marginalized or excluded in the public sphere, or do not enjoy the social and 
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economic conditions and freedom from the threat of violence that make meaningful 
the status of citizen. That this can be the case even in liberal states suggests that those 
who fully enjoy status as an individual in the cosmopolitan liberal sense are 
disproportionately male.
2:3:2 Politics and Economics of the Individual
Cosmopolitan liberalism is a fundamentally Western way to view the world, 
developed in line with our historical experiences, which explains why many accept it 
as natural or self-evident. In fact, an examination of alternative political vocabularies 
shows that ‘[t]he idea that individuals have rights and that the government ought as 
far as possible to be based on the consent of the governed has great power, but it 
cannot be said to be self-evident, or to encapsulate a general truth about how the 
world necessarily is or should be’ (Brown, 2000a: 206). The idea that human beings 
are ‘individuals’ rather than just individuated and the concept of human life as a 
project are similarly not universal – they are the products of particular political 
cultures. This section examines the how and why the individual has been produced.
Prior to a politics which valued the individual, social relations in the West tended to 
be ordered around feudalism, with little room for individual rights. The Westphalian 
system began to change this by emphasising a direct relationship between the 
monarch and the subject, although this change should not be overstated. Brownlie 
explains that even though Grotius and others conceived of a natural law of nations in 
which the ruled had certain protections from their rulers, these theories ‘did not have 
much substance for their contemporaries’ (Brownlie, 1964: 437).
During the eighteenth century, new social movements fought for the recognition of 
basic individual rights. This fight is seen in the American and French revolutions and 
the subsequently issued Bills of Rights. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen was particularly important as it conceptualised individuals as 
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having rights stemming from something other than their citizenship, while also 
asserting the right of self-determination within a nation. These liberal concepts were 
quickly adopted into the rhetoric of Western states, even if not the practice, thus the 
formal equality of men (and it was only men) as members of the political community 
was established. 
There was much to be said for this new view of human life: seeing intrinsic value in 
the individual made the class or group based oppression common in feudal times 
difficult to justify or enforce. Yet modern liberalism is a child not just of changing 
social sensibilities, but also of massive economic upheaval in the West during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and as such it has both destroyed social ties and 
made new kinds of oppression possible.
Karl Polanyi (2001) describes the effects of the ‘Great Transformation’ during which 
market economics replaced the feudal system that existed in most European states 
prior to the eighteenth century. Before the market came to dominate, economic 
relations were submerged within social relations. By the end of the eighteenth century 
the economic sphere had become separate from the political sphere and social 
relations were clearly subordinate to economic relations. A conception of people as 
individuals rather than community members is necessary for a capitalist economy to 
function, as such an economy requires that there are markets for each factor of 
production, one of which is labour. In order for a labour market to be generated, 
labour must be separated from land and the other activities of life to which it was 
previously tied: ‘Traditionally, land and labour are not separates; labour forms part of 
life, land remains part of nature, life and nature form an articulate whole’ (Polanyi, 
2001: 187). The separation of the individual from her community and her land is also 
necessary to render her vulnerable to the market, for ‘the individual … is not 
threatened by starvation unless the community as a whole is in a like predicament.’ 
(Polanyi. 2001: 171). Only when social structures have been destroyed is the labourer 
‘reduced to the choice of being left without food or of offering his labour in the 
market for the price it would fetch’ (Polanyi, 2001: 172).
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To separate labour out, according to Polanyi, was to ‘annihilate all organic forms of 
existence and to replace them by a different type of organization, an atomistic and 
individual one.’ (Polanyi, 2001: 171). This annihilation was enacted through ‘the 
application of the principal of freedom of contract … [which] meant that the non-
contractual organizations of kinship, neighbourhood, profession, and creed were to be 
liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his 
freedom [to sell himself wherever he could attain the optimum price for his labour].’ 
(Polanyi, 2001: 171) This effect of liberalism on law will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Haney has looked specifically at the United States and argues that the rise of liberal 
individualism took place in the time not just of laissez-faire capitalism, but also of the 
Protestant work ethic and when ‘the cultural ethos was dominated by the ‘myth of 
rugged individualism’ (Haney, 1982: 193). He follows Weber in his view of 
Protestantism as supporting the new social relations necessitated by capitalism. 
Protestants in nineteenth century America preached that hard labour was necessary 
both to repent for original sin, and to bring about personal improvement. Weber noted 
that the commitment to work was a necessary condition for the rise of capitalism: 
‘One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of 
that but of all modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, 
was born … from the spirit of Christian asceticism.’ (Weber, 1958: 180) This ethic 
supported the individualism inherent in liberal economics by pitting each person 
against the others, seeing labour as the possession of individuals to sell to whoever 
would pay the highest price (thus breaking down social classes) and by making 
failure to do with personal effort and not position in a social system. Incidentally, 
Weber saw that while capitalism needed Protestantism to take hold, it quickly 
outgrew its religious foundations, leaving ‘the idea of duty in one’s calling [prowling] 
about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs.’ (Weber, 1958: 181). The 
contemporary critique of Western hyper-consumerism and moral decline was 
foreshadowed by Weber: 
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Where the fulfilment of the calling cannot directly be related to the 
highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need 
not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally 
abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest 
development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its 
religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely 
mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport. 
(Weber, 1958: 182)
The belief that riches were available to all, with social status now irrelevant, provided 
incentive for the labour force to work harder, and the transfer of responsibility onto 
the individual for his own success or failure kept social unrest at bay in a time of 
huge societal turbulence. Individualism also provided some level of stability and 
purpose in changing times, as support from and identity in the collective was replaced 
by the veneration of individual character.
Cosmopolitanism is implicated alongside liberalism in the production of the 
individual. From the mid-nineteenth century, as the effects of economic globalisation 
began to be debated, cosmopolitanism was argued by theorists such as Marx and 
Engels to be an ideological reflection of capitalism; justifying and allowing the 
misery that capitalism caused. The cosmopolitan positions favoured in the twentieth 
century by libertarian economists such as Friedrich von Hayek and, later, Milton 
Friedman, which support a single global market, free trade and minimal political 
interference are still open to this challenge. Opponents contend, following Marx, that 
capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction, either because of the poverty, 
exploitation and alienation it causes, or because it encourages hyper-consumerism 
which will lead to environmental destruction. Economic cosmopolitanism is rejected 
by the contemporary anti-globalisation movement for being complicit with global 
capitalism and for concealing the power politics behind its moral position. Burchill 
offers some evidence for this, arguing that the states which promote free trade 
developed behind protective barriers, and that states still do not practice what they 
preach (Burchill, 2001a: 51-54; 59). Rather than enhancing freedom, free trade works 
to further the interests of the powerful, with multinational corporations exploiting 
markets in developing countries and paying tax on the profits of this exploitation to 
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Western governments (though I argue in Chapter 7 that this may be changing). 
Burchill also notes the irony that ‘the basic procedural freedoms and rights which 
citizens in liberal democracies take for granted, including freedom of association, the 
right to organize and collectively bargain, the prevention of forced labour, and so on, 
are being denied in a number of developing East Asian societies by policies of market 
liberalization which Western liberals are encouraging.’ (Burchill, 2001a: 43). 
Contemporary cosmopolitan liberals have difficulty accommodating the economic 
foundations and implications of the concept of the individual they rely on so strongly 
to ground their ethics. Some simply reject the association, defining economic 
liberalism and economic cosmopolitanism as distinct from the moral or political 
versions of these doctrines. Contemporary liberal theorists differ substantially over 
private property and the market. For some, property and liberty are fundamentally 
linked: libertarians such as Steiner (1994) see property as a form of freedom. From 
the eighteenth century onwards, most liberals have seen private property as necessary 
to freedom – we must be able to sell our labour and use our capital as we please, so 
must be able to make contracts, run businesses, spend or save money and so on. Only 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the role of the market and 
private property in granting freedom seriously questioned, and through the twentieth 
century optimism grew about the ability of the state to regulate the market, resulting 
in support for limited redistribution by the state in the work of the century’s most 
celebrated liberal (Rawls, 1971). Liberal thinking also tends to vary geographically 
over the role of economics: Gaus and Courtland describe English liberalism as 
centring on ‘religious toleration, government by consent, personal and, especially, 
economic freedom’, French liberalism as more closely bound up with secularism and 
democracy and American liberalism as often combining ‘a devotion to personal 
liberty with an antipathy to capitalism’ (Gaus and Courtland, 2003: 1). 
This difference in approach can be seen in discussion of economic rights. The human 
rights regime is grounded on ideas of substantive justice, but the role of economic 
man in liberalism leads to the elevation of civil and political rights above social and 
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economic rights. This has been criticised by American cosmopolitans such as Henry 
Shue (1980), Charles Beitz (1999a) and Thomas Pogge (1999 & 2002), who question 
the separation of global distributive justice from the broader goal of global justice, 
but identify as liberals. They argue that human freedom cannot be adequately 
promoted when so many of the world’s people are desperately poor and therefore that 
the issue of global inequality should have a place alongside the promotion of freedom 
in any discussion of human rights. This notion has met with a great deal of resistance 
in the West, partly due to the concern that if economic rights prove very difficult to 
achieve, then the entire human rights regime may suffer, and partly due to the much 
less defensible fear that to admit the importance of economic rights in achieving 
human flourishing would mean giving up some of the resources the region has long 
enjoyed.
Cosmopolitan liberals cannot simply reject the economic implications of their 
doctrine. Economics was not only necessary to the founding of liberalism, but certain 
economic principles are held (implicitly or explicitly) to be normatively valuable. 
Free markets and free trade, for instance, seem to follow logically from placing value 
on choice. The fact they work against the material interests of many shows the 
instability within the doctrine. Burchill notes that there is a fundamental tension in 
liberalism over the role of economics that cannot be wished away and is far from 
being reconciled. He sets out the opposing positions as follows: ‘the market view of 
human beings as consumers maximizing their utilities and the ethical view of humans 
as striving to realize their potential’ (Burchill, 2001a: 29). The development of 
capitalism is intrinsic to the history of the liberal individual, but dismissed by many 
of liberalism’s modern proponents. 
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2:3:3 The Epistemological Impasse
All of this is not to suggest that the ontology, politics or economics of 
communitarianism is to be preferred. Communitarians tend to reify and essentialise 
culture in the same way that cosmopolitan liberals reify and essentialise the 
individual. Cultures are often assumed, in the face of a great deal of evidence to the 
contrary, to be closed or bounded, and no position is available from which to criticise 
foreign traditions. Given that cultures have political and economic effects (they work 
to establish and justify sets of power relations, such as control over women by men 
(Moller Okin, 1999)), a normative theory which offers no possibility of critique for 
anyone outside a particular community is unsatisfactory. 
The concept of agency in communitarianism is also left wanting. Where 
cosmopolitan liberalism assumes free will, communitarianism implies determinism. 
Neither cultural change nor individual agency (in the form of critically evaluating our 
ends and our social attachments) can be accommodated in this ontology. The self is 
created by culture, but no account is given of any agency in that creation: it is not at 
all clear what is doing the work here – how does culture create anything unless it has 
independent agency? Once we’ve been (mysteriously) created as selves, the majority 
of our behaviour follows socially conditioned routines and habits: we do not exercise 
agency, but act out social roles. Culture is a structural phenomenon from which 
identities and selves are generated, but little thought is given to how cultures are 
created and maintained. Culture also tends to be conflated with (or at least not 
adequately differentiated from) community, society and state, so the sovereign state 
system becomes both inevitable and normatively justified with reference to its 
apparent necessity in constructing the self. Much communitarian theorising seems 
perilously close to collapsing into a realist ‘morality of states’ (Hutchings, 1999: 44-
46).
The most intractable problem faced by both cosmopolitan liberal and communitarian 
positions is to do with their epistemology. Both sets of theories are foundational: they 
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rely on a correspondence theory of truth, or the idea that truth is somehow ‘out there’, 
separate from our theorising and acting. The foundations of each position are 
assumed to be external to the theory itself, thus providing independent criteria to 
measure theoretical propositions against. The foundation of cosmopolitan liberalism 
is the pre-social individual and her needs, which supports a universalist ethics 
advocating a common set of rights and duties. The foundation of communitarianism 
is the reified community, grounding a particularist ethics which sees morality as 
culturally bounded and values as being generated through cultural traditions. 
Molly Cochran argues that the foundational epistemology of each set of theories leads 
to a structural opposition between them, making any attempts at accommodation 
between the two sides futile (Cochran, 1999). The fundamental conflict over how 
moral claims are to be grounded is not possible to resolve within the epistemology 
employed by each side. Communitarians see the cosmopolitan account of the liberal 
individual as privileging a post-Enlightenment, Western view of the world, itself 
particularistic. Cosmopolitans argue that there is no justification for privileging the 
community, and to do so is to ignore the morally primary and common identity of 
people as human beings rather than members of communities. These positions are 
simply incompatible unless their foundations are up for question – they speak past, 
rather than to, each other.
Epistemological concerns do not just impact on theorising, but on practice. MacIntyre 
(1981) suggests that modern, liberal individualist moral discourse in and of itself is 
incapable of reconciling conflicting positions, because its foundations depend upon 
beliefs now rejected in Western culture. The concept of the pre-social individual only 
makes sense if we hold the teleological belief that man has a purpose or good which 
he strives to reach, and the Judeo-Christian belief that morality comes from divine 
law. These beliefs no longer hold sway in many Western cultures, yet we are left 
without new beliefs on which to base practice, as contemporary society has stripped 
away shared social norms. The individual has become the sole arbiter of values and 
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the author of her own identity. Without social norms to frame them, moral arguments 
are simply statements of individual preference: morality is just emotivism. 
A range of theorists, Cochran included, have proposed anti-or non-foundational ethics 
in order to move beyond the epistemological problems faced by both cosmopolitan 
and communitarian theories. I will discuss some of these positions in Chapter 5, when 
I return to a consideration of agency. They all provide innovative ways of thinking 
about the issues raised in this chapter, but they remain outside the mainstream of 
theorising, which is my focus here. 
The mainstream is monopolized by debates within and between cosmopolitan liberal 
and (to a lesser extent) communitarian positions. These debates cannot be resolved as 
the epistemological impasse between universalism and particularism is based on 
inadequate ontology. The sovereign individual and the essentialised community are 
set up in opposition to each other, but the foundations chosen by each side bear 
striking similarities. Each is idealised and treated as sovereign or autonomous, with 
ethics being ‘read off’ the ideal type. Either the asocial individual or the asocial state 
is elevated to being the ‘independent loc[us] of moral authority’, so each ethics 
highlights the separateness of its constituent units (Warner, 1991: 3). Identity exists 
prior to interaction in each case, with no real account offered in either view of how 
individual and communal identities develop and change – each theory is static. 
National self-determination is justified for communities using the same reasoning that 
individual self-determination is justified for persons: each must be left alone as far as 
possible to pursue its own projects. These projects are implied to be self contained 
and self referential: in terms of association with others, the path to human perfection 
apparently requires only that we do not impede our fellow travellers. Even the 
communitarian position has little to say about sociability; about the dynamism of 
collective life. Ethics in international relations has, to a large extent, become a choice 
between privileging an unrealistic individual or an undesirable state. Neither side can 
make convincing claims against the other, yet neither can accommodate the intuitions 
which render its opposite attractive. The cosmopolitan liberal can neither explain nor 
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understand the importance of community in shaping human identity and interests, or 
the psychological value of local or particularistic identifications. The communitarian 
has no basis from which to call for action when the community she so venerates 
attacks the individuals it is supposed to protect. As Hutchings argues, ‘[t]he idea of 
international ethics is premised on the acceptance of a gulf between politics (nature/ 
reality/ particularity) and morality (reason, ideality, universality)’ (Hutchings, 1999: 
47). Both sides take idealised and dichotomous positions on the individual and the 
collective, with no account of sociability or politics, and the drawbacks of each lead 
to impoverished accounts of human agency. 
2.4 Conclusion
Liberalism and, more recently, cosmopolitanism have come to dominate Western 
thinking so successfully that the idea of the sovereign individual, who has rights by
virtue of her humanity, is largely accepted. This chapter has called the ontology, 
history and epistemology of the doctrines into question, and shown that the sovereign 
individual is neither a universal nor an unproblematic concept. 
Individualism developed both because of dissatisfaction with previous, 
communitarian, conceptions of the value of the person, and because the emerging 
economic system required people to be separated from their communal support 
systems and made vulnerable to the market. This second foundation of individualism 
is often forgotten, particularly by liberal and cosmopolitan thinkers. The next chapter 
will explore the conceptions of responsibility which follow from the view of agency 
within the dominant cosmopolitan liberal discourse and outline how these have 
influenced the practice of international relations through the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 3: LEGALITY, CRIMINALITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY.
The discussion in the previous chapter highlights the links between agency and 
responsibility. Our ability to choose how to act, for the liberal, is the basis upon 
which we are held responsible for what we do. As long as we are not forced to take 
one action or another – as long as we could have done otherwise – then we can be 
held to account, and may be deserving of praise or blame, for our behaviour. Much of 
the debate between cosmopolitan/ liberal and communitarian positions in IPT 
concerns responsibility or obligation as well as the nature of agency: principally, the 
responsibility we have towards others in our political communities versus duties we 
have to outsiders. Responsibility is seen by cosmopolitans as being generated by our 
common membership of the human race, and by communitarians as being generated 
by our communal identity or by an implicit contract with our compatriots. Strict 
cosmopolitans such as Singer (1972) argue that any responsibilities we have are owed 
to all humankind, so those local to us cannot be favoured unless to do so is to the 
advantage of all. A more moderate cosmopolitanism (see, for instance, Barry (1995)) 
can allow for some special responsibilities to our compatriots while still holding that 
we have a universal responsibility to aid any individual who needs our help, 
regardless of where she is in the world. Communitarians argue that responsibility is 
generated by membership of the community, so minimal universal duties exist.  
This chapter will focus on responsibility within cosmopolitan and liberal thought, 
and, in particular, the relationship within such thought of morality to law, which has 
led to the individualisation and legalisation of responsibility. I argue that this 
conception of responsibility is impoverished for three reasons: firstly, because the 
role of law is problematic within liberalism and cannot do the work that liberals rely 
on it to do, secondly, because the individual agency implied by a liberal, legal 
conception of responsibility is difficult to identify at the international level, and 
thirdly, because the focus on law as a neutral, objective arbiter within cosmopolitan 
liberalism denies the relevance of political and economic power in the formation and 
64
execution of the law. Despite cosmopolitan law being touted by its supporters as 
providing more protection to the individual by combating the impunity inherent 
within the sovereign state system, these three factors actually serve to limit the 
possibilities for encouraging responsibility within contemporary international 
discourse. 
Most discussion of responsibility within liberalism is concerned with identifying the 
agent responsible for outcomes which have already occurred: responsibility is 
retrospective or ex post. Consideration of prospective or ex ante responsibility is 
largely to do with the identification and protection of rights, and these responsibilities 
tend to be institutionalised. Freedom or liberty of the individual is the highest moral 
good, and that freedom is most threatened by arbitrary state action. To prevent the 
state from impinging upon the freedom of the individual, the individual is afforded 
‘natural’ rights (i.e. grounded in natural law, or human nature). These rights structure 
moral relationships in liberal societies by outlining the obligations that political 
institutions have towards the individual, and these obligations tend to be negative, i.e. 
they require the state not to act in particular ways. Liberalism has little to say about 
prospective intra-societal responsibility, for three main reasons. Firstly, liberals are 
keen not to impinge on the freedom of the individual any more than is absolutely 
necessary, and secondly, they do not believe such responsibility to be necessary, 
given their belief in an underlying harmony of interests. The final reason is that moral 
concern within liberalism is focused upon the individual and her relationship to the 
state, because the state has the potential to do most damage to individual freedom. 
Rather than being implicated in the everyday practice of all individuals, responsibility 
is largely procedural and institutional: it is written into the workings of the liberal 
state. Rights are best protected by certain kinds of (liberal, democratic, constitutional) 
institutions, and through the application of law. Barry Barnes notes that 
responsibilities traditionally located in the family are transferred in modern liberal 
states to administrators, skilled professionals and technical experts: ‘most of the 
responsibilities attendant upon birth and death are in their hands, as are those relating 
to the health, education and basic well-being of children; and they share responsibility 
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… for the basic economic provision in family units’ (Barnes, 2000: 94). Where rights 
do impact on interpersonal relationships, they do so only as side constraints to the 
self-interested pursuit of the Good, valued as the principal goal of human life by 
liberal theorists. The state is morally and legally responsible to the individual to 
protect her freedom by not acting arbitrarily to limit it, and the individual is morally 
responsible to herself to develop and pursue her own idea of the good. 
Cosmopolitanism has taken the liberal idea of natural rights within communities and 
expanded it beyond national borders. For the cosmopolitan, we have rights by virtue 
of our common humanity: ‘human rights’. These rights should be protected by the 
states in which we live, but if our state fails to protect us, an international institutional 
regime now exists which establishes responsibilities to prevent and punish abuses of 
our rights. These responsibilities are established through an elaborate new system of 
international law, and are grounded on the assertion of the innate value of the 
individual discussed in Chapter 2. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 examine the importance of 
law to liberal conceptions of responsibility and document how that emphasis on law 
has translated, via cosmopolitanism, to conceptions of responsibility in the 
international realm.
3.1 Liberalism and the Law
The principal feature of the cosmopolitan liberal view of responsibility, beyond its 
focus on rights, is the legalisation of the concept. Law plays a central role in liberal 
theory. The rule of law is judged to be the best way to safeguard the individual from 
the arbitrary action of states, by requiring that government authority only be exercised 
in accordance with laws adopted through legitimate procedures. Liberalism in general 
sees law as an efficient and rational way to regulate relationships previously governed 
by violence – whether those relationships are between individuals, states and 
individuals, or states. Law is valued so highly by liberals because it is conceptualised 
as the apolitical expression of an objective moral code. Law is aligned with morality, 
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so moral responsibility is defined and discharged through law. This is true 
particularly of criminal law: criminal behaviour is seen as differing qualitatively from 
illegal behaviour to the extent that it breaches societal moral codes, though contract 
and civil law are also underpinned by normative claims. Obedience to the law is all 
that is needed to satisfactorily fulfil one’s moral responsibilities in a liberal polis. 
This legal approach to ethics can be seen in the expansion of liberalism in both 
domestic and international realms. Liberalism does not just value law, but particular 
types of law, and so has had significant effects upon legal frameworks and the 
construction of responsibility within them. Before I document the effect of liberalism 
on law beyond borders, this section will discuss the implications of the rise of 
liberalism on domestic law. 
Haney argues that the principal effect of the rise of liberalism in domestic polities 
was a move away from doctrines of collective responsibility to doctrines where the 
primary responsibility lay with individuals, with a new emphasis on individual 
autonomy and personal character or disposition. A person’s legal situation ‘was no 
longer defined in terms of his place in a hierarchy of social status, but came to depend 
instead upon his personal efficiency and capability in a capitalist economy’ (Haney, 
1982: 194). As Polanyi noted, the principal of freedom of contract became paramount 
as relationships of social status were replaced by contractual relations. Parties to 
contracts were seen as free and autonomous under what became known as ‘will 
theory’. ‘Will theory assumed that parties were equally capable of knowing what they 
wanted, of freely choosing the circumstances under which they would get it, and of 
expressing contractual agreements whose ‘fairness’ was a matter for the autonomous 
parties to decide themselves’ (Haney, 1982: 208). Contract law suggested both that 
all parties were equally able to contract with each other (thus writing out the effects 
of differences in power between parties, particularly important in, for instance, 
negotiations between employers and employees) and that there was moral value in the 
pursuit of self interest and individual wealth (giving lie to the assertion that liberalism 
does not privilege any particular idea of the Good). 
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The effect of economic transformation and individualism on the criminal law was 
also profound. The focus of such law changed from the punishment of sinners to the 
protection of property and of the rich from the poor. Criminal law in Western states 
came to reflect the three key assumptions about human behaviour implied by the 
individualism which grounds liberalism, namely that: ‘1) individuals are the causal 
locus of behaviour; 2) socially problematic and illegal behaviour therefore arises from 
some defect in the individual persons who perform it; and, 3) such behaviour can be 
changed or eliminated only by effecting changes in the nature or characteristics of 
those persons’ (Haney, 1982: 195). 
‘The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence is that a crime is the act of a 
voluntary and responsible agent who chooses between the lawful and the unlawful’ 
(Haney, 1982: 209). The doctrines of free will and individual responsibility are the 
foundations of contemporary Western criminal law and it makes sense to focus any 
response to criminal activity on punishing or reforming individuals if the individual is 
seen as the causal locus of criminal behaviour, the agent. Nineteenth century 
liberalism valued free will very highly, thus it conceived of deviance as a sickness 
rather than something determined by physical or psychological traits of criminals (a 
view which had been popular in the eighteenth century). This fitted both with the 
science of criminology, which, at the time, suggested that there were criminal ‘types’, 
and with liberal support for the doctrine of free will. This sickness was treated in 
prisons, which were used to change and reform individuals and to give an example to 
others of what would happen if they broke the law. Prisons also functioned to support 
the new market economy - state institutions took the ‘burden’ of caring for and 
rehabilitating defective individuals – prisoners, orphans, the disabled, and the insane 
– away from the community to ensure maximum labour productivity. 
Haney concludes that, in the nineteenth century: ‘[t]he legal system, in harmony with 
widely held psychological theories about the causal primacy of individuals, acted to 
transform all structural problems into matters of moral depravity and personal 
shortcoming’ (Haney, 1982: 226). This approach became institutionalised in the 
criminal justice and prison systems, and, despite great progress in social science and 
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fundamental challenges to methodological individualism, remains embedded in both 
domestic and international criminal law. Again, as highlighted in Chapter 2, the 
historical context of liberalism and the economic interests it serves should cause us to 
question claims of neutrality in its central concepts of agency and responsibility.
The epistemological status of law itself also changed through the nineteenth century 
as economic life was transformed: law was increasingly viewed in secular, 
instrumental and positivist terms. Laws were less about sin and more about 
controlling a constructed market place and protecting property – and as such, laws 
became divorced from social codes. Rather than being based on natural, or God’s, 
law and expressing the moral values of the community, laws became seen by critics 
of liberalism as constructed to facilitate the realisation of individual desires and to 
support the distribution of economic and political power in society. This changing 
view of the foundations of law (from religious and natural to secular and contingent) 
caused a crisis of legitimacy for Western law, which was solved by re-founding law 
on the principal of (natural) reason and making the study of it a science. Law students 
were taught that law is objective and neutral, and should be seen as entirely separate 
from politics (which is subjective, arbitrary and value-laden). Recasting law as 
founded on reason also had the effect of privileging the status of the judiciary. Walzer 
argues that, as liberalism is founded on an idea of natural rights, liberals tend to see 
philosophers and judges as having some special understanding of the relevant issues, 
so assume that courts are the best places to define and protect rights (Walzer, 1984). 
This assumption and resultant institutional design and practice can be witnessed in 
the legalisation of both domestic and international rights questions.
The re-grounding of law on reason has not entirely solved the problem faced by 
liberalism, and the positivist view of law that began to gain credence in the nineteenth 
century remains a real threat to the doctrine. One of chief tenets of liberal ideology is 
that political, economic and social transactions are controlled by the rule of law. But 
if law is seen as positive or socially constructed, then the state can quite legitimately 
eliminate freedoms as long as it acts according to the rule of law, for instance by 
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giving ‘fair notice’ of its actions to restrict freedom, and generally by following the 
correct procedures of the law. Thus, ‘liberalism must depend on a natural law of 
humans to guarantee from the rule of law a sizeable zone of freedom’ (Gray Carlson, 
1993: 266-267). This dependence on a theory of natural law in turn creates significant 
problems. Liberalism needs to separate law from politics to protect individuals from 
arbitrary political action. However, this is impossible, as the ‘zones of freedom’ 
necessary for individuals to flourish, though phrased as apparently determinate law, 
are necessarily constructed though language, using phrases such as ‘due process’ and 
‘good faith’, and thus open to interpretation. Conflicting normative views and 
political positions find their way into law through this process of interpretation. Some 
see this as beneficial, as scope for interpretation allows legal norms to be adapted to 
fit new contexts. But a true liberal position must reject the imposition of politics into 
the law. Dworkin (1978, 1985b & 1986) exemplifies this position – he contends that 
there is only one right answer to any question of law, and that law and morality 
cannot be separated – the role of judges is to apply the law as it is to find the right 
answer, and if the existing law does not provide the answer, they must consult the 
moral code of society. The key idea that Dworkin’s work provides is that of ‘fit’ –
judges must not and do not make political decisions between equally viable answers, 
but rather search for the solution which best ‘fits’ legal practice and existing law. The 
Critical Legal Studies critique of liberal jurisprudence argues that there is no best fit –
law is radically indeterminate as it reflects ideological struggles in society. Thus 
almost every decision judges make entails making subjective choices between equally 
compelling positions, therefore making new law, and each such decision is by its 
nature political. In terms of liberal democratic process this is unacceptable because 
the rule of law requires a separation of powers between the legislature and the 
judiciary, but more importantly it is unacceptable to liberalism because it blurs the 
line between power politics and neutral law.
Liberalism ends up, according to Gray Carlson, stuck in a serious dilemma: 
‘Naturality reduces liberalism to unproven dogma. Conventionality [i.e. positivism] 
reduces liberalism to politics.’ (Gray Carlson, 1993: 277). There are great difficulties 
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for the ideology to be found on each side. If naturalism is claimed to justify the 
‘Right’ (i.e. the structure of political institutions), it is very difficult to understand 
why it is not used (or at least not explicitly used) to justify a particular conception of 
the ‘Good’. If there is such a thing as natural law – if there are naturally correct 
answers to how we should structure our societies and discharge our responsibilities, 
this does suggest, as many of liberalism’s critics have pointed out, that liberalism 
entails a view that there are naturally correct answers to what we should value and 
how we should live.
This debate between liberalism and its critics over the epistemological status of law 
(as discovered or produced), is far from resolved. Yet, despite its problematic 
foundations, cosmopolitan liberalism has been successful in exporting its 
individualism and legalism into the international realm. The international 
responsibility of both states and individuals is now defined largely in terms of rights, 
with these rights being protected by an international legal regime of unprecedented 
scale.
3.2 Human Rights and the Development of International Law
The triumph of cosmopolitan liberalism since 1945 can be witnessed in the new 
importance of the individual in international law and practice. The appeal of 
liberalism in the West along with the failure of the international community to 
manage its affairs peacefully by ascribing agency and responsibility only to states has 
led to the increasing individualisation and legalisation of international relations. 
Cosmopolitan thinkers took the liberal focus on rights and law and wrote it large 
upon the global scene, which has resulted in significant changes to conceptions of 
responsibility in international relations. Gradually, through the twentieth century, 
individuals have gained both rights and responsibilities. They, rather than states, are 
now conceived as the causal locus of the behaviours which are of most concern in IR 
and these behaviours have therefore been written into international law as crimes. 
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There has been a double movement of, firstly, the criminalisation of international law, 
i.e. an increase in the amount of international law which is concerned with identifying 
and prosecuting criminal acts and, secondly, the internationalisation of criminal law, 
i.e. the prosecution of those responsible for criminal acts above the level of the 
sovereign state. Whereas the communitarian sees obligation as being generated within 
states, cosmopolitan liberals appeal to a universal code of right and wrong in order to 
establish responsibility beyond national borders. They use law, the favoured tool of 
liberalism, to establish and control these new structures of responsibility. This section 
briefly traces the development of international law designed both to protect and to 
prosecute the individual. 
First, a caveat: much international legal practice remains constituted of cases 
assigning civil responsibility to states for breaches of international treaties. 
International law in the most part has been developed by states to regulate their 
relationships and most international law still concerns the actions of states. States are 
the primary subjects of this law and the International Court of Justice, as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN, is authorised to settle disputes between states and issue 
advisory opinions. States who the ICJ finds against are not judged to be criminal –
rather they are seen as breaching legal codes they have freely acceded to as sovereign 
bodies – their acts are illegal rather than criminal, in a way analogous to domestic 
civil responsibility in contract law. The International Court of Justice has no 
jurisdiction over matters involving individual criminal responsibility.
However, through the twentieth century, there has been an increasing focus on the 
welfare of individuals in the form of the human rights regime, and also a trend 
towards holding individuals responsible for international crimes. I explained, in 
Chapter 2, the emergence of the human rights regime after the Second World War. 
The rhetoric of the regime may be very powerful, but progress has been slow towards 
assigning responsibility for human rights protection beyond the state. The Preamble 
to the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights asserts that human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law, but, due to the political stalemate that was the Cold War, 
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it is not until the 1990s that major shifts towards the emergence of a legal regime 
genuinely capable of protecting those rights took place. The emerging regime 
concentrates on protecting civilians from the gross breaches of rights involved in 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and consists in a variety of 
treaties, ad hoc tribunals, regional courts and the new International Criminal Court. 
War crimes prosecutions themselves are not new. There are records of such trials 
dating back as far as Ancient Greece, but, until the twentieth century, suspected war 
criminals were tried under domestic law in national courts (meaning, in practice, that 
the perpetrators were safe from prosecution if they held senior positions within the 
state). In 1872, Gustav Moynier, one of the founders of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, called for the creation of a permanent international criminal court. 
The process of its creation took more than 100 years, and, understandably given the 
liberal belief that law is preferable to violence as a method of managing relationships, 
most moves towards it coincided with the end of major conflicts. 
During both the First and Second World Wars there were calls for the international 
prosecution of leaders of belligerent states for acts of aggression and gross violations 
of the laws of war. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles provided for an ad hoc international 
court to try the Kaiser and German military officials. No prosecutions ever took place 
as the Netherlands granted asylum for the Kaiser, and Germany refused to hand over 
suspects, but the demand marked a shift in thinking in favour of holding individuals 
internationally responsible for war crimes. During the Second World War an 
international criminal court was proposed, but rejected by the Allies who instead 
established ad hoc International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. These 
tribunals began the process of the international criminalisation of acts constituting 
serious human rights violations, rejected the principle of sovereign immunity and 
began to see individuals as the relevant actors (and therefore hold them responsible) 
instead of states or groups. 
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The Cold War led to deep divisions in the UN and its various bodies, and work on 
international criminal law lay almost dormant for more than thirty years. Only after 
1989 did demands for a permanent, centralised system grow again. Perhaps 
surprisingly, given the charges made by various scholars that the international 
institutional system is a tool of Western liberal hegemony, it was not the West who 
instigated the campaign for an international criminal court, but Trinidad and Tobago, 
who were struggling to control activities related to the international drugs trade taking 
place on their soil and in 1989 requested that the UN reconvened the International 
Law Commission to establish a permanent institution. 
Reports of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia overtook the work of the 
Commission: in 1993, the Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to prosecute such acts. A year later, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established, this time in 
response to the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, also as a 
subsidiary organ of Security Council. Questions remain over whether the tribunals 
were an appropriate response to these atrocities or a more cynical, low-cost way of 
responding to the demand that ‘something be done’ Still, the tribunals have set a 
number of important precedents in terms of both the situations and the people over 
which the jurisdiction of international criminal law extends. Previous war crimes 
trials had all been concerned with acts which took place in the context of inter-state 
war, however the ICTY has jurisdiction to prosecute persons responsible for crimes 
against humanity whether committed in an international or an internal armed conflict, 
while the ICTR Statute makes no reference to armed conflict at all, implying that 
these crimes can take place in peacetime, within a state. This is a highly significant 
step in terms of enforcing human rights but also in its challenge to state sovereignty. 
The trial of Slobodan Milosevic at the ICTY, for 66 counts of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide, was the first time in history that a former head of 
state has been prosecuted for international crimes, and the conviction of Jean 
Kambanda, former Prime Minister of Rwanda, marked the first time that a head of 
government was convicted for the crime of genocide. 
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Despite the will of the international community to bring the perpetrators of atrocities 
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to justice, the tribunals soon demonstrated 
major drawbacks. Principle among these is the enormous cost and slow speed of the 
proceedings. The monies paid to the ICTY between 1993 and 2006-07 total 
$1,243,157,722. The ICTR has received more than $550m between 1996 and 2005. 
Yet the number of trials completed is astonishingly low. These sums of money have 
paid for 62 trials in twelve years at the ICTY. Of these, at the time of writing (June 
2006), 14 are at the appeal stage, 40 have received their final sentence, and 8 have 
been acquitted. A further 8 are on trial (this does not include Milosevic’s trial, which 
was ongoing at the time of his death) and 43 are at the pre-trial stage. 6 accused are 
still at large, including Karadic (former political leader of the Bosnian Serbs) and 
Mladic (former military leader of the Bosnian Serbs), much to the embarrassment of 
the international community who have tried for 10 years to apprehend them. $550m 
has paid for 26 trials in eleven years at the ICTR. Of these, 7 are at the appeal stage, 
16 have received their final sentence and 3 have been acquitted in the Trials 
Chamber. A further 28 people are on trial and 15 are awaiting trial. 19 indictees are 
still at large (sources: ICTR and ICTY websites, 2006).
The conflicts in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda had two distinct contributions to 
make to the progress of the campaign for an ICC. They re-focused attention on large-
scale human rights violations during times of conflict and they highlighted the 
significant practical difficulties encountered in setting up and running ad hoc 
tribunals, so showing the benefits which could be gained from a permanent 
international body dedicated to holding individuals responsible for human rights 
violations. 
In 1998, delegates from 160 states plus 33 IGOs and a coalition of 236 NGOs met in 
Rome at the UN Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court. A draft Statute was drawn up which was adopted 
by majority vote at the final session. 120 states voted in favour of the Rome Statute, 
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21 abstained (including India and a range of Islamic, Arab and Caribbean states) and 
7 voted against. The votes were not recorded, but the US, China, Israel, Libya, Iraq, 
Qatar and Yemen are widely reported to have voted against. After 60 states ratified 
the Statute, it entered into force on 1st July 2002. The Court is now up and running, 
with investigations taking place into crimes allegedly committed in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, in Uganda and in the Darfur region of Sudan3. 
The ICC is phenomenally innovative in international relations. The Rome Statute 
established a Court with broad ranging powers to prosecute acts of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and, potentially, aggression (although the Court will 
only have jurisdiction over crimes of aggression if a definition can be agreed upon, 
which looks unlikely). The Court is an independent organisation and not an arm of 
the UN. It is funded by State Parties (those States who have ratified the Rome 
Statute), voluntary contributions and the UN. The Court can prosecute for crimes 
committed after the Statute entered into force and committed either on the territory of 
a State Party, or by a National of a State Party. It follows the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY and ICTR in establishing that prosecutable genocide and crimes against 
humanity can take place in the context of internal armed conflict, and in times of 
peace. Prosecutable war crimes can also take place in internal armed conflict, but not 
in times of peace. Also following the tribunals, individuals are treated equally before 
the Court, and exceptions are not made for persons who hold positions in the 
government, bureaucracy, parliament or military. 
Cases can be brought before the court in three ways. They can be referred by State 
Parties or the Security Council, or instigated by the Prosecutor (non-State Parties, 
NGOs and individuals have access to the process by petitioning the Prosecutor to 
start an investigation). When a matter is referred by the Security Council, the territory 
of the offence and the nationality of the offender are irrelevant: the Court has 
                                                
3 For general background on and discussion of the ICC, see American Journal of International Law 
Special Issue (1999); Cassese (1999 & 2002); Economides (2001); Megret (2001); Ralph (2004); 
Robertson (2005); Schabas (2001). The websites of the Coalition for the ICC (2006), the ICC (2006) 
and the Rome Statute of the ICC (2006) contain many useful fact sheets and links to key documents, 
including the text of the Rome Statute itself.
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jurisdiction due to the superior legal status of the Council. This final point is of 
particular concern to non-State Parties as it establishes automatic jurisdiction and no 
longer depends on state consent. Both non-State and State Parties do have the option 
to try cases in their domestic courts. Under the principle of complementarity, the 
Court will only exercise its jurisdiction when the states that would normally have 
national jurisdiction are either unable or unwilling to exercise it. If a national court is 
willing and able to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case, the ICC cannot intervene.
Within the ICC, the individual is of paramount importance. As well as the rights of 
individuals rather than ‘peoples’ receiving most attention since 1945, individuals are 
also being held responsible for international violence. International criminal law 
suggests that some acts or omissions in international relations are the direct 
responsibility of specific persons rather than states, and the ICC has been set up to 
prosecute those persons. Neither position nor action of state holds any relevance: the 
individual has replaced the state as the agent of concern in international criminal law.
The ICC is a significant achievement of cosmopolitan liberalism: the Court has the 
power to over-rule the domestic legal systems of State-Parties if it feels that offences 
have not been adequately investigated or tried, and it is concerned to punish severe 
breaches of human rights regardless of the nationality or official position of 
perpetrators or victims. The offences covered by the Rome Statute are judged to be 
wrong whether or not they are illegal within the domestic law that applies to the 
actors involved and little regard is paid to sovereignty and borders. Through 
international criminal and human rights law, in particular the ICC, cosmopolitan 
liberals are able to promote their particular view of the correct roles of individual, 
state and law. Frédéric Mégret notes that: ‘probably no international legal institution 
better approximates the Kantian ideal-typical vision of a cosmopolitan-federation-of-
states-in-the-making than the creation of a permanent international criminal court’ 
(Mégret, 2001: 258). 
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This is not to say that its supporters are entirely satisfied with the system as it is. 
Fernando Tesón has set out the most comprehensive vision of a cosmopolitan future 
(Tesón, 1998). He argues that the legitimacy of international law rests on the 
normative foundation of respect for individual human rights: ‘Morally legitimate 
international law is founded upon an alliance of separate free nations, united by their 
moral commitment to individual freedom, by their allegiance to the international rule 
of law, and by the mutual advantages derived from peaceful intercourse’ (Tesón, 
1998: 2, italics in original). He argues that all existing international law should be 
examined to ensure that it is consistent with human rights, and rejected if not, and 
supports this further imposition of liberal values by arguing, firstly, that it is irrational 
to support anything other that the Western conception of human nature and the rights 
which follow from that and, secondly, that liberal democracies are less likely to go to 
war with each other than other forms of government. This position follows Kant’s 
assertion that the republic is the least aggressive form of government; a view which 
echoes the early liberal internationalists and has been revived in contemporary 
liberalism by Michael Doyle (1983) along with Russett (1993), Gleditch and Risse-
Kappen (eds) (1995) and Brown, et al. (eds) (1996). Tesón’s proposals are radical: he 
urges that diplomatic recognition is refused to any state which does not respect 
human rights, and that the UN should refuse membership to such states. 
The work of Thomas Franck, another influential cosmopolitan lawyer working in this 
area, is equally radical. Franck has restated the liberal case for international law (see, 
especially, Franck (1995 & 1999)), proposing a non-foundational Rawlsian 
liberalism, committed to liberal procedures rather than liberal ends. Like Tesón, he 
calls into question the power of the contemporary state and documents the ‘emerging 
triumph of individualism’, as enabled by international law (Franck, 1999: 281). He
declares that the ‘burgeoning canon of individual rights has begun to crack open the 
previously encrusted Vattelian system, transforming formerly unchallenged concepts 
of state sovereignty and curbing the long-established powers of society to compel 
individuals to conform even to its most repressive practices.’ (Franck, 1999: 281). 
Post-1945 changes in international law are breaking down the power of the state and 
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the group, so freeing the individual to define her own identity and realise her own 
goals. Both of these theorists see the correct role of international law to be 
underpinning the rights of the individual, and argue that the system is or should be 
expanded at the expense of state sovereignty.
Anne Marie Slaughter concurs that significant change has taken place: international 
law has been individualised; the ‘principle of civilian inviolability’ (Slaughter & 
Burke-White, 2002: 8) has displaced the principles of Westphalian sovereignty and a 
cosmopolitan ‘new world order’ has emerged as states have been replaced as the 
principal decision-makers on the world stage by transnational networks of judges, 
regulators and legislators (Slaughter, 2004a). Slaughter catalogues in particular the 
new lines of communication opened between national, regional and international 
legal professionals, whose collaboration has led to the globalisation of jurisprudence. 
Sovereign states, on this account, have been broken down into their component 
functions, and those functions, particularly that of sovereign legislator, are now being 
performed by cosmopolitan networks of enlightened professionals. The politicians 
have been ousted by lawyers and bureaucrats.
It is worth noting that as well as seeing progress in the promotion of human rights and 
their protection in international law, although perhaps not as much as that implied by 
Franck and Slaughter, the 1990s also saw the birth of a new, more violent, 
phenomenon of rights protection: ‘humanitarian intervention’. The decade started and 
finished with innovative international action: in 1991, ‘Safe Areas’ were created for 
Kurds in Northern Iraq and in 1999, NATO intervened in Kosovo. 
Humanitarian intervention is a more comprehensive cosmopolitan challenge to a 
morality of states or to communitarianism than either the idea of human rights or the 
expansion of international law, as it involves the invasion of the territory of a 
sovereign state using military force, motivated supposedly to alleviate suffering 
within that state. Such action appears to be entirely in contradiction to the principles 
of the sovereign state system. Its emergence can be linked to the increasing strength 
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of the liberal human rights regime, particularly the regime’s conception of legitimate 
state sovereignty as flowing from the rights of individuals4.
The growth of the human rights regime in the 1990s meant states were held to new 
standards of legitimacy, based on their observance of international human rights laws 
and norms. State sovereignty and non-intervention began to be seen as privileges, 
conditional upon responsible behaviour (an assertion of the liberal principle that a 
state is responsible for upholding the rights of its citizens, and, through this, their 
freedom) and the observance of international standards. A logical implication of the 
view that human rights rank higher than state rights to sovereignty is that intervention 
in support of human rights becomes legitimate and maybe even required (Beitz, 
1999a; Tesón, 1998 & 2005a; Wheeler, 2000). This view can be traced back to the 
1960s, or perhaps earlier, but fear of superpower involvement and commitment to 
traditional views of sovereignty meant that interventions in Bangladesh, Cambodia 
and Uganda in the 1970s which could have been seen as humanitarian were not 
(Wheeler, 2000). The end of the Cold War simultaneously removed the risk of 
superpower conflict, and created many more candidates for humanitarian action as 
protectorates collapsed and nationalism spread through ex-socialist states. During the 
1990s, interventions in Bosnia, Somalia and East Timor took place as well as those 
mentioned in Iraq and Kosovo (though it must be noted that these interventions 
happened late in the conflicts and were undertaken with some reluctance). Attempts 
to redefine sovereignty and make it conditional upon responsibility, along with the 
new, albeit qualified, willingness to override the sovereign rights of states bears 
further witness to the influence of cosmopolitan thought on international practice. 
The cosmopolitan liberal project to make the individual the focus of moral concern in 
international relations and support that position through new kinds of law and war is 
increasingly successful. The promotion of human rights and the view that conflict can 
                                                
4 For general background on the development of the concept and practice of humanitarian intervention, 
see especially Wheeler (2000); also Chatterjee and Scheid (2004); Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003) 
Lang (2003b); Mayall (2004: Part IV) and Moore (1998). On the likely effect of the ICC on 
humanitarian intervention, see Smith (2002).
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and should be managed through law were prevalent in international practice at least 
until the events of 11th September 2001, and even debates which concern the US 
response to the attack focus on human rights, the legitimacy of conflict and real or 
perceived breaches of international law. Cosmopolitan liberalism has brought about 
some of the most critical changes in the normative landscape of twentieth century 
international relations, including the challenge to absolute state sovereignty, and the 
establishment of the ICC. However, there are real questions over the legitimacy of the 
move from state civil to individual criminal responsibility that this position entails.
3.3 From State Civil to Individual Criminal Responsibility
Past efforts by international society to control violence with law have focussed on the 
state as agent. The League of Nations system conceived of governments as 
responsible for violent acts. However, the League did not prevent the onset of the 
Second World War, and the approach to controlling violence changed. Rather than 
structuring the relationships between states to deter conflict and suffering, 
cosmopolitan international lawyers turned their focus to the individual. This 
concentration on the role of the individual was accompanied by a move away from 
narrating international violence as civil wrong and towards conceptualising it as 
international crime. Both the moves from state to individual agency and from civil to 
criminal responsibility pose problems for the international political theorist which 
will be examined below. 
Pace Franck and Tesón, the characteristic use of international law is to regulate the 
interactions between states, with breaches of the law being classed as illegal but not 
criminal acts – analogous to civil wrongs within domestic legal systems. States are 
the originators of international law and this law can be seen as a body of rules made 
freely between, and binding upon, equal and sovereign bodies (Tallgren, 2002: 562), 
or ‘consenting sovereigns acting in private’ (Mayall, 2000: 94). International criminal 
law is often justified in a similar way - international jurisdiction is seen as an 
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extension, by delegation, of state power to determine criminal law norms and to 
punish transgressors. Sovereign states remain the originators of law and individuals 
its subject. The behaviour proscribed by international criminal law, according to this 
argument, is proscribed within all or most national criminal codes, and is recognised 
universally as being heinous. 
The analogy between domestic and international civil legal systems seems 
reasonable. Civil laws govern relationships between nominally equal bodies judged to 
be in contractual relations with each other. The move upwards from domestic to 
international sees the contracting bodies change from individuals or firms to states, 
and the guarantor of the contracts changes from state to confederation of states or 
international institution enabled by states. However, the domestic and international 
spheres are not so easily reconciled with respect to criminal law for two principal 
reasons: the cultural foundations of the domestic criminal system and the necessity of 
a particular type of agency.
Domestic criminal law sees a vertical relationship between the subject of the law and 
its enforcer, and concentrates on punishing individuals for breaching societal moral 
codes (which may be shared by the populace or imposed by the ruling elite). Criminal 
behaviour is an acute form of deviance, i.e. ‘conduct which does not follow the 
normal, aggregate patterns of behaviour’ (Denham, 1992: 119), judged to be so 
serious by the representatives of the society as to merit punishment. Criminal acts 
threaten the ability of the individual or the group to achieve their goals or projects. 
Punishment is needed to protect individuals or, for the communitarian theorist, the 
common life of the community, by deterring future criminal action. Domestic 
criminal law therefore, at least in theory, rests on a system of shared norms and 
values or an idea of natural law, and punishment is justified in terms of these norms. 
The concept of international crime was until recently quite different from that of 
domestic crime. For centuries the term has been used to describe crimes such as 
piracy on the high seas which are ‘offences whose repression compel[s] some 
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international dimension’ (Schabas, 2001: 21) or which have taken place in the context 
of international armed conflict. However, the type of crime which prompted the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court is different in character and much 
more similar to the concept of crime just discussed. New international crime is 
international not because of the cross-border co-operation necessary to control it, but 
rather due to its apparently universal moral repugnancy. International crime is no 
longer limited to covering acts committed in times of international armed conflict. 
According to the Rome Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
can take place in the context of internal armed conflict, and genocide and crimes 
against humanity can also take place in times of peace. A common or universal 
morality is therefore assumed to justify the criminalising of certain actions and the 
imposition of punishment by an international body. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
despite the grand statements of supporters of the regime, international society has 
neither the shared natural moral code that liberalism assumes nor a central authority 
to impose a constructed moral code, so it is difficult to see how it can be justified in 
the same way as its domestic counterpart. 
Alongside this assumption of a shared cultural context, domestic criminal law 
envisages a particular type of agent. A traditional move from the domestic to 
international level would see states being punished for breaching the morality of the 
society of states. However, criminal law requires not just for certain actions to have 
taken place (actus reus or guilty action) but also for the perpetrator of the acts to have 
had a particular state of mind or intention (mens rea or guilty mind). This recalls the 
importance given in liberal individualism to voluntarism and the idea that individuals 
choose how to act. Nothing in domestic criminal law allows us to conceive of states 
as having mens rea as it is a psychological property that can only be held by an agent 
with a mind. Thus, to ensure that responsibility was assigned for atrocities, but 
limited to using legal methods to do so, the liberal model of the individual 
international agent was imported. I discuss the problems of the individual agency 
assumed within international criminal law, exemplified within the Rome Statute, in 
more detail in Chapter 4.          
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The problems inherent in making the move from state civil to individual criminal 
responsibility for violence in the international sphere can be seen in the history of the 
transition. The first significant codifications of the laws of war into international 
treaties - the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 – were intended to impose duties 
and responsibilities onto states, and not to create criminal liability for individuals. 
They do not mention sanctions for breaches of the conventions, and such breaches 
should properly therefore be regarded as ‘illegal’ rather than ‘criminal’. By 1913, 
however, the Conventions were being presented as a source of the law of war crimes, 
and at Nuremberg individuals were prosecuted for the first time for breaches of the 
Hague Conventions (Schabas, 2001: 2). The Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, which established the Nuremberg Tribunal, gave the Tribunal jurisdiction 
over three categories of offence: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The legal bases relied on by the Tribunal for prosecution for these offences 
were and remain problematic. The 1907 Hague and 1929 Geneva Conventions were
cited as the bases for war crimes prosecutions and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact 
served the same purpose for the prosecution of crimes against peace. These treaties 
were intended to apply to states as international agents, not individuals, and as such 
were dubious sources for international criminal law5. The basis for prosecution of 
crimes against humanity was (in a strict sense) even weaker. Neither the Charter nor 
the Tribunal addressed the question directly, so there is little evidence of the 
intentions of the framers and judges. During the preparatory work for the Charter, the 
clearest reference to the source of law on which to base these prosecutions came in a 
Memorandum dated 29th December 1949 sent from Assistant Attorney-General 
Wechsler to US Attorney General Biddle. Wechsler wrote: 
It may be [suggested] that any treaty definition which goes beyond the 
laws of war would have retroactive application in violation of the 
principle nulla crimen sine lege … I think it is a sufficient answer that the 
                                                
5 Clark gives an alternative viewpoint, arguing that ‘While there might have been some room for 
argument, it was fairly well established that  ... breaches [of the Hague and Geneva Conventions] gave 
rise to individual criminal responsibility …’ (Clark, 1997: 174). It may indeed have been fairly well 
established among those lawyers and politicians who favoured the Nuremberg prosecutions, but the 
wording of the treaties is clear that the Contracting Powers are the agents of concern.
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crime charged involves so many elements of criminality under the 
accepted laws of war and the penal laws of all civilized States that the 
incorporation of the additional factors in question does not offer the type 
of threat to innocence which the prohibition of ex post facto laws is 
designed to prevent. (Smith, 1982: 84, 86, cited in Clark, 1997: 175) 
The transition from a ‘morality of states’ system, where states were held responsible 
in international law, to a system where the individual is both principal rights-bearer 
and principal protagonist has not been at all straight-forward and is highly contested. 
The following section looks more critically at the historical context of the transition, 
to determine whose interests are served by a change in the conception of 
responsibility. 
3.4 Politics, Economics and Law
Liberal cosmopolitans (e.g. Beitz (1999a); Téson (1998); Franck (1999); Barry
(2001); Pogge (2002)) see international law as a solution to the problem of politics. 
Kahn summarises such a position as follows: ‘… the politics of vital national interests 
should be replaced by the managerial and technocratic sciences of the welfare state, 
on the one hand, and a regime of universal law, on the other.’ (Kahn, 2003: 2) 
Politics, particularly the politics of sovereign nation-states, has a tendency to turn 
violent, evidenced throughout the twentieth century, and it must therefore be 
controlled by law. A system of responsibilities, phrased in terms of rights protections, 
is safer managed by judges than left to politicians or publics.
Carl Schmitt (1996 & 2003) argues precisely the opposite. He sees the collapse of the 
Jus Publicum Europaeum (the territorially bounded legal order in which European 
states recognised each others’ sovereignty and rights to non-intervention) between 
1890 and 1918 and its replacement with a universalist, liberal international order, 
founded on an elaborate scheme of international law, as a cause for great concern. 
Schmitt was particularly troubled by the rise of Anglo-American universalism 
manifested in US economic expansionism as a new, non-territorial, form of empire. 
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This expansion was presented as non-political – as progress for the benefit of all 
humanity – and was accepted as such because the tools of control wielded by the 
aspiring empirical power were mostly concerned with applying economic pressure to 
recalcitrant states (Schmitt, 2003: 255-7). ‘Free’ trade was trade supposedly free of 
the state, though in fact the (American) state had great influence, by virtue of its 
economic power, in both international trade policy and in decisions concerning inter-
allied debts and German reparations – policies which had substantial political effects.
Schmitt (1996) argues that the liberalism used to justify American expansion did so 
by attempting to remove the political (in essence, the friend/ enemy distinction) from 
politics. For Schmitt, removing the political is impossible – politics is necessarily 
conflictual – and any attempt to do so is merely to try to disguise the pursuit of 
political interests by making economic, moral or technical/ legal claims. Attempts to 
do so can nonetheless be seen both in the presentation of policy as purely concerned 
with economics, and also in the rhetoric of morality, humanity and universal law 
which became common from 1890. The beginning of the twentieth century marked 
the end of international law as a ‘concrete spatial order’ and its transformation into 
‘nothing more than a series of generalisations of doubtful precedent, most based on 
transitory or heterogeneous situations, combined with more or less generally 
recognized norms, which, the more generally and spiritedly they were ‘recognised,’ 
the more contested was their application in a concretely disputed case’ (Schmitt, 
2003: 238-9). In the words of Martti Koskenniemi, ‘[a]n era of empty normativity 
began’ (Koskenniemi, 2002: 417), and Europe slid into the First World War. Worse 
was to come: under the influence of American liberalism internationalism, war 
became criminalised in international law, transformed from the legitimate act of a 
sovereign state, to a crime against humanity (Schmitt, 2003: 259-280). 
According to Schmitt (himself a potential defendant in the Nuremberg war crimes 
trials, who was arrested and interrogated but released without charge), wars claimed 
to be motivated by morality, for instance humanitarian interventions, are 
tremendously dangerous. Narrating one’s opponent (the state which is breaching 
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human rights) as morally wrong and, in particular, as an enemy of all humanity, can 
justify extremes of violence towards them, as such enemies must be defeated at any 
cost: ‘To confiscate the word humanity … probably has certain incalculable effects, 
such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an 
outlaw of humanity; and war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity’ 
(Schmitt, 1996: 54). This argument is echoed today by those who accuse the US of 
not respecting Iraqi lives in its action to discharge the responsibility it has assumed to 
bring freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people. Schmitt argues that conflict within 
Europe in the nineteenth century was less violent than the devastation of twentieth 
century warfare precisely because of the settled system of sovereignty. Each power 
respected the others and recognised them as legitimate enemies in war, so gross 
violence or attempts at annihilation were not seen as justified. While his view of 
conflict as civilised or ‘humanised’ in the nineteenth century is very much open to 
challenge (see Brown, 2004c: 8-9), Schmitt’s analysis of the dangers of war as a 
moral crusade, and his recognition that such wars are still political (‘When a state 
fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of 
humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept 
against its military opponent’ (Schmitt, 1996: 54)), is an important juxtaposition to 
the enthusiastic interventionism of much cosmopolitan liberalism. The analysis of the 
Gulf War undertaken by Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand (1994) underscores 
this point: more than 100,000 civilians were killed in the most legalistic war in 
history, fought for universal principles of justice, by an international community 
which saw itself as responsible for protecting Kuwaitis, and under the banner of 
humanity. Like Schmitt, they dispute the ability of liberalism and law to bring peace, 
and argue that ‘the laws of war have facilitated rather than restrained wartime 
violence. Through law, violence has been legitimated’ (Jochnick & Normand, 1994:
50).
Politics is also evident, though denied, in the development of the international 
criminal law used to try acts which do breach the laws of war. The regime is claimed 
to be universal and value free, however law and its application are always the subject 
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of political contestation. War crimes trials in particular are inevitably political: the 
decision over whether to hold a trial in any given situation is highly politically 
loaded. Power can prevent certain crimes ever being tried, as it did after the Second 
World War. The Nuremberg trials effectively legitimised the mass bombings of 
civilians carried out by Allied forces in WW2, as these bombings were not tried, so 
not defined as war crimes. War crimes trials also tend to be biased in favour of 
dominant groups, shown by the lenient treatment of technologically advanced versus 
primitive weaponry, and the exclusion of gendered crimes such as rape from the 
definition of crimes against humanity until very recently. Once established, Gerry 
Simpson (1997) argues that such trials are often used to legitimate current power 
arrangements or state actions. For instance, the prosecuting state can be narrated as 
good and the offender state (or the state the perpetrator originates from) as bad. This 
can serve to excuse or draw attention away from crimes committed by the prosecuting 
state as the crimes being tried are framed as being more serious. Thus on the 8th of 
August 1945, the Allies signed the London Charter which established the Nuremberg 
Tribunal to try German war criminals, apparently signalling their intention that 
international relations in the post war era would be run according to the demands of 
international justice and basic human rights. Yet two days prior to the signing, the US
had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, killing an estimated 140,000 people 
(mostly civilians), and the day after the signing, they bombed Nagasaki, killing an 
estimated 74,000. Such was (and is) the power of the US that these acts have never 
been assessed in any war crimes trial. 
The Nuremberg Tribunals have been the inspiration for many of the developments in 
international criminal law since 1945, but they serve a political purpose as much as a 
legal one: 
[a]s well as trying alleged war criminals, these trials serve as vindication 
of Western progress, they maintain the idea that National Socialism was 
an aberration in Western culture, they function as moral demarcations 
between the accused and the accuser, they avert attention from war crimes 
closer to home and, finally, they contain the message that the untried 
crimes are not of this magnitude or order. (Simpson, 1997: 9). 
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Hannah Arendt makes a similar argument with regards to the Eichmann trial: she 
argues that Ben-Gurion wanted to use the trial to establish a link in the popular mind 
between Nazis and Israel’s contemporary enemies, Palestinian terrorists and anti-
Zionist Arabs, and to re-legitimate the Israeli state (Arendt, 1963: 9-12, cited in 
Simpson, 1997: 22).
Rudolph (2001) has continued such analysis into the contemporary ‘atrocities 
regime’. He concludes that ‘although liberal humanitarian ideas have created the 
demand for political action, the process of dealing with brutality in war has been 
dominated by realpolitik – that is, furthering the strategic interests of the powerful’ 
(Rudolph, 2001: 656). He argues that the ICTY was a compromise between the 
promotion of human rights and the political costs of intervention to stop the atrocities. 
The Tribunal has been narrated as the first step in challenging impunity for crimes 
against humanity, but was in fact the response to human rights abuse which had the 
lowest political cost for powerful states. For Rudolph, power and interest best explain 
why tribunals are, or are not, established in any given case: politics is an inevitable 
part of the legal process6. 
Schmitt’s economic concerns also bear consideration. I discussed the economic 
foundations of liberal individual agency in Chapter 2 – here I consider economics in 
relation to responsibility. The human rights regime, central to liberal notions of 
responsibility, has little to say about economic abuse or hardship, or the extent to 
which economics influences war. The standard Western liberal governmental 
position, as identified by Schmitt, has been to claim that free trade brings peace, and 
so to impose neo-liberal international economic policies and institutions onto weaker 
states. As noted in Chapter 2, some cosmopolitan theorists (for instance Shue (1980); 
Beitz (1999a); Pogge (2002); Barry (2005)) are critical of liberals who deny the 
                                                
6 For more on the politics of international law and war crimes trials see Beigbeder (1999); 
Koskenniemi (1990); McCormack and Simpson (1997); Reus Smit (2004); Simpson (2001); Tallgren 
(2002); Yasuaki (2003).
89
importance of economics to the realization and exercise of human rights. In general, 
however, Western liberal theorists have privileged civil and political rights above 
social and economic rights, and rejected the notion that the problem of global 
inequality should have a place in any discussion of human rights. This stems from the 
normative value placed on free trade and free markets within liberalism and is 
reflected in the Rome Statute of the ICC, the institution supposed to be the missing 
link in human rights enforcement: social and economic rights are barely covered. The 
Rome Statute states that it will prosecute the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’ (Article 5), and as the operation of international 
capitalism is not a crime committed by individuals, its effects are ruled out of the 
rights discourse. 
Schmitt’s identification of the use of economic claims to hide politics has also been 
seen by contemporary critics. Cosmopolitan liberalism tends to disguise power within 
the rights discourse by claiming that politics, law and economics are separable. 
Walzer argues that the limited government necessary to protect private space from 
political power has opened the door to private government, or government by wealth. 
Modern markets are not separate from politics: great inequalities in wealth mean that 
many are forced to sell their products or services for unfair prices, and ‘vast wealth 
and ownership or control of productive forces convert readily into government in the 
strict sense: capital regularly and successfully calls on the coercive power of the state’ 
(Walzer, 1984: 321-322). Walzer notes that the individualist foundation of liberalism 
tends to disguise the power of wealth as ‘what power takes by force, money merely 
purchases, and the purchase has the appearance of a voluntary agreement between 
individuals’ (Walzer, 1984: 325). As such, Western liberal states retain their position 
in the system relatively unchallenged, while still purporting to be concerned with the 
most severe human suffering. 
Polanyi makes a similar point. He sees that the idea of freedom inherent in the liberal 
ideology is only one possible understanding of the term: 
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No society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor a 
world in which force has no function. It was an illusion to assume a 
society shaped by man’s will and wish alone. Yet this was a result of a 
market view of society which equated economics with contractual 
relationships, and contractual relations with freedom. The radical illusion 
was fostered that there is nothing in human society that is not derived 
from the volition of individuals and that could not, therefore, be removed 
again by their volition. (Polanyi, 2001: 266) 
Polanyi’s explanation highlights the importance of individual agency to the liberal 
position (and its reliance on methodological individualism) and through this the 
consequences for responsibility are apparent. As life is fragmented under a market 
system, society becomes invisible. As the market works more freely, so state power, 
necessary to sustain the market according to Polanyi but denied by liberals, 
disappears from view. Thus: 
Neither voters, nor owners, neither producers, nor consumers could be 
held responsible for such brutal restrictions of freedom as were involved 
in the occurrence of unemployment and destitution. Any decent 
individual could imagine himself free from all responsibility for acts of 
compulsion on the part of a state which he, personally, rejected; or for 
economic suffering in society from which he, personally, had not 
benefited. (Polanyi, 2001: 266)
The market economy, seen by many liberals as a milestone in the advance of human 
freedom, is argued by Polanyi to be the cause of a great deal of the death and 
destruction of the twentieth century, as well as the general misery of ‘societies’ in 
which all social relationships have been destroyed. There is no room here to evaluate 
Polanyi’s thesis that the Second World War was caused by the failure of laissez-faire
economic policy, followed by state overreaction and over-intervention. Suffice to 
note that, should this thesis be correct, liberalism may be implicated in (though 
clearly not entirely responsible for) the crimes that the ICC seeks to prosecute as well 
as the structure of the international criminal legal system, in so far as the policies 
pursued in its name provide conditions amenable to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.
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3.5 Liberalism and the Limits of Responsibility 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the cosmopolitan liberal conception of 
responsibility both limits the scope of that responsibility and serves the interests of 
the powerful. The work of Schmitt and Polanyi implies that the scope of 
responsibility is narrowed by liberalism: the workings of the free market are used to 
disguise political interests, destroy society and so liberate powerful individuals from 
any sense of responsibility for the suffering which results from policies promoting 
‘freedom’. Responsibility is only increased for those who are suffering – liberal 
individualism, as documented in Chapter 2, transfers responsibility for any failure to 
flourish away from the collective and onto the individual.
Responsibility is also limited because the commitment to its realisation through law 
constrains the notion of responsibility that can be applied. Iris Marion Young argues 
that the most common contemporary conception of responsibility is the ‘liability 
model’, which ‘derives from legal reasoning to find guilt or fault for a harm’ (Young, 
2006: 116-118). Under this view of responsibility, an agent is only responsible if her 
actions were both ‘causally connected to the circumstances for which responsibility is 
sought’ and ‘voluntary and performed with adequate knowledge of the situation’ 
(Young, 2006: 116). This standard of responsibility is necessary for the fair 
application of the law, given the severe penalties that can be imposed for acts found 
to contravene the criminal code and the general equation of responsibility with blame 
in liberal thought, but serves to limit the states of affairs which can be included in 
liberal discourses of responsibility. Few harms in the international sphere can 
accurately be traced back to the voluntary and informed actions of individual 
‘criminals’, so much suffering is excluded from the discourse of responsibility. 
International law seeks to prosecute individuals for war crimes, but, despite a great 
deal of fanfare, only 56 individuals have been held responsible for their actions thus 
far at the two international criminal tribunals of the 1990s. The following chapter 
suggests that the ICC will not perform a great deal better. 
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Part of the reason for this limited responsibility for great harms is due to the difficult 
transition made within post 1945 international law from state civil responsibility to 
individual criminal responsibility. The reason d’être of much international law is now 
the protection of human rights. Cosmopolitan liberalism sees such rights as essential 
to human flourishing and deriving naturally from our status as human beings, 
therefore any breach of our rights is viewed as immoral. Immoral acts are the domain 
of the criminal law, yet the transition to international individual criminal agency is 
highly contested and grounded in very dubious readings of past laws.
There is an even bigger issue at the heart of all of this: the rights model of 
responsibility central to liberalism and cosmopolitanism. There are two main 
drawbacks to this model: the first is the lack of universal assent and the second is the 
lack of concrete obligation generated at the international level. 
The status of rights as a Western liberal idea, based on ontological claims which do 
not resonate within all cultures, was touched upon in the last chapter. Rights 
proponents argue that the history of the idea does not matter – what matters is that it 
is widely assented to now. They point out that support for the regime has grown to be 
almost universal, particularly in the last twenty years. It is certainly the case that 
during the 1990s there was a dramatic increase in the number of states ratifying the 
six main human rights conventions and covenants. Ratifications of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights grew from around 90 to nearly 150 through the decade. 
Broad support for the goals of the regime was also demonstrated by the participation 
of over 170 countries in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, who met in 
Vienna to reaffirm their commitment to protect human rights. However, ratifying 
conventions does not prove assent. Actions speak a great deal louder than words with 
regard to human rights, and it is notable that Amnesty International reported in 2004 
that human rights were under their most sustained attack in 50 years, due to violence 
by armed groups and to the responses to these groups by governments (Amnesty 
International, 2004). The 2006 Human Rights Watch World Report names some of 
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the most powerful states in the world as human rights abusers: the US, the UK, 
Canada, the member states of the European Union, Russia and China, as well as 
Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe.
As well as having to deal with a lack of universal assent, using human rights to 
ground international responsibility causes problems as it is not always clear what 
responsibility or responsibilities rights actually generate. Unlike the specific rights 
found within (some, liberal) domestic polities, which identify the state as responsible 
for enforcing them, human rights are broad statements of what all human beings 
deserve and are rarely backed up by accounts of correlative duties. Cosmopolitan 
international law has shifted responsibility for individual welfare from the sovereign 
state to an international institutional regime, but that regime seems incapable of 
agreeing upon and discharging its responsibilities. During the 1990s, when so many 
more states were signing up to human rights covenants, the international community 
was fiddling while, inter alia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Kosovo burned. Some form of international intervention happened 
eventually in these cases, but all had limited success. Even when the major players in 
the international community could agree that widespread human rights abuses were 
taking pace, there was no agreement over who had responsibility to halt these abuses, 
particularly when to do so would have meant breaching the borders of a sovereign 
state. The theoretical architecture of the debates centred on the contest between the 
priority of the sovereign individual and that of the sovereign state, and reached an 
impasse with irresolvable claims that neither should be violated. Responsibility was 
unclear, and its grounding on human rights was contested. Intervention policies were 
read by powers such as China and Russia as a ploy to further Western interests. The 
intervention in Iraq, begun in 2003 and justified principally now on human rights 
grounds by the US and the UK, seems to its opponents to bear out such suspicions. 
The lack of intervention in Darfur, with an estimated death toll now approaching 
200,000 as well as the displacement of millions, tells a similarly grim story, though 
this time the international community is criticised for its inaction.
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Cosmopolitan liberal notions of responsibility do not appear to be working to 
alleviate suffering to any significant extent. Can communitarianism offer us a more 
pleasing alternative? The answer is a qualified ‘no’. 
Communitarian notions of responsibility do appear to rest on firmer ground than 
those of cosmopolitan liberalism. For the communitarian, we owe duties to each other 
because of the benefits we gain from living in community (a share of the social 
surplus) or because the social roles we act out, such as friend, father or fellow citizen, 
have constitutive or inherent obligations. Communitarian theorists have also 
recognised the impoverished notion of responsibility within rights-based liberalism, 
which they see as threatening social cohesion. These concerns led Amitai Etzioni to 
set up the Responsive Community project in 1993. The project ‘recognized the need 
for a social philosophy that at once protected individual rights and attended to 
corresponding responsibilities to the community’ and set about to define these 
responsibilities (Communitarian Network website, 2006). Mary Ann Glendon (1991), 
a founding endorser of the Responsive Communitarian Platform, has written 
influentially on what she calls ‘Rights Talk’. She argues that individualist liberal 
societies (her focus is on the US) turn every dispute into a clash of rights, with no 
reference to personal and civic responsibilities. This has the effect of shutting down 
possibilities for compromise and attempts to discover common ground or reach 
consensus – the very activities that sustain community. To assert a rights claim, 
according to Glendon, is to attempt to shut down a discussion and to invite a similarly 
confrontational response (Glendon, 1991: 14). Thus, framing everything in rights talk 
threatens the community that protects the rights, so threatening the rights themselves. 
Although communitarianism offers more scope for responsibility within a state, it has 
little to offer us beyond state borders. Responsibility, for the communitarian, is 
politically generated and sustained within society. Beyond borders, only a morality of 
states is possible, with responsibility for the welfare of its citizens falling upon the 
sovereign state. If a state does not discharge that responsibility, it does not pass to any 
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other agent. Given the suffering caused by many sovereign states to their people (for 
instance in pre-2003 Iraq as well as in the states singled out by Human Rights 
Watch), and the highly interconnected nature of social life in the 21st century, the 
communitarian view that borders are impermeable seems both wrong and unethical. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Given the quietism of much communitarian theory in the face of intrastate violence, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that cosmopolitan liberalism has gained so much momentum 
in post 1945 IPT and international practice. I have argued that the conception of 
responsibility within such a view is highly limited, but its supporters believe that its 
limitations are gradually being overcome, with the establishment of institutions such 
as the ICC. In the following chapter I assess whether the limits identified here –
principally the questionable international status of the individual agent and the denial 
of the effects of power upon law – have been overcome by the Court.
96
CHAPTER 4: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
BEYOND THE STATE
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice. 
That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its realization. We 
will do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you . . . to do yours in our struggle 
to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights 
with impunity. Only then will the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they, 
too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who 
violate those rights will be punished (Kofi Annan, 1997).
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is premised on the now familiar cosmopolitan 
liberal assumptions that there are universal moral standards which apply to human 
behaviour and that through the legal assignation of responsibility to individual human 
agents for human rights abuses and the meting out of punishment according to these 
universal standards, the international criminal justice system (ICJS) can deter crime,
end conflict and bring about justice. The previous two chapters have identified 
problems with the theoretical foundations of this position. In this chapter I examine 
whether the drawbacks discussed can be seen within the construction of the 
institution which represents the most significant achievement for cosmopolitan 
liberalism so far: the ICC. I argue that two limits outlined in Chapter 3, regarding 
agency and the denial of power, are very much in evidence in the Court. The 
conception of agency within the Rome Statute is internally contradictory – locating 
the perpetrator of crime as a sovereign individual outside society and her victim as, 
first and foremost, the member of a social group – and the uneasy relationship 
between law and power within cosmopolitan liberalism is evident in the history of the 
Court. The final section of the chapter examines the implications of these limits in 
terms of the stated goals of the Court, noting both its role in assigning responsibility 
to specific agents in international relations, thus seeming to control it and bring about 
order, and its role in enabling state violence through the ascription of responsibility to 
individuals.
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4.1 Characteristics of Individual Agency in the Rome Statute
What follows is a close examination of the Rome Statute which seeks to identify and 
critique the clauses that conceptualise the perpetrator and the victim of international 
crime. I argue that the Statute presents an internally inconsistent concept of the 
individual: at times seeing the person, in cosmopolitan liberal terms, as a free and 
rational actor, independent of social role and culture, but conversely requiring that 
some persons (the victims) are entirely defined by their social role or group 
membership. The implications of this confused conceptualisation will be explored 
towards the end of this chapter. 
4.1.1 The Perpetrator of International Crime
The fact that the Rome Statute follows the Nuremberg philosophy that men, not 
abstract entities (e.g. states) exercise agency and commit crimes against international 
law is not in doubt. Article 25 (2) of the Statute, entitled ‘Individual Criminal 
Responsibility’ explicitly declares that the Court shall have jurisdiction over 
individuals (‘natural persons’) and that ‘[a] person who commits a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in 
accordance with this Statute.’ However, the nature of a person is not elaborated 
further, and it is necessary to look at the detail of the Statute, particularly at Part 3: 
General Principles of Criminal Law, to understand how the Court conceptualises the 
perpetrator of international crime. I will examine the requirement of mens rea, the 
defences allowed and the rules outlining mitigating or aggravating factors of crimes 
with regard to punishment to establish the qualities assumed to be held by the 
international criminal.
As outlined in Chapter 3, a crime involves both a certain action (actus reus) and a 
particular state of mind or intention (mens rea). Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
concerns mens rea and sets a high standard for the mental element of crimes. Article 
30 (1) specifies the requirement as follows: ‘Unless otherwise provided, a person 
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shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.’ Intent is defined as having two necessary parts – one which relates to 
conduct and another to consequence. Thus, a person has intent according to Article 30 
(2) where: ‘(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) 
In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.’ Finally, to fulfil the mental 
requirement, the accused must have ‘knowledge’ of the material elements of the 
crime: ‘For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events’ 
(Article 30 (3)). Most Rome Statute crimes also have the necessary mens rea written 
into the definition of the crime. Genocide must be committed with “intent to destroy” 
and crimes against humanity with “knowledge of the attack.” Many of the war crimes 
listed have “wantonly,” “wilfully” or “treacherously” written into the definitions. 
The requirements for mens rea are well specified within the Statute, and signal the 
high level of intent a person must be shown to have had in order to be convicted of an 
international crime. This intent is a quality closely bound up with the liberal 
conception of a person as a sovereign, bounded unit, whose actions and desires are 
under the control of her reason – a view of the person that appears throughout the 
Statute. Unfortunately, proving the intent a person had at the time of an action is, in 
practice, tremendously difficult to do, therefore inference and legal fictions tend to be 
used within domestic systems to satisfy the mens rea requirement. For instance, it is 
assumed that all agents know ‘the law’ – Barnes notes the irony of this situation, 
given the inability of lawyers to agree on what many given laws mean (Barnes, 2000:
12) – and that all agents know whatever a ‘reasonable person’ would know in their 
circumstances. This use of inference and fiction is likely to be a feature of 
prosecutions under the International Criminal Court, and may either allow the 
concept of the perpetrator as rational, intentional being to stand unchallenged or lead 
to an inability to prosecute on the basis that the intent required is too extensive and 
specific to be satisfactorily inferred. Given the complexity of the applicable law and 
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the lack of consensus over what a ‘reasonable person’ might know in a time of 
conflict, any use of inference is potentially unjust.
The defences which can be offered before the Court also give us significant clues to 
the type of individual agent the Court envisages as responsible for international 
atrocities. Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Rome Statute cover defences which 
perpetrators can offer. Article 31, ‘Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility’, 
outlines the defences of insanity, intoxication, self-defence, duress and necessity. The 
concept of the volitional, reasonable person is evident again very strongly here. 
Under the Statute, a person is not deemed to be criminally responsible if, at the time 
of her conduct, she suffered from a mental disease or defect that destroyed her 
capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of her conduct, or capacity to 
control her conduct to conform to the requirements of law. Equally, she is not 
criminally responsible if she was in a state of intoxication sufficient to destroy her 
capacity as above, unless she became ‘voluntarily intoxicated under such 
circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the 
intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court’ (Article 31 (1) b). A ‘normal’ person’s capacities to 
appreciate the kind and quality of her conduct, and to control that conduct, are taken 
for granted here, and the lack of these capacities is seen as being caused by either 
disease, defect or drugs. Thus the default setting for the notional international agent is 
one of contemplation and control. This element of rational capacity appears again in 
the following clause, which details the range of actions allowable in self-defence. 
Under the Article 31 (1) c of the Rome Statute, a person is not criminally responsible 
if she acts reasonably to defend herself or another person or, in the case of war 
crimes, essential property, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner 
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property 
protected. Essential property is limited to that which is essential for the survival of 
the person in question or another person, or which is essential for accomplishing a 
military mission. The agent must therefore make judgments on the proximity and 
legitimacy of the force facing her, the degree of danger posed by that force, the 
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responses which would count as proportionate to the force, given the means available 
to her, and, in the case of defence of property, the importance of the property to be 
defended in terms of human survival or military tactics. There is no room in this 
clause for instinctive, intuitional or emotionally propelled action, even though the 
likelihood of finding time for all of the necessary rational calculations is small given 
the imminent nature of the danger required by the Statute.
The final clause of Article 31 (1) covers the defences of duress and necessity. Clause 
(d) excludes from criminal responsibility conduct which is ‘caused by duress 
resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily 
harm against that person or another person, [where] the person acts necessarily and 
reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a 
greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.’ Such a threat may either be made by 
other persons (duress) or constituted by other circumstances, e.g. natural occurrences, 
beyond that person's control (necessity). Assumptions within this clause are 
particularly problematic. In an effort to allow for action where an agent is seen as 
having no viable moral choice, the drafters of the Statute set up an impossible 
situation where the agent must act both necessarily (i.e. without choice, 
deterministically), but also reasonably (i.e. under rational control) and with specific 
intent (not to cause greater harm than they are attempting to avoid). There is no 
satisfactory account of individual agency that could reconcile these demands, thus the 
defences of duress and necessity seem impossible to apply.
Article 33 covers the defence of ‘Superior Orders’, a defence which was not allowed 
in the Nuremberg Charter, nor in the ICTY or ICTR statutes. The Rome Statute 
allows for the defence in a very limited and specific set of circumstances, and then 
only for War Crimes (and, arguably, Aggression). Article 33 states first that the 
presumption of the Court is in favour of holding the defendant criminally responsible 
(‘The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a 
person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or 
civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless …’) then sets 
out the three conditions which must be fulfilled for the defence to be considered: 
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(a)    The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the 
Government or the superior in question; 
(b)     The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and 
(c)     The order was not manifestly unlawful.
The Article then goes on to rule out the Superior Orders defence for two of the crimes 
covered in the Statute: ‘For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or 
crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful’ (Article 33 (3)). The standard of 
action here is extremely high, and the wording suggests that Superior Orders will 
rarely be a successful defence before the Court. Many actors will fulfil condition (a), 
but few will be able to satisfy (b) and (c), except perhaps for the less heinous of war 
crimes listed. 
The position an individual holds in relation to her state does not offer any possibility 
for a defence. Article 27 makes clear that official capacity is irrelevant both to 
criminal responsibility and to mitigation of sentence under the International Criminal 
Court, and that any special rules or immunities which traditionally attach to the 
official capacity of a person, under domestic or international law, will not prevent the 
Court exercising its jurisdiction. The drafting of this Article was uncontroversial at 
the Rome Conference. 
The defences allowed within the Rome Statute reinforce the view of the individual 
gleaned from the requirements of mens rea. The ‘ideal type’ perpetrator of 
international crime is reasonable, rational, intentional and knowledgeable, and her 
actions are entirely under her volitional control. Her social origin and position, 
particular capabilities and personal circumstances are irrelevant. Only in the 
discussion of punishment are these issues considered, and it is to this I now turn. 
The correct punishment for international criminality according to the Rome Statute is 
imprisonment: Article 77 (1) lists ‘[i]mprisonment for a specified number of years, 
which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or […] [a] term of life imprisonment 
when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances 
of the convicted person’ as the two principal sentencing options open to the Court. 
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Article 78 (1) gives the following guidance on sentencing: ‘In determining the 
sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (hereafter ‘Rules’), take into account such factors as the 
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.’ Rules 
outlines a range of possible mitigating or aggravating factors, additional to the gravity 
of the crime and the individual circumstances, many of which are relevant to our 
discussion of what constitutes an individual agent according to the Statute. Rule 145 
states that the Court should give consideration to: ‘the extent of the damage caused, 
in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the 
unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime; the degree of 
participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of 
manner, time and location; and the age, education, social and economic condition of 
the convicted person.’ Rule 145 goes on to list substantially diminished mental 
capacity or duress and the convicted person’s conduct after the act as mitigating 
circumstances, and relevant prior convictions, abuse of power or official capacity, 
commission of the crime where the victim is particularly defenceless or there are 
multiple victims, commission of the crime using particular cruelty and commission of 
the crime for any motive involving discrimination7 on the basis of generalized or 
social characteristics as aggravating circumstances. 
It would seem, therefore, that social or group factors are relevant in the field of 
punishment for international crime (even though they are not seen as affecting 
individual agency in commission of the crime – the individual is still held to be 
responsible, but her punishment may vary depending on her personal characteristics 
and the social circumstances of the crime). The Court is instructed to take into 
account the degree of participation and the age, education, social and economic 
condition of the convicted person. Again, an ‘ideal type’ agent can be discerned – a 
sort of noble savage who treats her victims as equals, does not discriminate, does not 
                                                
7 Discrimination here refers to discrimination on any of the grounds referred to in article 21, paragraph 
3 of the Rome Statute, i.e. gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.
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abuse power, picks fair fights with victims who can defend themselves and does not 
have the age, education, class or money to know better. 
The final point to note before examining the conception of the victim of international 
crime is the issue of layered responsibility. As mentioned at the outset of this section, 
Article 25 sets up the individual as responsible for international crimes. However, in 
an effort to capture all possibilities of agency, the Rome Statute envisages a 
complicated web of responsibility for the crimes it is concerned with. Article 25 goes 
on to state that a person shall be criminally responsible for a crime if she is involved 
in that crime at almost any level, regardless of whether other persons are also 
criminally responsible for the same crime. Under the Statute, a person can be 
responsible for a crime committed with or through another person, a crime she 
attempted, ordered, solicited, induced, facilitated, directly and publicly incited (in 
respect of genocide) or in any other way intentionally contributed to (Article 25 (3)). 
Article 28, entitled Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors, establishes 
that both military and civilian commanders can be criminally responsible for acts 
committed by any subordinates who were or should have been under their effective 
command and control.  To establish the guilt of a military commander in this area, the 
Prosecutor must show that the commander either knew or should have known that her 
subordinate/s were committing or were about to commit a crime. A civilian 
commander can only be responsible if she ‘either knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about 
to commit such crimes’ (Article 28 (b) i). Unless they are successful with a defence 
of superior orders, subordinates can also be held responsible for the crimes 
commanded. Articles 25 and 28 therefore set up the possibility of multiple 
responsibilities for the same crime, but only in terms of individual perpetrators. The 
group membership or social role of the perpetrators is irrelevant, as responsibility 
cannot be shared but can only reside simultaneously within multiple separate 
individuals.
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4.1.2 The Victim of International Crime
In the rhetoric of the ICJS, the victim of international crime is often conceived of as 
humanity as a whole, with humanity then being entitled (or even required) to 
prosecute the perpetrators. For our purposes in this chapter, it is more instructive to 
examine the victim as conceived within the descriptions of the Statute crimes, and in 
the sections on punishment. I argue that the victim of international crime is 
necessarily socially located, entirely in contrast to the perpetrator who is modelled as 
having no relevant social ties. 
Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court will rely on evidence of harm to 
individual persons, yet genocide and crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome 
Statute could not take place if individuals do not have significant identities as 
members of groups. Individuals may be victims of murder or serious bodily or mental 
harm, but they cannot by themselves be victims of genocide or crimes against 
humanity. A genocide must by definition take place against a group: ‘For the purpose 
of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group …’(Article 
6). Equally, crimes against humanity is defined by the Statute as meaning any of the 
qualifying acts ‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’ (Article 7, emphasis 
added). 
This is not to say that all groups count as relevant victims under international law. As 
discussed in connection with mens rea requirements earlier in the chapter, the Statute 
has difficulty conceiving and defining relevant groups. A person has not committed 
genocide, for instance, unless the Court makes the political decision that the group 
the person intended to destroy was a ‘proper’ group. Political and social groups were 
explicitly rejected by the framers of the Rome Statute as possible targets of genocide, 
leaving a series of accepted groups that are assumed to be well bounded and stable 
over time, a lot like the individuals postulated as their attackers. 
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Group membership of the victim is also important in a more general sense: Article 17 
(1) d declares that the Court must rule a case inadmissible if it is not of ‘sufficient 
gravity’, that is if the number of victims is not judged to be high enough. The 
definitions of the crimes all contain threshold statements to help focus prosecutions 
onto the most serious breaches of the Statute. For both genocide and crimes against 
humanity, the threshold is quantitative. For prosecutable genocide to have taken place 
there must have been a high level of special intent to destroy a group in whole or in 
part. Similarly, for a crime against humanity to fall within the scope of the court, the 
crime must have been part of a ‘widespread or systematic attack’. Thus, genocide and 
crimes against humanity are only likely to be prosecuted by the Court if planned or 
committed on a large scale. The threshold for war crimes appears within the 
introductory paragraph of Article 8. This states that: ‘The Court shall have 
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’ Individual victims or 
small groups of victims will not be significant enough to trigger the Court.
Characteristics of the victim can also be discerned in a reading of Rule 145 of Rules, 
in which the Court is instructed to consider the degree of harm caused to victims and 
their families, and in assumptions about the relevance of motive to punishment. The 
Rome Statute does not cover motive in detail but is likely to follow the ruling made 
by the ICTY in Delalic:  
[Motive] is to some extent a necessary factor in the determination of 
sentence after guilt has been established. … The motive for committing 
an act which results in the offence charged may constitute aggravation or 
mitigation of the appropriate sentence. For instance, where the accused is 
found to have committed the offence charged with cold, calculated 
premeditation, suggestive of revenge against the individual victim or 
group to which the victim belongs, such circumstances necessitate the 
imposition of aggravated punishment. On the other hand, if the accused is 
found to have committed the offence charged reluctantly and under the 
influence of group pressure and, in addition, demonstrated compassion 
towards the victim or the group to which the victim belongs, these are 
certainly mitigating factors which the Trial Chamber will take into 
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consideration in the determination of the appropriate sentence (Prosecutor 
v Delalic et al, Judgement of the ICTY in case number IT 96-21-T 
(1998), para 1235)
If the International Criminal Court does follow this ruling, the group membership of 
the victim can be seen again to be of relevance. Aggravated punishment is required 
when the accused is seen to be taking revenge on an individual or the group to which 
she belongs, and lesser punishment is merited when the perpetrator showed 
compassion toward the victim or the group to which she belongs. The relationship of 
perpetrator to victim is somehow complicated by group membership: the actions of 
perpetrator towards the group that the victim belonged to are seen as possible to 
separate from the actions of the perpetrator towards the individual victim.8
Groups have complex roles in the Statute. ‘Humanity’ is the largest group allowed 
for, and, in a very idealised sense, humanity can be both victim and judge. National, 
ethnical, racial or religious groups (assumed to be well bounded and stable over time) 
can be the specific victims of crimes, and are in fact required to be the victim for the 
successful prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity. These groups are of 
course comprised of individuals, yet something aside from the sum total of people, 
something shared between the current members of the group and their historical 
forebears, is seen as relevant to their victim status. The group membership of the 
individual victim is paramount in the prosecution of the two most important 
international crimes, and of relevance in the determination of punishment, yet the 
group membership of the individual perpetrator is formally irrelevant to the Court and 
judged to be irrelevant to the perpetrator when he plans his actions. This confused 
conception of the individual as both a pre-social criminal and simultaneously a 
socially embedded victim demonstrates that the institution of the ICC has not been 
able to overcome the impasse between cosmopolitan and communitarian positions 
discussed in Chapter 2.
                                                
8 It is noted that this ruling also allows group pressure as a mitigating factor. This type of pressure is 
not seen as mitigating within the Rome Statute. 
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4.2 Speaking Law to Power 
Supporters of the ICC, such as the Coalition for the ICC, regard the Court as a step 
along the path to the global moral enlightenment: a genuine challenge to the dirty 
business of power politics. International criminal law on this view represents a 
universal declaration of right and wrong. The Court is seen as the missing link in 
international human rights enforcement and a natural progression in the fight to 
award and enforce basic human rights to all people. Yet there is nothing natural about 
the Court. International criminal law actually represents the results of negotiations 
between states rather than a universal moral code, and as such it is inherently 
political. The discourse may seek to deny a role to the political, but it is weakened by 
its inability to acknowledge the necessity of politics in the field of international 
justice.
The International Criminal Court is located in political time and geographical space. 
The idea for such a Court gained ground in the 1950s, but the configuration of the 
Cold War international system meant no real progress towards the Court was made 
for more than thirty years. Then, when the political context changed, new possibilities 
for international justice began to be pursued in earnest. Schabas argues that the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s ‘provided the laboratory for 
international justice that propelled the agenda [for the creation of an International 
Criminal Court] forward’ (Schabas, 2001: vii). I will discuss briefly here the format 
of the Rome Conference from which the Rome Statute emerged, and highlight the 
political nature of the negotiations. 
In June 1998 delegates from more than 160 states attended the Diplomatic 
Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court in Rome. They were joined by representatives from a range of international 
institutions and hundreds of non-governmental organisations. Driving the dynamism 
of the conference agenda was a group of states known as the ‘Caucus of the Like-
Minded’, which contained delegates from more than 60 of the participating states and 
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from a well organised coalition of NGOs. The Caucus had been active since the early 
stages of the Preparatory Commission and was committed to a set of principles which 
were substantially in conflict with the view of an International Criminal Court held 
by the Permanent Members of the UNSC. These principles included an inherent 
jurisdiction of the Court over the ‘core crimes’ of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes; the elimination of any UNSC veto on prosecutions; the establishment 
of an independent prosecutor with power to initiate proceedings proprio motu and a 
prohibition of reservations to the statute establishing the Court. The Caucus of the 
Like-Minded had a great deal of success in negotiating its wishes at the Conference, 
largely because it was so geographically diverse that it cut across traditional regional 
divides. It also dominated the structure of the conference, holding most of the 
Working Group Chairs, but other groupings also played a part: the Non-Aligned 
Movement campaigned in particular to see aggression included as a crime, the 
Southern African Development Community took positions on human rights which 
counterweighted the Europeans, and the Caucus of Arab-Islamic States supported the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons and the inclusion of the death penalty.  
The majority of the work of the Conference was done in working groups charged 
with looking at aspects of the formation of a Court such as General Principles, 
Procedures and Penalties. Provisions of the Statute were adopted ‘by general 
agreement’ in the working groups. In an example of the disdain for politics found 
within international law, voting was not allowed within the groups – provisions had 
to be accepted by consensus. This process, however, must still be seen to be political. 
Provisions were negotiated, and consensus was reached through bargaining and trade-
off. Two examples of this process of compromise are the positions taken by the 
conference on command responsibility and on the death penalty. There was a good 
deal of support at the Conference for the proposal to extend the principle of command 
responsibility to civilian commanders, but China opposed this very strongly. The US 
negotiated a compromise position, with civilian command responsibility possible, but 
requiring a higher standard of disregard. The issue of whether or not the International 
Criminal Court should be able to sentence perpetrators to death was the cause of 
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much greater conflict. A group of Arab, Islamic and Caribbean states, along with 
Singapore, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Nigeria argued strongly in favour of its inclusion. 
After much negotiation, the final Statute does not allow for the death penalty to be 
imposed by the Court itself, but the principle of complementarity (whereby national 
courts take precedence in prosecuting crimes covered by the Rome Statute if they are 
willing and able to do so) means that the national courts of State Parties can impose 
death sentences if their domestic legal systems allow for it.
The history of the crime of aggression within the Court formation process is also 
illuminating. The Rome Conference agreed that aggression should be part of the 
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but could not agree on a definition of the crime or 
on an appropriate mechanism for judicial determination of whether the crime had 
taken place. The Conference eventually agreed that the crime should remain in the 
statute, and that the Court should have jurisdiction over it when it is defined and its 
scope designated ‘in a manner consistent with the purposes of the statute and the 
ideals of the UN’ (Schabas, 2001: 26). Germany and Japan were particularly keen 
that aggression be included, and found it hard to comprehend the seeming demotion 
of a crime defined as the supreme international crime at Nuremberg, just fifty years 
before. As well as struggling to define aggression, the Rome Conference also had to 
contend with the right of the UNSC, under Article 39 of the UN Charter, to determine 
situations of aggression. This suggests that an international court could only 
prosecute in cases where the UNSC has stated that aggression has taken place. It is 
clearly very problematic that a court should have to leave the determination of a 
central factual issue in a case – i.e. whether the crime being prosecuted has actually 
taken place – to a political body, yet no way around this could be found at the 
conference. 
These examples show that the Conference was a place of politics where law was 
made, rather than discovered through the illumination of a common moral code. The 
most difficult questions in the establishment of the Court, those concerning 
jurisdiction, the core crimes, the trigger mechanisms for prosecution and the role of 
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the UNSC, were not even publicly debated for the majority of the conference 
(although a good deal of informal negotiation took place). Instead, Phillipe Kirsch, 
Chair of the Committee as a Whole and former Chair of the Like-Minded Caucus, 
handled these issues personally. He drew up a proposal, but chose not to circulate it 
until the 17th July – scheduled to be the final day of the Conference. The gamble paid 
off to the extent that many supporting states were afraid that disagreement over more 
minor points may lead to an unravelling of the grand compromises already achieved. 
However, Kirsch’s proposal was strongly opposed by the US, who forced a vote at 
the final session, thus preventing the hoped for consensual adoption of the Statute. 
120 states voted in favour of the Rome Statute, 21 abstained and 7 voted against. A 
majority prevailed and the Statute was adopted but through a political rather than 
legal process9.
The politics of the court can also be seen in the power and orientation of the states 
that support it. There are now, as of July 2006, 139 signatories to, and 100 
ratifications of, the Statute, representing more than half of the 191 UN member states. 
However, only two of the UNSC Permanent Five have ratified: the UK and France, 
arguably the least powerful. None of the major nuclear powers has ratified the treaty: 
China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia or the United States. Only Jordan has ratified in 
the Middle East. The Court is dominated by European and Latin American states, 
showing that states still have very different ideas of what international justice consists 
of.
This has not stopped advocates of the Court from claiming a natural, universal 
grounding for the laws the Court will apply, expressed most clearly by Kofi Annan, 
who, quoting Francis Bacon, claims that the court is designed to ensure that even 
sovereign powers cannot make ‘dispunishable’ acts which are evil in themselves, ‘as 
being against the Law of Nature’ (Statement at the opening of the Preparatory 
Commission for the ICC, New York, 16 February 1999). The Preamble to the Rome 
                                                
9 For more on the politics of the establishment of the ICC, see Megret (2002); Robinson (1999 & 
2003); Wippman (2004) as well as the texts cited in fn 3. On the politics of international law and war 
crimes trials in general, see fn 6. 
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Statute also claims a universal agreement not in evidence at the Conference: the State 
Parties to the Statute are apparently ‘Mindful that during this century millions of 
children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity, and Recogniz[e] that such grave crimes threaten 
the peace, security and well-being of the world’. This pair of statements is 
particularly illuminating as it claims that those acts which shock the conscience of 
humanity are crimes (a position which follows a cosmopolitan liberal natural law 
view of the world – transgressions of the moral code are crimes, whether or not they 
are currently prohibited by criminal law – and with the assumption of a harmony of 
interests which suggests that if liberal policies are instituted, all needs can be met and 
suffering will cease), and also claims that these crimes threaten the peace and security
of the world – a classic liberal internationalist view. These claims to naturalism show 
one of the weaknesses of the Court: the politics of writing the law are very apparent 
in the history of the institution. There is no agreement on basic values, so a positivist 
approach is needed, but this is anathema to liberalism. Instead, universal moral 
standards are simply asserted, in the face of the evidence.
One of the most difficult questions the Conference had to face was the role of the 
UNSC and the relevant provisions in the Statute remain highly controversial. As 
noted above, the UNSC has a significant role in determining aggression. Another 
critical concern at the Conference was the ability of the Council to interfere with the 
work of the Court. States who were not Permanent Members of the Council did not 
want the international legal process to be politicised. Permanent Members argued that 
decisions over possible criminal prosecutions should not be taken at a time that 
negotiations to promote international peace and security were underway. The 
compromise reached allows the Council to prevent the Court from exercising 
jurisdiction by passing a positive resolution, renewable annually. This measure is 
called ‘deferral’ but it appears that it could be used to prevent permanently the 
International Criminal Court trying a particular case, through continued renewals. 
The scope of the UNSC to block the work of the Court is limited to some degree by 
the requirement that to prevent the Court from investigating or prosecuting a case, the 
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Council must be acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. they must 
determine the existence of a ‘threat to the peace’, a ‘breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of 
aggression’. However, the success of the US in forcing the Council to pass in 2002, 
and renew in 2003, Resolution 1422 (which guaranteed that non-State Parties 
contributing to UN forces were exempt from the Court), by threatening to veto all 
future peacekeeping operations, demonstrates a genuine stalemate between Council 
and Court. The US failed to renew 1422 in 2004, but only because they lacked 
leverage due to the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. 
The position of the US is particularly important to consider in the context of the ICC 
because, given its power in the international system, the US offers the most damaging 
opposition to the Court. From 1995 through to 2000, the US government supported 
the establishment of an ICC, but always argued for a Court which could be controlled 
through the UN Security Council (UNSC), or that provided exemption from 
prosecution for U.S. officials and nationals. On the final day of the Clinton 
Administration, the US signed the Rome Statute, signalling its desire to stay in the 
debate. At the time, President Clinton stated the treaty was fundamentally flawed and 
would not be forwarded to the Senate for ratification. He also recommended that his 
successor not forward the treaty to the Senate. Certainly, the Bush administration has 
taken an altogether more aggressive approach, by renouncing the US signature on the 
Statute and any legal implications which followed from it, passing the American 
Servicemembers Protection Act (which authorizes the president to take ‘all means 
necessary’ to free Americans taken into custody by the court, presumably including 
invading the Netherlands), strong-arming states into signing Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements and threatening to veto all future peacekeeping operations in order to 
gain support for UNSC resolution 1422 which guaranteed that non-State Parties 
contributing to UN forces were exempt from the Court. But this increase in the 
ferocity of the response does not change its basic character: the US always has been 
opposed to a Court exercising universal jurisdiction which is not controlled by the 
UNSC. 
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So why is the US, a liberal state known for its long-standing support for human rights 
and commitment to promoting them throughout the world, so vehemently opposed to 
the Court? The main aspect of their opposition concerns doubts over the scope and 
nature of international law. The ‘new sovereigntist’ critique (see Rabkin (2005), Spiro 
(2000 & 2004) and Woolsey (2003)) argues that the Court is a grave threat to state 
sovereignty due to its potential jurisdiction over US nationals even if the US does not 
ratify the treaty, which is seen as fundamentally in breach of both customary treaty 
practice and UN Charter protections of national sovereignty. The threats stem from 
jurisdiction and new crimes provisions within the Rome Statute. The ICC purports to 
have jurisdiction over certain crimes committed in the territory of a State Party, 
including by nationals of a non-party. Thus the court would have jurisdiction for 
enumerated crimes alleged against US nationals, including US service members, in 
the territory of a State Party (Article 12), even though the US is not a Party. The 
Statute does require the Court to defer to national prosecution unless the Court finds 
that the state concerned is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution, but the Court itself makes this decision so the Statute would allow the 
ICC to review and possibly reject a sovereign state's decisions not to prosecute or a 
domestic court’s decisions not to convict in specific cases. The new crimes provisions 
also cause problems: a State Party to the Statute can ‘opt out’ of crimes added by 
amendment to the Statute, thereby exempting its nationals from the ICC's jurisdiction 
for these crimes. A non-party cannot opt out (Article 121). The US is particularly 
concerned here over the crime of aggression, a crime which has been included within 
the court's jurisdiction, but has not been defined. The parties to the Statute will amend 
it to define this crime and specify the conditions for exercise of jurisdiction over it 
(Article 5). Only parties to the Statute can opt out of the jurisdiction of the court over 
the crime of aggression as per Article 121, leaving the US uniquely exposed to the 
Court (given its vastly disproportionate contribution to UN and independent 
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions) but unable to opt out of the 
crime, however defined. 
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The US recognises the inevitability of power and politics in international law, and 
supports a hybrid system of international administration that includes a significant 
role for the Security Council, which should remain free to wage war or negotiate for 
peace as it sees fit to uphold international peace and security, alongside an 
international legal regime which can be brought to bear when the politics of a 
situation allow for it. Given the highly political nature of the adoption of the Rome 
Statute, the fears of the US that its application will also be political are certainly 
understandable. The desire for the UNSC to retain a key role keeps the politics of 
international law in view, given that they cannot and should not be banished. Had 
they been given an opportunity to influence the process, through the Security 
Council, the US position on the Court would have been very different10.
The format of the Rome Conference attempted to factor politics out of the creation of 
international criminal law, but the resultant Court may be weakened by its inability to 
acknowledge the necessity of politics in the field of international justice. There is no 
shared moral code upon which to ground international criminal law and no central 
authority to enforce it, so politics is an inevitable feature of the system. It may also be 
a useful feature, as is only through politics that difference can be successfully 
negotiated (demonstrated at the Rome Conference, where an innovative Court was 
created through compromise and bargaining). There is a danger in the cosmopolitan 
liberal tendency to treat the legal rules that resulted from a political process as if they 
are expressions of a universal moral understanding, somehow above the world of 
politics, for doing this tempts one to overlook the very real difficulties of reconciling 
law with power in the international sphere.
                                                
10 For further discussion of the US position on the ICC, see Franck & Yuhan (2003); Kahn (2003); 
Ralph (2003 & 2005); Rodman (2006); Rosenthal (2004); Sands (2005); Weller (2002).
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4.3 Implications of the Conceptualisation of Agency & the Denial of 
Politics within the Rome Statute
Customary international criminal law since 1945 does not seem to have had much 
effect in preventing genocide, stopping wars or ending injustice and impunity. As 
documented in Chapter 3, the ICTY has held 62 trials in twelve years and the ICTR 
has held 26 in eleven years. Considering the scale of the atrocities these tribunals 
were set up to confront, this number of trials suggests that justice is far from being 
done. The innovation of the International Criminal Court, with its confused
conception of the agent of international violence, and its fear of politics and power, is 
unlikely to fare any better.  In the final section of the chapter I will begin to explore 
the implications of the particular conceptions of agency within the Rome Statute and 
the political/ historical context of the Statute, as they impact on the goals of the 
Court.  
The official website of the Rome Statute of the ICC lists the following as reasons for 
the establishment of an international criminal court: to achieve justice for all; to end 
impunity; to help end conflicts; to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals; to take 
over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act; to deter 
future war criminals (Rome Statute website, 2006).
These are noble goals, but the problems highlighted in this chapter suggest that the 
International Criminal Court and its attendant international criminal law will not 
achieve the most critical of them. The Court may remedy some financial and practical 
deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals, and it may take over in a small number of cases 
where national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act. However, I 
argue below that it will not achieve justice for all: the vast majority of international 
suffering and violence will remain unpunished, and it will not deter future crime. 
The possibility of the Court achieving justice for all is encouraged by the illusion that 
that Court has the causes and perpetrators of the most serious incidents of 
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international violence within its jurisdiction. In fact, the move from state civil to 
individual criminal agency described in Chapter 3 and concretised in the Rome 
Statute has narrowed the focus of concern to exclude considerations of responsibility 
for most suffering:  
By focussing on individual responsibility, criminal law reduces the 
perspective of the phenomenon to make it easier for the eye. Thereby it 
reduces the complexity and scale of multiple responsibilities to a mere 
background. We are not discussing state responsibility, we are discussing 
criminal law. We are not really discussing a crime of aggression, we are 
busy discussing a rape or murder. We are not really discussing nuclear 
weapons, we are discussing machete knives used in Rwanda. We are not 
much discussing the immense environmental catastrophes caused by wars 
and the responsibility for them, we are discussing the compensation to be 
paid by an individual criminal to individual victims. Thereby the exercise 
which international criminal law induces is that of monopolizing violence 
as a legitimate tool of politics, and privatizing the responsibility and duty 
to compensate for the damages caused (Tallgren, 2002: 594).
A consequence of the development of the ICJS has been to frame violence which is 
seen as intolerable or ‘atrocious’ as the action of individuals, conferring a level of 
legitimacy on violence which does not fall within the remit of the system, principally 
state violence or aggression (which is unlikely to ever be defined satisfactorily). Yet 
it is states which bring about the situations of conflict which facilitate the atrocities 
that the ICC seeks to prosecute. This echoes Schmitt’s observation that criminalising 
war actually legitimises extreme violence on the part of those fighting for ‘justice’ or 
‘humanity’ (Schmitt, 1996: 54).
The legalised, individualised conception of agency within the Statute limits the 
possibilities for responsibility so guarantees impunity for those who do not fit the 
model of the individual criminal. The focus of criminal law tends to be on liability for 
actions taken rather than on the contexts in which such actions became possible or 
acceptable. Many of the agents that enable atrocity (by, for instance, fostering or 
helping to sustain a climate of ethnic fear or hatred – responsibility for which is 
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considered in more detail in Chapter 7) are ruled out of consideration by the Court 
because their actions and attitudes were not intended directly to cause harm. 
The focus on rights within the ICJS also limits the scope of responsibility. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the rights outlined in the Declaration of Human Rights are 
designed to protect the individual from arbitrary state interference while he acts in a 
public capacity (as a citizen of the polity or a unit of labour) but not to interfere with 
his activities in the private sphere. Private sphere actors (who have traditionally been 
women) are not sufficiently protected by the human rights regime, as private sphere 
actions do not fall within the remit of the ICC. The Court seeks to punish actions 
which take place as part of systematic or widespread attacks, predominantly in times 
of war. The physical attacks and economic disadvantage suffered by women, such as 
rape within marriage, domestic violence and unequal property rights, remain legal 
within many states, are rarely seen as part of a systematic attack and certainly are not 
confined to times of conflict. Even in the context of war, the public/ private split 
seems to have had an effect. In wartime, sexual violence, enforced prostitution and 
trafficking in women have long been regarded as weapons, spoils or unavoidable 
consequences of conflict. The ICC has gone some way to tackling the gendered 
effects of conflict, but the question remains how much can be done if the conception 
of the individual at the heart of the human rights regime is itself gendered.
The privileging of political and civil rights at the expense of social and economic 
rights in the Rome Statute does not just impact on women. Because of liberalism’s 
concentration on the individual and on crime, poverty and massive economic 
inequality are not considered suitable concerns for the institutions of the human rights 
regime. The Rome Statute states that it will prosecute the ‘most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole’ (Article 5), and as the operation 
of international capitalism cannot be viewed as a crime committed by individuals, its 
effects are seen as secondary in the rights discourse.
The Court is also severely limited by its founding Statute as to the number of cases it 
can try. Most of the accused who appear before the Court will not be the direct 
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perpetrators of crimes, but those who plan, organise and incite them.  The Court will 
have to make judgments both between crimes, on the basis of gravity, and between 
persons, on the basis of the role they played in the crime, in order to manage its case 
load. The scale of the solution is far smaller than the scale of the problem.
This, however, is a backwards looking view. What of the final goal on the list – the 
deterrence of future crime? Deterrence is seen as the most critical ambition of the 
Court:
Effective deterrence is a primary objective of those working to establish 
the international criminal court. Once it is clear that the international 
community will no longer tolerate such monstrous acts without assigning 
responsibility and meting out appropriate punishment -- to heads of State 
and commanding officers as well as to the lowliest soldiers in the field or 
militia recruits -- it is hoped that those who would incite a genocide; 
embark on a campaign of ethnic cleansing; murder, rape and brutalize 
civilians caught in an armed conflict; or use children for barbarous 
medical experiments will no longer find willing helpers. (Rome Statute 
website, 2006) 
If the ICC is successful in deterring crime through assigning responsibility and 
punishing criminals then the size of the Court machinery may in time be irrelevant. 
Unfortunately, the unproblematised move from domestic to international criminal law 
suggests that international criminal law will not prevent future atrocities, as the 
necessary societal conditions are not present, and the nature of international crime 
differs so considerably from that of domestic crime.
Tallgren examines whether the consequentialist or utilitarian justification for 
punishment at a national level has bearing at an international level (Tallgren, 2002:
568-9). This justification for punishment concerns its ability to deter or prevent future 
wrongs, which it is said to do in three ways: through fear, through internalisation of 
moral values and through creation of coherence in a value system. Punishment 
prevents future wrongs through fear by a deterrent effect, i.e. the criminal law 
changes the motivational structure or cognitive profile of the offender, who fears the 
negative consequences of her actions so decides against committing a crime. The 
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second mechanism of prevention concerns the repressive and rhetorical apparatus of 
the criminal law shaping the value system of a society and thus encouraging the 
subjects of the law to come to believe that the actions the law prohibits are actually 
wrong. The final mechanism is subordinate to the first two and can be discerned when 
the subjects of the law behave according to the law out of habit or through imitation 
of others. 
These mechanisms work best under particular conditions, many of which simply do 
not apply at the international level. The systemic and behavioural mechanisms rely on 
conditions in which the criminal legal system has a high level of legitimacy, when the 
criminalised acts are widely seen as deserving of condemnation and when the 
behaviour of the offender is open to change. Pace the cosmopolitan lawyers who 
promote the benefits of international criminal law, these conditions are very unlikely 
to be present in the international realm. The international criminal justice system does 
not enjoy a high level of legitimacy among states or peoples, and thus the norms it 
promotes are unlikely to be internalised in preference to domestic norms, where the 
two conflict. Also, rather than being a member of a society which abhors the 
criminalised behaviour, the international offender may be part of a group which 
actively promotes such behaviour. The offender must therefore choose between 
breaking a distant international criminal code which she feels has little bearing upon 
her life and breaking with the norms of a group with whom she identifies strongly. 
Finally, the behaviour of the offender may not be open to change as international 
criminality is not socially deviant in the way that domestic criminality is seen to be, 
so is unlikely to receive community censure. The only likely mechanism for 
prevention of crime at international level therefore appears to be the cognitive 
mechanism of the deterrent effect. This relies upon the potential offender being aware 
of and motivated by both the likelihood of negative consequences and the severity of 
the punishment. As the likelihood of being punished for an international crime is 
statistically minute, international criminal law can only deter through severity of 
punishment. However, the severity would need to be so extreme to balance out the 
low likelihood of ever having to suffer it that the punishments would surely count as 
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cruel and unusual and thus be ruled out by international human rights standards. The 
fact that atrocities were committed in Kosovo while the ICTY was already active 
seems to bear this analysis out: the perpetrators were not at all deterred by the 
prospect of being tried at an international tribunal (see Snyder and Vinjamuri (2004), 
for more discussion on the failure of tribunals to deter atrocity). 
In further contrast to domestic crimes, international crimes tend to be committed by 
ordinary people in extraordinary times (as opposed to deviant people in ordinary 
times). In the conclusion to their study of the Holocaust, Kren and Rappoport state: 
‘Our judgment is that the overwhelming majority of SS men, leaders as well as rank 
and file, would have easily passed all the psychiatric tests ordinarily given to US 
recruits or Kansas City policemen’ (Krenn & Rappoport, 1994: 70). International 
criminals cannot therefore be identified by their dysfunction or difference to their 
fellow citizens. Their behaviour cannot be explained with reference to their economic 
or societal marginalisation. It is the circumstances they act in which are unusual. War 
is as far from the ‘ordinary course of events’ as can be imagined. Extraordinary 
circumstances may mean there are no guidelines or norms for individuals to apply, or 
that the norms applied change, and norms which promote stability or the safety of the 
group become more relevant. For instance, following the trial of William Calley for 
the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, a survey of the American public found 
that 51 % would follow orders if commanded to shoot all inhabitants of a Vietnamese 
village. Kelman and Lawrence (1972) who conducted the survey concluded that a 
substantial proportion of Americans saw Calley’s actions as ‘normal, even desirable, 
because [they think] he performed them in obedience to legitimate authority’(cited in 
Gross, 1991: 325).
Finally, the International Criminal Court is unlikely to ensure that justice is done 
because it conceives of the individual as an international actor in a contradictory and 
unjust way. Victims and perpetrators of international crime are seen as different types 
of individual – one as socially embedded (which implies the absence of agency) and 
the other as pre-social. This false dichotomy constructs our understanding of 
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atrocities in a way that precludes us from seeing perpetrators as victims and vice 
versa. They are simply not constructed as the same types of human being, and this 
leads to conflict being viewed in dangerously simple terms: as the battle between 
innocence and evil.. Yet the perpetrators of international crime are invariably playing 
particular roles, be it state representative, organisation member, follower of a 
particular ideology or member of the formal or informal armed forces. The Rome 
Statute virtually requires that the individuals it prosecutes be located in relation to 
others as organisers, leaders or instigators of the crimes within its jurisdiction yet 
denies the relevance of social roles. The idea of international criminality within the 
Rome Statute therefore misses much of the significance of the societal nature of the 
person – the effect of social roles and the enabling function of groups – and omits to 
assign responsibility for actions carried out socially.
Why does this problem of social role or structure arise only to a limited extent when 
discussing domestic criminal law? Such law may be more stable because there is 
some assumption that all agents are framed by the same culture, and that the social 
roles played within the society are comprehensible to all members of that society: a 
jury can think their way into the roles and understand the perpetrator from within her 
own frame of reference. Also, the social pressures that apply to the defendants are 
likely to apply to others in the same community, so judgements can be made about 
how far these pressures can mitigate an offence. However, beyond the borders of the 
state the social aspects of the individual can be much less well understood. The 
pressures across societies and situations are diverse, and the construction of the 
individual takes place in different ways and with different results across time and 
place. 
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4.4 Conclusion
The ICC is an innovative addition to the institutional architecture of international 
society, and represents a historically unprecedented level of co-ordination between 
states, inter-governmental organisations and NGOs. This chapter has argued that the 
Court cannot achieve the goals set out for it, but this does not mean the institution has 
no merit. The Rome Statute has killed off the concept of sovereign immunity, and the 
Court itself has the potential to reduce the arbitrary power of the state to prosecute or 
pardon at will. The creation of the Court was motivated by a desire that those who 
inflict great suffering upon others should be held responsible for their actions: a 
position I support absolutely within this thesis. It is the method of holding responsible 
rather than the impulse to do so that is at fault. In order to prosecute the crimes 
envisaged by the Statute, the Court is built upon mutually contradictory foundations: 
the liberal conception of the free individual and the communitarian conception of the 
inherent value of community and the identity-constitutive nature of group 
membership. 
The perpetrator is portrayed as a free and rational actor, propelled by intention, 
independent of social role and culture, whose actions are under her volitional control. 
Her social origin and position in social institutions such as governments or the armed 
forces, particular capabilities and personal circumstances are seen as irrelevant both 
to the Court, and more importantly, to the perpetrator. In other words, the perpetrator 
is the model of liberal individualist agency, unfettered by communal ties and so 
solely responsible for any action taken. This narrative of the international agent is 
seductive: if atrocity is described as the work of voluntary agents – individual 
perpetrators doing violence to innocent groups – then it can be punished and future 
atrocity deterred. Responsibility can be assigned to individuals for all acts which 
displease us, and no questions need to be asked about the effects of larger practices 
such as nationalism and war on the incidence of atrocity. Breaches of the universal 
moral code are just that: breaches or disruptions, certainly not consequences of the 
normal workings of the international system.
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But the crimes that the ICC seeks to prosecute call into question the model of the 
individual supposed to be their perpetrator. Distress at genocide and crimes against 
humanity is about something more than just the injuries to individuals, and the 
definitions of these crimes recognise that they are crimes against peoples, groups or 
cultures which are judged to be of value in and of themselves. The ICC has been set 
up to prosecute sovereign individuals for inherently social crimes. This confusion 
suggests that the conception of agency within the statute is fundamentally flawed.
This view of agency also has a practical effect on policy. Agency is seen as residing 
with individuals and the conception of individuals as ‘uncaused causes’ makes 
atrocity impossible to predict. The ICC is a logical response to this liberal conception: 
if atrocity cannot be predicted, then it cannot be prevented. The way to respond to it 
must be after-the-fact legal prosecution and punishment.  Acceptance of this highly 
problematic conception of the individual gives undue support to a legal rather than 
political response. Taking on the political task of preventing atrocity in the very early 
stages of violence, or the military task of intervening to forcibly bring it to a close are 
much more costly options, but may be normatively preferable if lives can be saved. 
The ICC does not just rely on an ideology which rules out the possibility of 
prevention, it also makes force more difficult to use, because states who send troops 
are risking prosecution by the Court. The US among others will be very reluctant to 
answer calls to intervene in future in situations of great crisis such as Kosovo. It is 
worth repeating that the ICTY was in place when the atrocities in Kosovo started and 
it does not seem to have had any deterrent effect. 
The concept of responsibility within the ICJS is also problematic, as it tends to 
narrow the scope of agents and actions that can be included in any assessment of our 
obligations to each other. The liberal emphasis on intentionality of agency means that 
many of those people (as individuals or groups) who enabled crimes by creating the 
social conditions which made them possible will escape unpunished as they cannot be 
shown to have intended particular harms. More important still is that the legalised 
approach to responsibility disguises the interests of power: the effects of that violence 
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which is bracketed away from ‘atrocity’ because it is permissible under the laws of 
war or is carried out in the ‘private sphere’ are much greater on human beings and the 
environment than the effects of the small number of crimes that the ICC will 
prosecute. The liberal individualist focus of the Court means that the field of 
international justice is narrowed to exclude the most serious and widespread suffering 
in contemporary international relations. Suffering is not just caused by violence. The 
effects of liberal economic policy on global poverty and economic inequality in 
particular are obscured by the attention directed towards international crime. The 
scale of the solution offered by the Court is far smaller than the scale of the problem, 
and, as the discussion in Chapter 3 suggested, some of that problem may itself stem 
from the very ideology which gave us the ICC.
All of this suggests a need to go back to basics in international ethics and rethink the 
root assumptions that lie beneath the cosmopolitan liberalism which suffuses much 
contemporary theorising and practice. A great deal of such thinking has been started 
in the last decade, with the foundations of cosmopolitan liberalism challenged by 
essentialist, non-foundational and anti-foundational theorists. Some of the most 
challenging work has been on the ‘Agency-Structure debate’, which calls the very 
concept of agency into question. Before I can examine new theories of responsibility, 
I need to consider, in the following chapter, claims that structure so dominates our 
lives that our experiences of agency are merely illusions.
125
CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURE AND THE (IM)POSSIBILITY 
OF AGENCY
In Part One of the thesis, I explored the impasse that contemporary international 
political theory seems stuck within. Cosmopolitan liberalism defends the rights of a 
radically free, sovereign individual, unconstrained by social or material structures –
the epitome of an agent. Communitarianism sees people as constructed by the social 
structures that surround them – their freedom in some sense not just limited by their 
reliance on community, but also extended by it, as the community provides meaning 
and direction to individual lives. The insights of each side are appealing, and each 
feature in the workings of the contemporary international system: human rights are 
promoted to protect the freedom of the individual and the concept of individual 
responsibility is the foundation of the ICC, yet states are afforded a high level of 
protection from external interference by the UN Charter and as a norm of the system, 
and crimes against groups are seen as more significant than crimes against individuals 
at the international level.
Can the impasse to be overcome? There have been a number of attempts to so in 
recent theorizing, which I will document below. Before I do, it is necessary to look 
more closely at the relationships perceived between agent and structure in the 
standard positions. The impasse reached may be a result of an understandable but 
unjustified desire on the part of cosmopolitan liberals to assert agency: a concept 
which, after all, is a necessary component of normative theory. Without some type of 
agency or freedom of action, all talk of right and wrong seems insignificant and 
meaningless. What will be, without agency, will be. There is no point discussing 
whether actions or states of affairs are good or bad, since they cannot be changed. 
Agency is therefore necessary to normative theory, but is the impasse reached 
because agency is to a large extent impossible? Is the world such that structures 
constrain or construct agency so totally that to theorise free action is quite literally 
wishful thinking?
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Classical IR theory tends to be agent-centric, with the relevant agents seen to be 
states. Waltz, with his book Man, the State and War (first published in 1959), brought 
about something of a revolution in the discipline by suggesting that the nature of the 
international system (a structural variable) was the best – though not the only –
explanation for war. Waltz’s work was followed in the 1960s and 1970s by theories 
which were more unambiguously structuralist: dependency theory, core-periphery 
analysis and world-systems theory. This chapter will argue that to pit agency and 
structure against each other in a competition to find the most powerful is to continue 
the dichotomous thinking criticized in Chapter 2. I look at theories which perceive a 
more subtle relationship between the two phenomena, and argue that neither is prior. 
At the end of the chapter, I outline a conception of agency that is sensitive to the 
contemporary agency-structure debate, but presents a more innovative and persuasive 
account of each phenomena than either cosmopolitan liberalism, communitarianism, 
or the various post-positivist theories which have attempted to move IPT beyond the 
stalemate of the mainstream positions.
5.1 Free Will, Volition and Agency
Cosmopolitanism, liberalism and communitarianism are normative positions: they all 
have something to say about the way the world should be as well as the way the 
world is. These positions are engaged in ethical or moral theorizing, thus assume that 
facts about the world are not fixed – that situations they find troubling can be 
improved. They judge actions rather than simply describing them, and assign praise 
and blame to actors, that is, confer moral status upon them. But is this status justified? 
The relevant criteria for actors and actions to be assigned moral status centre on the 
idea of volition. Aristotle, the first philosopher to explicitly construct a theory of 
moral responsibility, argued that praise and blame can only appropriately be ascribed 
to voluntary actions or traits which are carried out or displayed by particular agents 
(Aristotle, 2000, Book III Chapters 1-5). Agents will not be morally responsible for 
all of the actions they take – they will only be deserving of praise or blame for those 
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they chose to perform. According to Aristotle, there are two conditions which 
determine whether an action is voluntary: i) the control condition, which requires that 
the action or trait must have it’s origin in the agent, so must be done without 
compulsion and ii) the epistemic condition, which requires that the actor must be in 
full knowledge of the circumstances, so be aware of what she is causing or bringing 
about. Compulsory action is that caused by external circumstances, to which the 
agent contributes nothing. Involuntary action can also be the result of ignorance of 
any of the circumstances surrounding the action. In Aristotelian theory, actions done 
out of great fear or duress are likely still to be voluntary as there is an element of 
agential choice at the moment of action. A very high standard is imposed onto the 
moral behaviour of agents, and this thinking has been followed by Sartre, among 
others, who argues that in some situations where you must choose between life and 
death, choosing life will be the immoral choice. No matter how difficult the 
circumstances, if you have any choice at all (which you will, as suicide is always an 
option) then you are acting voluntarily and thus still morally responsible for your 
actions. This is why Sartre sees the absolute freedom of the individual as a burden: 
‘[m]an is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, 
in other respects is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for 
everything he does’ (Sartre, 1947: 23). 
The idea of volition is translated into law as intentionality, and only actions where the 
actor can be said to have had some choice are seen as suitable for legal consideration 
and punishment. It is not appropriate to blame or punish an agent for actions which 
were coerced, compelled or otherwise ‘caused’ entirely by factors external to the 
rational capacity of the actor, particularly if one of the objectives of punishment is to 
deter the actor from behaving that way again. Involuntary actions cannot be deterred. 
I noted in Chapter 4 that the ICC is premised on this model of responsibility, which 
sees intent and knowledge as necessary to guilt.
Any discussion of volition entails ideas of freedom. An intuition which flows through 
most philosophical work in this area is the fundamental injustice of holding someone 
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morally responsible for an action that they had no choice but to perform. However, 
the freedom of the agent cannot be easily established: if an action is caused then it is 
not free (as there were no other possible actions which the agent could have taken: the 
cause/s predetermined the action). Conversely, if an action is uncaused then surely it 
is random. It does not seem correct to assign moral responsibility in either of these 
cases – in the first the agent had no deliberative role and in the second they had no 
role at all. 
There are three principal positions taken in the debate over the causes of action in 
philosophy. Determinists assert that all action is caused and as such is not free. The 
causes cited may be structural, psychological, biological or theological, but they all 
have the effect of falsifying the hypothesis that the human will is free. Conversely, 
some theorists deny all determinist claims and argue that human agents are genuinely 
free and capable of identifying, deliberating over and choosing between courses of 
action open to them (a view which I have argued, in Chapter 2, is necessary and 
foundational to cosmopolitan liberalism). These two positions are both classed as 
‘incompatibilist’ as they deny that the will of the agent can be free if determinist 
theory is true. The third position taken is a ‘compatibilist’ position, which holds that 
both determinist theory and a theory of free will may be true simultaneously (i.e. that 
the theories are compatible with each other). 
Ideas of legal responsibility, in both domestic and international law, tend to be 
compatibilist. The abilities of law and jurisprudence to command respect depend in 
large part on their telling stories about individual responsibility which are close to our 
everyday understandings of the notion, principally that the agent must be seen as 
being the cause of the outcome (Hart, 1968 and Feinberg, 1970). However, legal 
scholars have long noted the problem of agency and causal chains. To assign 
responsibility under law, the agent must be assumed to be an independent source of 
power, rather than a domino destined to fall. This invokes Kant’s conception of the 
individual as the uncaused cause: ‘Our blame is based on a law of reason whereby we 
regard reason as a cause that irrespective of all … empirical conditions could have 
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caused the agent to act otherwise’ (Kant, 1782, quoted in Barnes, 2000: 9). Reason is 
seen as entirely free, so to locate responsibility for an action one must work back 
along the causal chain to find the first free act. The intuition here is that every event 
has a cause, but not every cause is an event: sometimes the cause is a rational agent. 
I discussed in Chapter 2 some of the problems with this account of the sovereign, 
volitional agent. I also noted that communitarianism does not offer us an easy 
solution. Cosmopolitan liberalism requires a highly disputed notion of free will, but 
communitarianism implies an opposite, though equally controversial, causal force –
the community. Communitarianism is deterministic: it regards individuals as 
constructed by culture, and action as caused by socially conditioned roles, routines 
and habits. Yet this position cannot account for change, and, more critically to the 
argument I wish to make in this piece, it does not accurately describe the world as we 
perceive it. Our experiences of free will and human agency are surely too powerful to 
simply be mistaken, but neither cosmopolitan liberalism nor communitarianism can 
adequately account for them. Both sets of theories reify and essentialise either agent 
or structure, leaving each open to valid criticism from its opponents. The following 
section looks at recent work on the relationship between agent and structure in 
International Relations to ascertain whether contemporary theorising can offer ways 
to get beyond this either/ or causal dichotomy to inspire new ways to think about the 
possibility of agency.
5.2 The ‘Agency-Structure’ Debate in International Relations
Consideration of the nature of agency and the extent to which it is free has appeared 
only recently in International Relations, yet the relationship between agent and 
structure is critical in justifying conceptions of agency. The debate over the influence 
structure exerts over agency originated in modern thought with the writings of 
Durkheim (see particularly Durkheim (1982)), who argued that long term structural 
factors were the most important determinants of individual behaviour. This is entirely 
130
contrary to the view, prevalent in British social thought at the time and seen in 
contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism, that social phenomena can be explained by 
reference to the actions and motives of individuals. This view is well summed up by 
John Stuart Mill: ‘Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of 
substance’ (Mill, 1843, Book 6, Chapter VII: 1, quoted in Carr, 2001a: 25). On the 
contrary, for Durkheim, action can only be explained when the social environment of 
the actors is understood, in particular, individual exposure to phenomena he labelled 
‘social facts’. These ‘facts’ are external to the individual, coercive of her and not 
dependent upon her for their existence, and among the clearest examples of them are 
structures of law. This structural view of action is inherent in communitarian thought, 
as noted above, though neither cosmopolitan liberal nor communitarian theorists tend 
to engage explicitly in the ‘agency-structure’ debate.
We have seen in previous chapters that assumptions about agency follow from 
particular normative positions taken on the value of community and the role it plays 
in the life of the individual. The ‘agency-structure’ debate in International Relations 
has been less concerned with the roles of the individual and the community, and has 
focused more on the roles of the state and the international system, but there is much 
to be learned from it none-the-less.
The first question to ask when assessing agential possibilities in the face of structure 
is what precisely we mean by ‘agent’ and ‘structure’. In mainstream (pre-
constructivism) IR theory, states as agents are viewed as rational beings that are pre-
social, that is, their interests and identities are formed prior to interaction and they are 
the source of their own conceptions of the Good. This is directly analogous to the 
model of the individual in cosmopolitan liberalism. Structures are largely conceived 
of in material terms, as the availability of resources across the system, or the security 
structure measured in terms of relative military capabilities. The interaction between 
these autonomous agents and material structures takes place only as states seek to 
attain their particular goals. Interaction or sociability itself is not a goal – it is a 
strategic activity for the purpose of pursing interests. 
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A number of theorists have found themselves to be dissatisfied with these 
conceptions and have sought to investigate the assumptions about agents and 
structures present in IR theories. Wendt (1991) argues that there are two ways to 
explain social phenomena: causally and constitutively. Causal explanations are those 
which use laws of cause and effect, and these explanations can show how rules and 
institutions change or are reproduced. Constitutive explanations use interpretation to 
understand the perspectives of the actors involved and the contexts in which they 
believe themselves to be. There are three ways to explain the agent-structure 
relationship using causal laws: structures may cause agents (as in communitarianism), 
agents may cause structures (as in cosmopolitan liberalism) or they may 
simultaneously cause each other.  
The belief that structures determine agents, or that society is ontologically prior to the 
individual, can be seen initially in the sociological work of Durkheim, and 
subsequently in dependency theory, core-periphery analysis and world-systems 
theory in IR. This argument suggests that agency is unimportant as individuals are 
just the bearers of social relations. Social phenomena have an existence of their own 
and can be studied independently of the behaviour of the individuals whose actions 
they determine. Human autonomy and creativity are denied, which runs counter to 
our everyday intuitions on agency. This conflict with everyday discourse can be 
explained in a number of ways. Many structuralists argue that the conflict is culture 
specific. They see subjectivity as a mode of awareness historically specific to the 
Western culture; not an innate part of human nature but rather socially constructed in 
different ways in different societies. Carr contributes to this line by historicising the 
individual. He quotes Burckhardt’s ‘Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy’, in 
which Burckhardt argues that the cult of the individual began in the Renaissance as 
man ‘became a spiritual individual and recognised himself as such’, whereas 
previously he’d been ‘conscious of himself only as a member of a race, party, people, 
family or corporation’ (quoted in Carr, 2001a: 27). Marxists and critics such as 
Polanyi (see Chapter 2) argue that this change in the construction of agency is linked 
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to changing relations of production and that it is the function of ideology to constitute 
subjects as the occupants of roles and bearers of social structures appropriate to 
different stages of capitalist development.
Susan Strange (Strange, 1994) advanced the structuralist position in international 
political economy by challenging the view that power was a property of agents, used 
to pursue their interests.  She argued that power resides in structure and is a feature of 
all structural relationships. Structural power is thus: ‘the power to decide how things 
shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, 
relate to people or relate to corporate enterprises’ (Strange, 1994: 25). Strange 
identified four primary structures in the international sphere: knowledge, financial, 
production and political. She was concentrating on the structures which constrain and 
enable state agency, but one may be able to make analogies across to individual 
agency and see political, economic, legal and cultural structures playing a similar 
role. 
Structuralist arguments suggest that talk of responsibility in IPT is meaningless. If 
agency depends entirely upon structure, and there is no sense in which it is free – no 
sense in which an agent could have done otherwise – then the concept of 
responsibility is empty. We can talk about causes in a structuralist world, but we 
cannot talk about responsibility, as responsibility suggests a moral judgement of 
actions taken, which is pointless if the actions were inevitable. This represents a real 
difficulty for communitarian political theories. How can responsibility be possible in 
a world in which the identity and interests of individuals – those aspects of the self 
that direct action – are formed by the structures of the community? The answer to this 
has to be to transfer agency up to state level, as the state is the institutional 
representation of the community. Communitarians support the rights of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention because of the intrinsic value of the community in 
the life of the individual, and in doing so indicate that they regard the state as having 
agency (for only if it has agency does its freedom need protecting). This is an 
interesting, though flawed, line of argument: the determinism of communitarianism 
133
does not allow for such an easy solution. If the actions of individuals are largely 
determined by interests and values transmitted through culture, some agent or causal 
force separate to it must create that culture. The state is staffed by individuals whose 
actions are (however distantly) caused by culture, so it is not at all clear how the state 
could be free of its determinative effects, i.e. could exercise agency and create 
culture. 
The opposite argument to the structuralist view contends that agents (individuals or 
states) create their world and any structures which are in it. As discussed in Chapter 
2, methodological individualists argue that all sociological and structuralist 
explanations are reducible to characteristics of individuals and rest on assumptions 
about individual behaviour. Individuals are thus ontologically prior to structures, even 
though they may act in response to structures, once created. This tends to be the 
working assumption made by legal systems, as without the possibility of free agency, 
criminal law would have no force and no meaning. Despite appearances to the 
contrary in Theory of International Politics (1979), there are elements of this view in 
the work of the most influential supposedly structuralist IR theorist of the late 
twentieth century, Kenneth Waltz. He argues that ‘from the co-action of like units 
emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of them. Once formed, a market 
becomes a force in itself, and a force that the constitutive units acting singly or in 
small numbers cannot control’ (Waltz, 1979: 90). This quotation demonstrates that 
those who place agents as prior to structure do not always hold that structures are 
created intentionally by agents, and indicates that even if it could be established that 
agents were ontologically prior, the individual agent may still be significantly 
constrained in given circumstances. There is then, more subtlety in agent-centric 
views – they can allow for some influence of structure upon agent. However, as 
outlined in detail in Chapter 2, methodological individualist views are unconvincing 
in their ontology and are lacking in explanatory power.
As neither agents nor structures can be convincingly presented as ontologically prior, 
the third way to explain the agent-structure relationship using causal laws is to argue 
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that agents and structures simultaneously cause each other. This position contends 
that structures and agents are ontologically equal and separate, but necessary to each 
other and mutually dependent rather than in opposition. It is effectively a compromise 
position between the first two outlined, and accords well with intuition. In the field of 
sociology, Talcott Parsons argued that social groups have ‘emergent properties’ 
(Parsons, 1949) that are produced when individuals interact, but that are not reducible 
to those individuals. He formed the concept of emergent properties from three 
notions. Firstly, social systems have a structure which emerges from the process of 
social interaction. Secondly, these emergent properties cannot be reduced to 
biological or psychological characteristics of social actors. Thirdly, the meaning of a 
social act cannot be understood in isolation from the total context of the social system 
in which it occurs.
Berger and Luckmann (1967) took up and expanded the argument made by Parsons. 
They argued that the meanings given by individuals to their world become 
institutionalised or turned into social structures via a dialectical process, and these 
structures then become part of the meaning system used by individuals, and so limit 
their actions. Giddens (1979 and 1984) has built further upon this idea and developed 
a theory of ‘structuration’ in which social structures are conceptualised not as barriers 
to action but rather as intimately bound up in the production of action. They are both 
the means by which people act and the product of those actions. However, while this 
type of theory is attractive in that it appears to accord well with our common sense 
understandings of the world, it is by no means universally accepted. Hollis and Smith 
define Giddens’ contribution to the agent-structure debate merely to be to describe 
the relationship rather than to explain or understand it (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 406). 
They see structuration theory as an ambition rather than an established theory.
Never-the-less, structuration theory has been introduced into the field of IR, 
principally by constructivists (see for instance Wendt (1987, 1992 & 1999) and 
Dessler (1989)) who have used it to challenge the dichotomous conception of agent 
and structure set out in the first two causal explanations. Alexander Wendt identifies 
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two truisms about social life which give rise to the agent-structure problem: ‘1) 
human beings and their organisations are purposeful actors whose actions help 
reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of 
social relationships which structure the interactions of these purposeful actors’ 
(Wendt, 1987: 337-338). His work goes on to examine how it is that both of these 
statements can appear to be true. 
Wendt imports from sociology the concept of ‘social structures’, or patterned 
relationships between elements of society that are repeated across time and space 
(Giddens, 1989: 19). These structures are not observable entities, but rather abstract 
formulations whose effects can be perceived. Wendt (along with other constructivists) 
argues that systems of norms, beliefs and ideas are social structures which function as 
enablers and constraints in largely the same way that material structures do in 
international relations, and should be taken into account when trying to account for 
agency. Normative structures affect agency by shaping interests and identities, which 
then condition action. However, constructivism also recognises that these structures 
are the result of the knowledgeable (although not necessarily intentional) behaviour 
of agents. Thus, agents and structures are mutually caused. 
Wendt has been most influential in advancing the agent-structure debate in IR, but E. 
H. Carr had identified the mutual dependence of agents and structures well prior to 
Wendt’s ground-breaking 1987 article. Carr saw society and the individual as 
inseparable: ‘necessary and complementary to each other, not opposites’ (Carr, 
2001a: 25). He argued that it was a fallacy to think that men had any existence before 
being brought together, as every human being is born into a society and is a social 
unit. Yet, Carr also held that ‘great men’ could create the social forces which change 
the world and shape the thoughts and environments of other agents. Wendt’s work, 
along with that of David Dessler (1989), has moved this forward significantly and 
applied the model of mutually caused agents and structures to the international 
system. 
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Wendt and Dessler do not limit their analysis to causal explanation. They argue that 
the relations between agents and structures cannot be properly understood without 
also using constitutive explanation. Constitutive theory brings the concept of social 
rules to the fore. According to Wendt (1991: 390), constitutive theory explicates the 
rules governing social situations, showing how actors can engage in certain practices 
in certain contexts and how these practices instantiate the rules (or fail to do so). This 
theory attempts to understand the perspectives of the actors involved in social 
situations and the contexts that they believe themselves to be acting within. 
Constitutive theory thus shows that agents and structures are mutually constituting 
(whereas causal theory shows that they are co-determined).
But how, exactly, are agent and structure co-determined and mutually constituting? 
Dessler conceptualises structure as a means to action, following the Aristotelian 
tradition through the scientific realism of Roy Bhaskar. The Aristotelian argument is 
that structure is a material rather than efficient cause of behaviour. Structure creates 
the possibility of agency, but does not dictate it, in the same way language creates the 
possibility of speech, but cannot cause any particular conversation. For Aristotle, 
efficient causes of action can only come from the agent (as discussed in Section 5.1 
of this chapter). For Bhaskar, agents and structures are ontologically distinct, with 
social agents being like ‘a sculptor at work, fashioning a product out of the material 
and with the tools available to him’ (Bhaskar, 1979: 43). 
Social rules are given centre stage in Dessler’s model, because he argues that rules as 
well as resources are necessary for action. Rules are structural rather than agential, 
resulting from action but not reducible to it, and serve two distinct functions: they 
either regulate behaviour in specific contexts, or they define and create (and thus 
make meaningful) new patterns of behaviour. Thus, actions can be judged to be 
legitimate with reference to regulative rules, but prior to a judgment of legitimacy, the 
behaviour must be meaningful. It is constitutive rules which render action meaningful 
or otherwise. Dessler feels that by emphasising the role of rules, the intentional action 
of agents upon structures can be considered. He argues that all actions either 
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reproduce or transform social structures, but that theory should be sensitive to the 
intentionality of the action. One can therefore argue, on this view, that innovations 
such as the International Criminal Court are the result of actors intentionally trying to 
change social structures, and these types of actions are of a different character to 
those which impact on structure in an unintended way. 
Colin Wight (1999 & 2004) also uses Bhaskar to think through the agent-structure 
debate. He builds a three level model of agency in order to show that, while agency is 
‘embedded within, and dependent upon, structural contexts’ (Wight, 1999: 109), 
agency is not reducible to structure. In fact, ‘agents always bring their structures with 
them’ (Wight, 1999: 110). The first level of the agency model Wight proposes, 
agency1, or self, includes three necessary elements of agency: accountability, 
intentionality and subjectivity (Wight, 1999: 130). Subjectivity is the most important 
element on Wight’s account – an assertion of self. He does not require that the self is 
autonomous, but does see some quantity of freedom of subjectivity as necessary to 
agency. Agency2, the second level, is the way in which agency becomes agency ‘of 
something’ (Wight, 1999: 133) – it links agency to its social context. Agents are only 
agents of groups and collectivities with which they identify, so social practice is 
necessary to agency. Agency3, the final level, is about roles or ‘positioned-practice-
places’ (Wight, 1999: 133), which agents1 inhabit on behalf of agents2, for instance 
the roles of prime minister or teacher. These are structural properties which persist 
irrespective of the agents who occupy them, and both constrain and enable action 
from agents1. Each of these levels of agency is necessary to describe agency 
accurately, and none are reducible to the others.
Friedman and Starr (1997) criticise constructivist theory, and Wendt and Dessler in 
particular, for reifying agents and structures rather than acknowledging them as 
dynamic. They note that, following Sartori’s model of concept formation, causal 
explanations for the relationship between agent and structure must have two specific 
ontological criteria: both agent and structure must be conceptualised as autonomous 
and irreducible to the other, plus they must each be conceptualised as variables and 
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not constants. Friedman and Starr argue that Wendt’s work does not satisfy the first 
of these criteria, as he conflates agency with social roles. This is how agency tends to 
appear within communitarianism – individuals are regarded as exercising agency if 
they act out social roles which have been defined by the social structure they find 
themselves within – but this lacks the aspect of freedom that we commonly 
understand as part of agency. Friedman and Starr also criticise the causal aspects of 
the models proposed by both Wendt and Dessler for being inattentive to the 
variability in the phenomena investigated. In contrast, they conceptualise agency as 
varying through the number of (sometimes conflicting) social roles that individual 
agents play at different times, and structure as varying through the concentric layers 
of structure that individuals are embedded in at each moment of agency. Structure in 
this view is agent-specific, if not agent-determined. Within international relations, as 
within domestic polities, this means it is unlikely that any agents will face the same 
set of structures under the same circumstances. Even if agents such as states 
understand the structure of the international system in the same way, they are likely to 
face differing regional or cultural structures which alter the character of their overall 
structure set.
The insight that agents and structures are dynamic rather than homogenous or static is 
a valuable one. On reflection, it seems highly likely that the relative power of agents 
and structures will vary in different contexts, as will the power of different agents or 
structures in the same contexts. The capability of an agent to act unhindered by 
structural constraint is likely to differ across situations depending on the social role or 
roles the agent is playing in these situations and the rules which apply. A uniformed 
police officer may have more freedom to act than the driver she has stopped for 
questioning. A father may have more freedom to act within his home than he does in 
his role of a subordinate in the hierarchical structure of a firm. However, some 
theoretical work, particularly neo-realism, seems insensitive to the possibility that 
agents and structures differ radically within themselves as categories and across 
different circumstances. Fortunately, much classical and contemporary IR theory is 
more subtle (though less parsimonious). Carr (2001a) argued that strong agents or 
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‘great men’ may have more substantial links to structures than less powerful agents. 
For him, what makes some individuals great is their ability to speak for and actualise 
the age they live in. Great men are at once ‘a product and an agent of the historical 
process, at once the representative and the creator of social forces which change the 
shape of the world and the thoughts of men’ (Carr, 2001a: 49). Within his 
structuration theory, Giddens (1984) also recognises that different agents have 
different effects. He argues that powerful agents recreate the structures that benefit 
them. 
Some theorists have gone so far as to suggest that the relationship between agent and 
structure is undergoing a radical shift at the present time. James Rosenau (1990 &
1997) argues that the world is undergoing profound, probably epochal change. He 
contends that current IR theoretical paradigms are increasingly incongruous in the 
face of technological advancements, international regimes, powerful sub groups and 
weakening states, but feels that these anomalies mark distinct types of breaks with the 
past, or patterns. The patterns concern the structure of global politics, which he 
argues consists now of ‘two interactive worlds with overlapping memberships: a 
multi-centric world of diverse, relatively equal actors, and a state-centric world in 
which national actors are still primary’ (1990: 97), the emergence of new actors and a 
qualitatively different relation between space and time as the pace of politics and 
economics has accelerated, with events and reactions happening almost 
instantaneously across great distances. He documents these changes in a ‘turbulence 
model’ and lists three critical variables as causing contemporary instability. The first 
is the expansion of analytical skills across all micro actors. The second is an authority 
crisis at the intermediate level which links individuals at the micro level to 
collectivities at the macro level. The final variable is the bifurcation at the macro 
level which has led to the emergence of a multi-centric world of sovereignty-free 
actors alongside the state-centric world of sovereignty-bound national governments
(1997: 43). The turbulence at the intermediate and systemic levels, according to 
Rosenau, has created more room for individual agency, and the uncertainty which 
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accompanies it motivates individuals to learn and adapt – to challenge their socialised 
responses to systemic stimuli. 
Rosenau conceptualises individuals in a way that is sympathetic to the concept of the 
agent in constructivist thought, and, to an extent, in communitarian theory. He sees 
individuals as simultaneously empirical wholes and conceptual parts, with each being 
a composite of roles: ‘there is no individual apart from the network of systems in 
which he or she is embedded’ (1990: 117). A role is ‘defined by the attitudinal and 
behavioural expectations that those who relate to its occupant have of the occupant, 
and the expectations that the occupant has of himself or herself in the role’ (1990:
212). All individuals occupy a large number of roles – some ascribed (for instance 
social class, ethnicity, gender and culture) and some chosen – and all express needs, 
skills and desires dependent on the roles that they play in the network of systems. 
Rosenau does not deny that there may be some variance between human beings in the 
same role – some human spirit or uniqueness – but rather asserts that the role-
composite conception accounts for most individual behaviour. The relevance of this 
definition to the contemporary world, and the mechanism whereby Rosenau theorises 
agency as increasingly important rather than static, is the observation that macro 
circumstances are currently so turbulent that individuals are experiencing an 
unprecedented level of uncertainty in their roles. In stable times, systems require 
appropriate performance in given roles, and individuals tend to behave according to 
habitual cognitive imaging or scenario construction, deeply engrained through 
political socialisation. However, as roles and expectations become more blurred and 
systems are placed under stress, individuals’ interests as players of different roles 
begin to conflict, and their routine action-scripts seem less appropriate. They begin to 
exercise more, and more independent, agency, in the face of weakened structures, 
though the increase in agency is dependent upon the skill of the actors to respond to 
the new macro conditions they face. The first of Rosenau’s critical variables – the 
expansion of analytical skills across all micro actors – suggests that there is greater 
potential for the exercise of agency in contemporary international relations both 
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because structures are breaking down and because individuals are developing a 
greater political skill base (via increased education, information and technology).
Rosenau is not alone in believing that micro level actors are impacting upon 
international structures in novel and powerful ways. Ronnie Lipschutz (1992 & 2000) 
argues that individual agency is becoming increasingly powerful through the 
emerging institutions of global civil society. These have come about, according to 
Lipschutz, for three reasons: firstly because states are losing sovereignty upwards to 
supranational institutions and downwards to sub-national groups as anarchy dies 
away as the organising principle of international relations, secondly as a functional 
response to the decreasing ability and willingness of governments to carry out welfare 
functions and the increasing competence of individuals in society, and thirdly because 
individuals are increasingly identifying with smaller, sub-state groups (1992: 399). 
Lipschutz explains that in order for Western states to ensure that their populations 
would support the workings of the economy after the Second World War, at a time 
when people were tremendously disillusioned with their state protectors (having seen 
that they were willing to risk the lives of enormous numbers of their population to 
preserve the institution of the state), governments needed to dramatically increase 
their welfare provision. To do this, they needed bigger bureaucracies, so had to 
expand higher education provision to generate enough capable bureaucrats. Vast 
numbers of people thus learned to use data as knowledge, facilitated by the 
technological revolution. They are now using their new skills and knowledge about 
the workings of the state to generate new ways of being political: global civil society. 
The explanation Lipschutz gives for why individuals are increasingly identifying with 
sub-state groups is an interesting reflection of the economic criticism covered in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis and a significant challenge to both cosmopolitan liberal and 
communitarian views of the world. Contra communitarians, he argues that as the 
same ideas and modes of production have become the operating system in the West, 
South and now East, habitual identification of individuals to the nation state as their 
primary social grouping has declined. However, individualised identities based on 
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consumption and the market have proved insufficient to give people the sense of 
social belonging they crave (and that cosmopolitans are reluctant to acknowledge that 
they have), so they have looked for other collectivities (i.e. the groups and institutions 
of global civil society) in which to identify and invest their interests. ‘Organic 
intellectuals’ including the intelligentsia, the well educated and the most skilful or 
powerful people in societies recognise the threats to the structures of reproduction 
and legitimation (i.e. the sovereign state system) inherent in contemporary 
international conditions (Lipschutz, 2000: 87). They have therefore begun to 
challenge the social order by developing and articulating new ideas, bringing an 
authority and legitimation crisis very similar to that outlined by Rosenau.
The two analyses outlined above also concur in arguing that agents are becoming 
increasingly important in the international sphere, and use very similar evidence to 
back up their assertions. Rosenau argues that the macro system has entered a period 
of prolonged turbulence during which it is especially vulnerable to micro inputs. The 
authority crisis at the level of micro/macro interaction has led to a bifurcation of 
macro collectivities and the development of a multi-centric world through which the 
number and types of actors who play important roles in global politics has increased 
exponentially. These actors have both new opportunities to impact on global politics 
as old structures break down, and also the analytic and emotional skills to perceive 
possibilities for change and to shape macro outcomes.
Lipschutz notes very similar dynamics. Using Robert Cox’s work (Cox, 1987) as a 
counterfoil, he argues that Cox is mistaken to assume that material structures, such as 
the means of production and the state, are the principal forces responsible for shaping 
and constraining individuals. Lipschutz believes that ideational structures and means 
of social reproduction are equally important in understanding a given society, and that 
in times of crisis it is these elements which first become threatened by individuals. As 
the material base of society is threatened, the contradictions in the relations of 
production become apparent to the social elite, and these agents begin to challenge 
and change the ideational structures on which society rests. With the new ideas 
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gained from exposure to new political forms and practices, agents begin to reform or 
reconstruct the social system and reconfigure their identifications and loyalties within 
it. In time, both authors agree, the crisis will pass, and a new equilibrium will be 
reached. The equilibrium will be marked by the development of new social and 
authority structures and habits of relations which will over time become entrenched, 
and at this stage agency may once again become causally less consequential than 
structure. Until this time, we should take agency seriously if we are to understand the 
dynamics of the contemporary world (dis)order.
These accounts of the increasing importance of individuals, while far from offering 
unconditional support to cosmopolitan liberal ontology, do endorse a view that 
agency is possible outside of or in the face of structure. This view can also be 
supported, though with significant qualifications, by post-structuralists. Roland 
Bleiker (2003) demonstrates that the constraints and possibilities for agency can be 
usefully investigated by using post-positivist insights to study the relationship 
between agency and discourse rather than agency and structure. Post-positivist theory 
generally does not deal with ontological questions of agent and structure, largely 
because of the difficulty of grounding ontological claims without recourse to 
objectivist, foundational assumptions. Bleiker approaches the issue in a similar way 
to Molly Cochran in her work on pragmatist theory (Cochran, 1999. See section 5.3 
below). He asserts that foundations are necessary to conceptualise agency, but that 
those foundations should be held as contingent and recognised as fallible. He argues 
that an anti-essentialist stance is the most viable way to make sense of how people 
situate themselves as agents and have influence, and that the ambiguity which results 
is a necessary condition of the conceptualisation and practice of agency rather than an 
obstacle to it.
To build his theory of agency, Bleiker begins by disputing the view that if one 
accepts the Foucaultian concept of discourse then agency is impossible. Michel 
Foucault (1979) argued that we can only know the world through discourse: it frames 
our thinking and determines the socially acceptable limits of what we can say, write 
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and even imagine. In every society there is a hierarchy of discourse, ranging from 
dominant to excluded. Discourse gives rise to social rules and renders social practices 
rational. The implication of this is that there is no room for agency. Yet Bleiker 
argues that dominant discourse is often fragile and weak, and cracks can be found. He 
uses Martin Heidegger’s idea of Being to explore the possibilities of agency under 
discourse. For Heidegger, Being is temporal: our existence in the present cannot be 
separated from the past discursive elements we have encountered (for instance 
education and language), but equally it cannot be divorced from the possibilities of 
the future. Being is constantly transforming through self reflection, and it is in this 
process that the weaknesses of discourse and the possibilities of agency can be 
encountered. Bleiker uses post-positivist feminist theory to demonstrate the 
consequences of this for agency in concrete circumstances, citing these theories’ 
rejection of the idea that there is an single essential nature of ‘woman’, and their 
focus on the multiple and mobile subjectivities which give rise to agency. He argues 
that it is in the moves between multiple identities (or different social roles, within 
communitarian and constitutive theories) that agency is located, as it is this 
movement which exposes the weakness in discourse. In Bleiker’s words: ‘an 
exploration of the discursive struggles that surround the pluralistic nature of identity 
is the very pre-condition for human agency’ (Bleiker, 2003: 32). Once the fragility of 
dominant discourse has been encountered, space can be re-appropriated and acts of
subversion and resistance can take place. These acts, be they speaking, writing, acting 
or dwelling, help to change social values and encourage social transformation.
The concept of human agency which runs through Bleiker’s work falls somewhere 
between the first and third causal position outlined above. The subject is constituted 
by discourse or specific regimes of power (which can be seen as analogous to 
structural constraint), but agency can be exercised by critically examining these 
regimes. There is ontological confusion here if the standard idea of causality is 
applied, as Bleiker indicates that the agent is both free and caused (a compatibilist 
position in the vocabulary of Section 5.2). However, post-positivism challenges the 
notions of agency traditionally used in philosophy. Bleiker argues, following Bubner
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(1976), that philosophy has tended to frame the understanding of agency in terms of 
teleology (or means/ ends relations), causality (in the assumption that agency requires 
an identifiable agent and an identifiable outcome) and intentionality (agency is 
limited to acts which agents claim to intend). Post-positivist, anti-essentialist theory, 
by contrast, sees many happenings as the result of actions which may not have been 
intended, or as having come about through a process where causal consequence 
cannot be clearly assigned to individual agents. Bleiker gives the example of the 
consumer who refuses to buy goods which are not in recyclable packaging (Bleiker, 
2003: 40-42). By herself, she makes no difference. If many others act in the same 
way, then manufacturers may change their packaging policy. This can happen 
regardless of the intentions of the consumers (some of whom may not have stopped 
buying the goods in question for environmental reasons) and the cause of the change 
cannot be ascribed to any of the individual agents.
These theories allow us to see a much more dynamic and nuanced relationship 
between agent and structure, individual and community, than underlies the two 
simplified positions on each side of the impasse outlined in Chapter 2. Post positivist 
theories in particular release us from the dictates of the ontological arguments and 
firm foundations which lead cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism to 
stalemate. The next section of the chapter explores the accounts of agency present in 
post-structuralist, constitutive and pragmatic ethical positions.
5.3 Agency, Structure and Ethics
Post-positivist theorists have, in the last twenty five years, brought new perspectives 
to the agent-structure debate, which can offer us possibilities to move beyond the 
impasse between cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism and conceive of 
agency and structure – individual and community - in more sophisticated ways. The 
object of this section is not so much to critique these approaches (which Cochran
(1999) does particularly well) as to identify the possibilities they offer before going 
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on to explore a view of human action (in section 5.4) which incorporates these 
insights and offers the most convincing account of agency I have come across.
5.3.1 Post-Structuralism
The most challenging group of theories I will consider here can be broadly 
categorised as post-structuralist. All reject positivist forms of knowledge, such as the 
cosmopolitan liberal and communitarian positions discussed in Part One of this 
thesis, which claim to be straightforward representations of the world around us. 
Rather, post-structuralists follow Foucault in seeing a nexus or necessary connection 
between power and knowledge. For Foucault, knowledge is not discovered but 
created, with powerful elites and ideas dominating the discourses which produce 
truth, meaning and morality in any given age. This position is explicitly anti-
foundationalist, arguing that objectivity is impossible; and anti-essentialist, seeing 
that identity and the definitions of the concepts we use to organise our lives cannot be 
fixed. Attempts to assert objectivity or deny ambiguity and fluidity are attempts to 
exclude. Given these characteristics, what does post-structuralism have to say about 
agency, structure and ethics?
Firstly, this set of theories calls for a radical reappraisal of the idea of agency, or 
subjectivity. Foucault (1979) rejects the idea of a transcendental subject, arguing 
instead that the subject or self is constructed in different ways by different discourses 
across space and time. Discourse is analogous to structure in the effect is has on the 
agent, suggesting that post-structuralism is deterministic and thus devoid of the 
possibility of morality. In fact, Foucault, along with many theorists who follow him, 
does see room for some kind of ethical or free action (see also the discussion of 
Bleiker’s work in section 5.2 above). The subject is not bound to subjugation by 
structure – it can be created or performed in subversive ways. Foucault wants to see 
the performance of the self become political: ‘we must hear the distant roar of battle’ 
(Foucault, 1979: 308). Agency appears in resisting the dominant modes of 
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subjectivity and performing the role of the subject in new ways, thereby creating 
some freedom within power structures. What is not clear, nor can it be, is how we 
should resist the prevailing social structures and roles, and what structures we should 
seek to replace them with. Foucault is not prepared to answer these questions, as to 
propose a universal ethical narrative or prescription for resistance would be, on his 
account, to engage in a totalising discourse just as objectionable as the ones he wants 
to see resisted.
Subsequent post-structuralist theorists have not been so reticent to engage in 
discussion of ethics. They take Foucault’s concern with dominant discourse and 
examine which discourses determine contemporary subjectivity. They find that the 
supposedly emancipatory discourse of the Enlightenment, upon which modern 
cosmopolitanism is based, privileges certain subjects: ‘insiders’ in the words of R. B. 
J. Walker (1993). These insiders are sovereign individuals: male, European and 
rationalist. Post-structuralists look to subvert the insider-outsider hierarchy, and so 
focus on difference and otherness. David Campbell (1998a & 1998b) is relevant here: 
he uses the work of Emmanuel Levinas to build a post-structuralist ethics. Levinas 
sees the condition of being, for humans, as a radically interdependent state. We only 
know we exist through encounter with the Other, and this, for Levinas (and 
Campbell) creates profound responsibility. This position turns the cosmopolitan 
liberal idea of agency on its head, conceiving of subjectivity not as an autonomous 
freedom, but as a relation of responsibility to other human beings. Ethics, for 
Campbell, should not be enacted in the form of grand moral meta-narratives (for all 
such narratives are suspect – necessarily involving power and exclusion), but should 
be lived, by all, continuously, as we attempt (and inevitably fail) to calculate our 
responsibility to the Other. Like Foucault, Campbell rejects rule-based approaches to 
ethics as being neither universal nor impartial. He also questions the ethical 
implications of nationalism (in National Deconstruction, 1998a) and shows that the 
concept of a unitary state, in which one nation or community resides, reinforces the 
communitarian idea that the political community is a single, territorial entity, so 
encouraging the kind of ethnic cleansing seen in Bosnia in the 1990s. 
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Walker also challenges the notion that identity is located within the spatial boundaries 
of the nation-state. He describes (in Inside-Outside, 1993) how the territorially 
defined self is constructed in opposition to the threatening ‘Other’ in contemporary 
international political theory. Spatiality is privileged in modern political thought and 
practice, but this privileging is historically contingent rather than necessary (and is 
threatened by our increasing experience of temporality as acceleration, speed and 
velocity rather than stability). Walker theorises new forms of political identity and 
community which do not rely on binary oppositions (universal/ particular, self/ other,
subject/ object) so are less exclusionary than the sovereign state. 
William Connolly (1991, 1995 & 2000), like Walker, sees the speed of the 
contemporary age as fundamentally challenging the notion that our identities can be 
fixed within territories. Our communities are no longer bounded (if they ever were) 
and we encounter difference every day. Individuals are not located within the single, 
thick morality envisaged by communitarians, but participate in a number of 
communities and belong to multiple groups. We are embedded in complex networks 
of identity and difference, but our contacts with alterity should help us to develop the 
ethos of mutual respect that Connolly proposes. The political implication of this is 
that the sovereign state, no longer being the focus of the allegiances and 
identifications of its members, is incompatible with democracy. Connolly asserts that 
democracy should be de-territorialized – freed from the boundaries of the sovereign 
state – with transnational groups mobilised around specific global issues. Difference 
should be embraced rather than denied or de-emphasized (as cosmopolitan liberals 
may seek to do), with space for difference between individuals and communities 
being created at the centre of politics rather than tolerated at the margins. 
These theories have in common a desire to question all that is presented as natural in 
IPT. They reject the foundations of both cosmopolitan liberalism and 
communitarianism, seeing the sovereign individual and the sovereign state as 
contingent constructs which serve the interests of the powerful. Agency in post-
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structuralism is far from free (though some form of free agency is surely assumed in 
any talk of resistance), with the subject being constructed through a contemporary 
discourse which links identity to territory. Post-structuralism shows this link to be 
unstable and imagines different forms of political subjectivities which could better 
serve human emancipation. But it also rejects both the cosmopolitan liberal 
conception of the individual, which locates the autonomous subject as spatially 
differentiated from the objective world, and the concept of humanity as a meaningful 
political category (Walker, 1993). 
Post-structuralism may not at first glance have much to offer a project in international 
ethics, as it is concerned first and foremost to deconstruct and undermine the 
discourses upon which current conceptions rely. Theorists in this vein cannot offer 
universal ethical prescriptions, for they reject all attempts to determine truth about the 
human condition. Nor can they explain why we enjoy experiences of freedom or of 
solidarity: Cochran argues that post-structuralist theorists cannot ‘adequately theorise 
the value individuals find, not only in individual autonomy, but in community 
tradition and membership as well’ (Cochran, 1999: 143). Yet there are insights in the 
theories detailed above which are useful to take forward: the rejections of the 
autonomy of the subject and the spatial location of identity (and with it the idea that 
the domestic political arena is the place of progressive politics, with the international 
arena a place of only recurrence and repetition), the acknowledgment of the 
importance of power, and the view of agency (and therefore responsibility) as created 
rather than discovered.
5.3.2 Constitutive Theory
Mervyn Frost (1996, 2002, 2003a & 2003b) has developed an innovative approach to 
agency and responsibility which takes the constructivist idea of constitutive 
explanations for behaviour and applies it to study the ethical relationship between 
individuals and their communities. He uses constitutive theory to think through moral 
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agency and argues that we can only understand agents and actions in the context of 
the social frameworks within which they are constituted. However, he does not 
simply equate social frameworks with communities or cultures. Rather, he identifies 
the frameworks as ‘practices’ and describes them as having embedded within them 
ethical codes which define what it is to act ethically and to be responsible within each 
practice (Frost, 2003a: 89). These ‘embedded ethics’ are values which (at least some 
of) those who engage in the practice wish to realise. Ethics within some practices may 
be relatively settled, and in others highly contested (for instance, in contemporary 
media debates, what it is to be a true American or a good mother). Debates over 
values within practices are therefore common, but this does not detract from Frost’s 
main argument that moral agency is not a single attribute possessed by individual 
humans of a given age and mental capability, but rather such agency arises only in the 
context of practices which have ethics embedded within them. The agency of 
individuals is both allowed and constrained by practice: if the agent does nothing to 
advance the values of the practice, they risk being ejected from it – having their status 
removed. This is similar to Wight’s observation (see section 5.2 above) that agency 
can be affected positively and negatively by structure, though Frost takes the 
argument further to show why this happens. 
For Frost, contrary to cosmopolitan liberalism, there is no such thing as the pre-social 
individual. As discussed in section 2.3.1, Frost sees that we are constituted as free 
individuals only through participation and mutual recognition within social 
institutions, which are grounded in certain norms (Frost, 1996: 137-159). Three 
institutions in particular influence our identities: firstly, the family, and the love we 
experience (or not) within it, secondly, civil society, which gives us a role in the 
market, and, thirdly, the state, through which we are joined together, as citizens, to 
form a society. 
Frost also sees the constitutive process as operating in the opposite direction. The 
individual is constituted through practices, but these practices are created, maintained 
and advanced by the actions of the individuals constituted within them. Once 
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constituted, individuals do not act in an unthinking way. Rather they reflect upon and 
interpret themselves within practices, thus developing and changing the practices as 
they act. Cochran explains Frost’s position as follows: ‘To act is an expression of 
one’s self-interpretation and those actions cumulatively articulate one’s self-
understanding within social institutions’ (Cochran, 1999: 84). This position casts 
agent and structure in a relationship that can overcome one of the critical objections 
to communitarianism outlined in Chapter 2, namely that it cannot account for cultural 
change. 
Like post-structuralism, constitutive theory captures some of the complexities and 
contradictions of the actual and ethical relationships between agent and structure. The 
idea of the autonomous individual is rejected, but so is that of the all-powerful 
community. Practices – social or structural phenomena – enable agency, but practices 
can and do conflict. There is no reason to think that the embedded ethics of all the 
different practices we act within will be consistent with one another. There is no 
guarantee of a moral ‘harmony of interests’ – in fact Frost sees the stuff of ethical 
debate as being precisely the arguments within and between practices on how best to 
behave.  
However, constitutive theory is also a little too optimistic for my purposes here. Frost 
describes his 1996 book as an attempt to ‘construct a background theory which 
justifies the list of goods [human rights, democracy, international law, state 
sovereignty] currently accepted as settled in international relations’ (Frost, 1996:
137). In doing so, he paints a picture of the state which suggests that all such 
groupings are not just necessary to the construction of the individual, but also have a 
positive effect upon her. Rights are essential to the constitution of the individual, on 
Frost’s account, and the ethical, sovereign state is necessary to guarantee those rights, 
thus justifying state rights to non-intervention. Individual rights and state rights are 
mutually constitutive and mutually required. However, many, if not most, states in 
the world cannot be said to fully provide or respect citizenship rights, yet these states 
still enjoy rights in the international system. Brown has taken up this point, arguing 
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that Frost threatens the plausibility of his position by assuming that ‘the vast majority 
of states are actually at least trying to be ethical in their conduct’ (Brown, 1997: 285). 
By identifying the sovereign state as critical to flourishing, Frost also ties agency to 
territory, which his concentration on practices rather than communities might suggest 
is unnecessary.
Despite my reservations about the role of the state within it, there are valuable 
insights to take forward from constitutive theory, most importantly the notion that 
individuals cannot have value before interaction with others: ‘a person only has value 
qua individual in a relationship of mutual valuation with another person or other 
people, i.e. within a community’ (Frost, 1996: 141); and the idea that social action 
has an in-built ethic, or that some conception of what is and is not acceptable can be 
found within all practices. These arguments reinforce the post-structuralist position 
that ethics is not self-referring, but other-referring.
5.3.3 Pragmatism
The final post-positivist theoretical position I will examine with a view to finding 
new thinking about agency in international ethics is pragmatism, particularly that of 
Richard Rorty (1989, 1991, 1993 & 1998). 
Like constructivism and constitutive theory, pragmatism sees agency as created both 
socially and personally. It also follows these theories in rejecting the notion of firm 
foundations on which to build a theory. Rather, pragmatism explores the ethical 
issues arising from the communitarian/ cosmopolitan liberal impasse by assessing 
which ethical practices are useful to us, rather than which are grounded in any ‘truth’ 
about the relationship between individual and society. While pragmatism rejects 
claims to metaphysical truth, it does see that philosophical theories can be judged 
against each other (an activity which post-structuralists are hard pushed to support) 
by assessing how far they help us to live our lives by providing convincing stories 
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about how to make sense of other ideas, practices and experiences together. Barbara 
J. Thayer-Bacon explains the pragmatist position as follows: ‘Truth means that ideas 
(which are themselves just parts of our experience) become true in so far as they help 
us get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience’ (Thayer-Bacon, 
2002: 95). 
William James, one of the founders of American Pragmatism, succinctly explained 
the method this school of thought uses like this: ‘The pragmatic method … is to try to 
interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference 
would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?’ 
(James, 1904, Lecture II). He saw the pursuit of absolute truth as a philosophical 
waste of time, explaining that, following FCS Schiller and John Dewey, ‘…“truth” in 
our ideas means their power to “work”’ (James, 1907: 23). This method of assessing 
theoretical positions was taken up by Richard Rorty in the late twentieth century.
Rorty’s principal contribution to the ethical debate this thesis is located within has 
been to provide a defence of the human rights regime supported by cosmopolitan 
liberals without relying on claims to know the truth about human nature. He argues 
that the West has created a human rights culture, no more and no less, and that this 
culture (and the tolerant liberal political philosophy that underpins it) is defensible in 
terms of being useful in reducing cruelty in the societies where the culture is present. 
Rorty thus rejects the Western meta-narrative of the sovereign individual used to 
justify the imposition of supposedly universal moral values identified by post-
structuralists, but argues strongly in favour of the institutional features of 
contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism (Rorty 1989 & 1993). He argues that the 
concept of human rights acts to ‘summarise our culturally influenced intuitions about 
the right thing to do in various situations’, and in doing so increases ‘the 
predictability, and thus the power and efficiency, of our institutions, thereby 
heightening the sense of shared moral identity which brings us together in a moral 
community’ (Rorty, 1993: 117). This heightened sense of moral identity in the West 
has come about, according to Rorty, not because of any increase in moral knowledge, 
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but because people have heard ‘sad and sentimental stories’ (Rorty, 1993: 119), and 
so expanded their moral boundaries by identifying a wider number of people as being 
‘human’. This identification of others as human is important as cruelty and violence 
is made possible by degrading the standing of one’s victim – seeing them as less than 
human, an Other. To further his goal of human solidarity, Rorty argues that we must 
spend less time engaging in pointless and irresolvable foundational battles, trying to 
persuade people that their position is objectively wrong or irrational, and devote our
energies instead to manipulating the sentiments of others, through ‘sentimental 
education’. Such education ‘sufficiently acquaints people of different kinds with one 
another so that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as 
only quasi-human. The goal of this manipulation of sentiment is to expand the 
reference of the terms “our kind of people” and “people like us”’ (Rorty, 1993: 123).
Thus, Rorty is concerned that communities grow continuously to include more and 
more people within their moral spheres of reference. This suggests an interesting 
position in the agency-structure debate, as agents, who are judged by Rorty to be 
socially constituted, are being asked to forever expand the structural webs in which 
they find themselves. Indeed, Rorty’s view of agency is complex. Cochran quotes 
him describing the self as ‘a centreless web of historically conditioned beliefs and 
desires’ (Rorty, 1990: 291, in Cochran, 1999: 152). Yet Rorty sees both human 
solidarity and self creation or invention as goals we should devote ourselves to 
achieving, with these projects being ‘equally valid, yet forever incommensurable’ 
(Rorty, 1989: xv). His position here rests on an elaborate argument about the 
dichotomy of the public and private worlds. He argues that the two worlds are distinct 
and their vocabularies are incommensurable. The private sphere is the realm of 
imagination and self creation where people are individuals, and use language to re-
describe aspects of their existence in order to change their understanding of them. 
The public sphere, in contrast, is a place of political utility where people are part of a 
larger moral community in which solidarity and shared vocabularies and practices 
take precedence over individual interpretations. Liberalism is a feature of the public 
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world: contingent, but necessary to prevent private, autonomous actions of self 
creation from adversely affecting the shared public sphere. 
Rorty’s position here has been roundly criticised (Cochran (1999: 162-165) and 
Langlois (1998) are representative pieces). Cochran argues that the public/private 
dichotomy undermines Rorty’s theory entirely, as it is an artificial split designed only 
to bolster his position. She contends that there is no neat distinction between the part 
of humans which is active in the practise of self creation and the part which interacts 
with shared intentions and other humans in the ‘public’ sphere. In fact, the public 
world provides the very resources necessary for self creation in the private world, i.e. 
language, vocabularies and social practices. Community change comes through both 
private and public acts of redescription – individual and collective creation of new 
language and vocabularies more adequate to deal with ethical issues we encounter in 
the world. Indeed, Rorty’s modelling of action in the public and private spheres 
seems to fail the pragmatist’s test of being a useful way to describe the world around 
us. Such rigid distinctions between our values and behaviours in different spheres just 
do not seem to exist. I return to this issue in section 5.4, when I discuss the principal 
drawback of all of the post-positivist theories reviewed here, namely, the conception 
of agent and structure, individual and community, as separate phenomena.
Rorty has been taken here to be representative of pragmatism, as his work is probably 
the most influential. However, it is necessary to broaden the discussion slightly 
before concluding, and consider the basic elements that unite all pragmatist ethical 
theory. Cochran (1999) cites Richard Bernstein (1995: 326-330), who identifies five 
themes of pragmatism: anti-foundationalism, fallibilism (recognising the 
‘situatedness of inquiry’ (Cochran, 1999: 175) or seeing that all beliefs are situated 
within our current context and may turn out to be false), acceptance of contingency, a 
commitment to plurality necessitated by fallibilism, and an acknowledgement that 
each individual must rely on a ‘community of inquirers – critical communities’ 
(Cochran, 1999: 175) in order to investigate philosophical questions, as no one person 
is capable of finding answers alone. Matthew Festenstein (2002) identifies similar 
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concepts which he thinks define the school of thought: holism (or not abstracting 
elements from one another in philosophical thought), anti-scepticism, fallibilism, and 
the primacy of practice in making ethical assessments. 
There is much here to enrich a conception of agency. As with all post-positivist 
theory, pragmatists reject the idea of an Archimedean point from which to discern a 
true ethics, so see our present location as the starting point for ethical criticism, but 
they, like Frost, place a great deal of emphasis on actually doing the criticising: 
contemplating the social contexts in which we find ourselves and trying out new 
kinds of ethical action within them. They view ethical agency as a significant force, 
both possible and desirable. This contrasts to post-structuralism, which, in general, is 
more pessimistic about the possibilities for ethical transformation under power-
knowledge structures. Also appealing about this approach (along with the others 
considered in this section) is the epistemological freedom offered by its rejection of 
the correspondence theories of truth and appeals to foundational claims about human 
nature which underlie the mainstream cosmopolitan liberal and communitarian 
positions outlined in Part One. It is a refreshing challenge to judge a theory by its 
practical application and its ability to tell a convincing story about the way the world 
works, rather than by its metaphysical ‘truth’. In keeping with this commitment to 
describing the world as we experience it, pragmatists emphasise the importance of 
sentimentality and the emotions rather than relying on rational justifications of ethics. 
That morality and ethical judgment involve feeling, intuition and the sentiments 
seems obvious, yet cosmopolitan liberalism in particular has little room for such 
considerations (a notable exception to this position is Martha Nussbaum (2001b & 
2004)). Rorty’s concept of sentimental education, and with it his focus on the 
emotional aspects of ethics, is long overdue.
Three final insights that I will take forward from this perspective: firstly, pragmatists 
do not regard borders as static or communities as fixed. They support critique within 
community or state boundaries, but also pushing beyond those groupings to expand 
moral inclusion and increase human solidarity. The second insight follows Frost in 
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recognising that status is valuable to human beings – here, the status of human itself 
is seen to confer a moral standing onto a person and to protect them from cruelty. 
Finally, pragmatism opens up the idea of agency beyond the individual, via the 
importance of critical communities in deliberating on ethical issues. The first two of 
these observations will be incorporated into the discussion of agency in the following 
section. A more detailed consideration of collective agency can be found in Chapter 
7. 
5.4 Beyond Individual and Community: Agency as Sociality
To recap, in Chapter 2 I outlined the dominant conception of agency in contemporary 
IPT and international practice: the cosmopolitan liberal model of the sovereign 
(autonomous, rational and volitional), rights-bearing individual. This individual has 
an identity and interests prior to social interaction, formulates her own idea of the 
Good, and is to be protected from arbitrary action of the state as far as possible in 
order that she might freely pursue her life projects. I showed the internal weaknesses 
of this model and the political purposes it serves, and also documented the opposition 
to it within communitarian theories. Communitarians see structure as dominating 
agency. The agent, in communitarianism, is a societal construct. The self is formed 
through social interaction, and interests, ideas of the Good and codes of ethics are 
deeply embedded within culture. The community is a necessary part of a flourishing 
human life on this view, so the state should be protected as intrinsically morally 
valuable in and of itself. 
I argued that there are significant theoretical problems with both of these positions. 
Both make dubious claims to truth, and both are based on, largely discredited, 
foundational approaches to ethics. Cosmopolitan liberals tend to venerate the free 
individual so much that they cannot account for structural effects on human life, and 
communitarians tend to reify the community, so cannot account for action and change 
which challenges structural imperatives, i.e. for agency. Each set of theories sees 
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individual and community as separate and opposing phenomena. They also lack 
adequate accounts of change: each sees identity (of the individual for cosmopolitan 
liberals and of the community for communitarians) as existing prior to interaction, so 
each set of theories offers a static account of human social and ethical life. There is 
no role for sociability or for politics on either side, leading to two equally unattractive 
viewpoints, each of which takes idealised and dichotomous positions on individual 
and community, on agent and structure.  
This chapter has returned to the debate about the relationship between agent and 
structure. I recognized that some idea of agency is necessary to normative theory, as, 
without it, there is no real purpose in contemplating what is right and wrong in the 
world, since it cannot be changed. I outlined the model of the volitional agent –
possessed of a free will – which is assumed in much ethical theory, and criticised 
both cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism for being unable to account 
satisfactorily for our experiences of freedom and human agency. I examined the 
agent-structure debate in IR theory and identified new ways of thinking about the 
relationship between the phenomena that get us further than the either/or causal 
dichotomy found within cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism. 
Constructivists, the theorists who have done most work to rethink the debate, have 
imported Giddens’ structuration theory from sociology, which conceptualises agents 
and structures as mutually caused and mutually constitutive. They have shown 
structures to be ideational as well as material (lending some support to the 
communitarian claim that individuals are constituted by ideational structures such as 
culture and communal values) but have called into question the idea that either 
agents/ individuals or structures/ communities could be ontologically prior.
While constructivism can help us to progress us some way beyond the stalemate of 
Chapter 2, it has limitations. Principally, constructivist theory, like cosmopolitan 
liberalism and communitarianism, conceptualises agents and structures as static. 
Again, there is little room for considerations of change (important given the 
arguments that contemporary life is seeing accelerating change and, with it, the 
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increased significance of agency), or of power differentials between agents, between 
structures and over time. Post-structuralism deals specifically with power, but offers 
little hope of change. Along with constructivism and the other post-positivist theories 
discussed in this chapter, post-structuralism shows us that theorising without 
resorting to strong foundational claims is a useful way to think beyond the 
mainstream. It also challenges the views that the subject or agent can ever be 
autonomous, and that identity is necessarily spatially located (for instance within a 
community); and suggests to us that agency, if it exists at all, is created rather than 
naturally occurring within humans.
Subsequent to the discussion of post-structuralism, I argued that the most important 
insights from constitutive theory to bring into any re-consideration of agency are the 
notion that individuals cannot have value before interaction with others, i.e. that 
valuing ourselves and each other is a social activity; and the idea that social action 
has an in-built ethic, or that some conception of what is and is not acceptable is 
evident within any practice. This view complements the position taken by pragmatists 
that morality is a function of the vocabularies we use to think through and discuss our 
experiences. Constitutive and pragmatist theorists also see agency as possible – they 
are keen to account for our experiences of being free, even if they cannot adequately 
explain these experiences – and encourage us to use it, via situated critique. 
Pragmatism further highlights the importance of emotion and status to ethics, the 
contingency of borders and the possibility of agency beyond the individual.
Despite being a great deal more subtle in tracing the relationship between agent and 
structure than positivist methodological individualism or methodological 
structuralism, and despite some protestations to the contrary, all of these theoretical 
positions imply that agency and structure are different entities. Post-structuralists 
search for space for autonomy or subjectivity within a powerful web of discourse: 
Cochran notes that they seem to value ‘an illusive autonomy, available only to those 
divested of community and the power impositions it brings’ (Cochran, 1999: 139). 
Frost follows Hegel in seeing individual self-interpretation as different from or 
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separate to her constitution within communities or practices. Rorty argues that self 
invention and human solidarity are ‘forever incommensurable’ (Rorty, 1989: xv). 
Actions of the individual and of the collective remain distinct.
The work of Barry Barnes (Barnes, 2000 and Loyal & Barnes, 2000) and of Philip 
Pettit (2001) offers a way to conceive of agency that both takes into account all of the 
post-positivist insights discussed above, and dissolves the dichotomy between agent 
and structure, incorporating both into the same explanatory framework. Barnes 
(2000) argues that the social sciences are too individualistic at the moment – they 
concentrate on the subjective and the objective, but would benefit, according to 
Barnes, from turning their focus to the inter-subjective. He argues that there is no 
good empirical way to identify actions as either chosen or determined, and rejects the 
philosophical and sociological preoccupation with establishing individual freedom. 
Theories which appear to prove that choice plays a role in human affairs actually rely 
on prior moral or political commitments to the value of choice (of the type we can see 
in liberalism, discussed in Chapter 2). Thus, according to Loyal and Barnes (2000), 
both Talcott Parsons and Anthony Giddens, perhaps the most influential sociological 
theorists of agency, fail to establish that individual action can be voluntary and 
brought about by a free will. Parsons (1949) argues that choice is exhibited when 
agents decide how to act by considering the relative pressures of individual desires 
and of social norms, and Giddens (1976) that choices are made as agents look to 
maximise their ontological security. However, neither provides sufficient argument to 
convince the sceptic that the weighing up of options or the need for ontological 
security do not have causal, rather than chosen, effects on action. Loyal and Barnes 
argue that Parsons and Giddens pursue the idea of choice or agency ‘to produce a 
sociologically realistic yet politically optimistic picture of the human condition. But 
the evidence for such a picture, and in particular for the role of agency within it, is not 
supplied’ (2000: 519). They conclude, however, that although actions cannot be 
empirically determined to be chosen, there is still utility in the language of choice: it 
allows us to map ‘the susceptibility of actors to persuasion’ (Loyal and Barnes, 2000:
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523). This idea is at the heart of the more extended theory of agency that Barnes 
develops in Understanding Agency (2000).
The principal argument made by Barnes (2000) is that voluntaristic discourse, or the 
discursive identification of human beings as volitional, free and independent agents, 
is the ‘highly functional collective practice of sociable, communicative human 
beings’ and the ‘crucial medium through which collective agency is (causally) 
engendered and mobilised’ (Barnes, 2000: xi). Thus, we discursively identify each 
other as independent units, and assign rights and responsibilities to each other as 
autonomous beings, for inherently inter-subjective and social reasons. Only by 
understanding agency in this way can we account for our seemingly contradictory 
intuitions and experiences of free will and of communal attachment. 
Barnes notes that the strict dichotomies of agent and structure, free will and 
determinism, are not apparent in everyday descriptions of action, which tend towards 
compatibilism. He argues that we commonly assign causes (such as upbringing or 
biological sex) to explain someone’s actions while still seeing their actions as the 
exercise of free will. To take this position is to see actions as being simultaneously 
intentional and the result of cause and effect mechanisms.  If agency is conceived as 
Barnes suggests, then this ceases to be an issue. He rejects entirely the cosmopolitan 
liberal model of the rational, independent individual, arguing that we very rarely 
behave either rationally (i.e. as rational choice theory would predict) or 
independently. Instead, we constantly take into account other people: ‘Individuals are 
revealed [through psychological experiments and in life] to be profoundly mutually 
susceptible through communicative interaction’ (Barnes, 2000: 51). They have a 
‘prior, non-rational inclination towards agreement and co-ordination’ (Barnes, 2000:
56), but this inclination is not by itself enough to enable communities to live 
harmoniously together. To do this, something looking a lot like the liberal model of 
the individual, whose behaviour is determined by her own free will or volition, is 
invoked within what he calls the ‘social practice of responsibility’: ‘Social life as we 
know it requires responsible agents who may be held accountable, and to whom it 
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makes a difference that they have been so held’ (Barnes, 2000: 74). The collective or 
community constructs such agents through voluntaristic discourse, which is, 
according to Barnes, ‘the medium through which social agents identify each other, 
communicate their expectations of each other and thereby (causally) affect each 
others’ actions. For all that it appears to refer to the internal states of individuals, 
voluntaristic discourse is actually the vehicle for human sociability, through which its 
users co-ordinate their actions and cognition and thereby constitute every level of 
their amazingly elaborate social life’ (Barnes, 2000: 74). The discourse of the 
individual agent is a tool necessary to communal living, not a truth.
This theory of agency can also account for our experiences of such internal states – of 
free will. Barnes hypothesises that: ‘i) our sense of the free will of an agent derives 
from her susceptibility to others, the kind of susceptibility implied in accounts of the 
deference-emotion system’ (Barnes, 2000: 69).11  In this system, individuals monitor 
the evaluations others make of their behaviour, via the communication they receive 
from these evaluators, and thereby monitor the extent of deference others have to 
them. High deference brings feelings of pride, and low deference makes individuals 
feel shame. Action is thus determined not by the actors own preferences, but by that 
of her observers. The link to free will comes in the second hypothesis: ‘ii) our 
characterisation of an action as chosen identifies it as the kind of action that is open to 
modification through use of the [deference-emotion] system, that is, through 
symbolic communications and the evaluations they convey’ (Barnes, 2000: 69). Thus, 
we see actions as free (and agents as responsible – more of which in the next chapter) 
when we feel that they could have been influenced by the evaluations of others, but 
we see them as caused when others would have made little or no difference, for 
instance when an individual acts out of a phobia. In fact, actions called and 
experienced as free here have been to some extent caused – by the anticipated and 
actual reactions of others – so the problems of the seeming incompatibility of 
determinism and free will can be avoided. Actions are free not because they are 
                                                
11 The deference-emotion system is suggested in the work of Scheff, (1988), cited in Barnes (2000: 
68).
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without external cause, but precisely because they can be influenced by external, 
societal factors.
This theory may appear at first glance to be a re-statement of communitarianism. Any 
possibility of agency depends on the community, and action is caused by something 
outside the agent. In fact, Barnes rejects the reification of structure as emphatically as 
that of the sovereign individual. He argues that social structures are not really-
existing, ontologically independent phenomena, but ‘intersubjectively constituted and 
wholly internal’ to the collectives which create and sustain them (Barnes, 2000: 151). 
It is not an abstract community or culture which does the work in Barnes’ theory: it is 
the individuals or people who collectively form any given community. It may make 
sense for individuals to treat social structures as external to themselves, as they alone 
could do very little to influence them, but we should not make the mistake of 
separating structures from the collective. This is why Barnes emphasises the 
importance of inter-subjectivity, or sociality: human beings are radically 
interdependent rather than sovereign, and exercise agency collectively rather than 
alone. They are influenced by and accountable to each other, not to the collective as a 
singular body, and the collective does not exist prior to action but is formed through 
interaction and debate. 
Philip Pettit (2001) takes a similar approach to agency. In an attempt to construct a 
theory of freedom which incorporates the insights of both the study of free will within 
philosophy and the consideration of liberty within political theory, Pettit argues that 
freedom concerns the fitness of an agent to be held responsible for her actions: ‘We 
engage with other human beings in a distinctive manner that involves the spontaneous 
attribution of responsibility, and we conceive of freedom as that property of human 
beings, and of the actions performed by human beings, that makes such an attribution 
appropriate under the rules of the practice’ (Pettit, 2001: 13). He, like Barnes, rejects 
the idea that agency is about individual choice, as if so, it would require that humans 
are able to transcend the laws of cause and effect, or act as Kantian ‘uncaused 
causes’. Also like Barnes, he recognizes that the concept of free will is impossible to 
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verify empirically, leaving no way to convince a sceptic of its existence unless they 
have a prior normative commitment to seeing individuals as capable of exercising 
choice. 
Having dispensed with the standard liberal account of agency, Pettit develops a 
substantive account of freedom in itself, by reflecting on the capacities and contexts 
that are presupposed when we judge someone to be fit to be held responsible. He 
argues that when we describe people as free, we mean two things: ‘First, we say that 
in their agency as persons – in the agency allowed to them by their relative standing 
to others – they are fit to be held responsible; they do not act under pressure or duress 
or coercion or whatever. And second, we may suggest that they are fit to be held 
responsible relative to an environment of choice that makes significantly numerous 
and distinct options available’ (Pettit, 2001: 65-66). The only way these conditions 
can be met, according to Pettit, is if the agent has discursive control in their 
environment, through being located in discourse-friendly relationships (Pettit, 2001:
69). It is here that the links with Barnes’ work are most apparent. Agency, for both 
theorists, is an inter-subjective and not simply a psychological property. It can only 
come about and be exercised within relationships. An agent is free, according to 
Pettit, to the extent that other agents relate to them in a discourse-friendly manner –
authorising them as being someone worthy of address and refraining from 
interventions which restrict or threaten discourse, i.e. affording them discursive 
status: ‘An agent will be a free person so far as they have the ability to discourse and 
they have the access to discourse that is provided within [discourse-friendly] 
relationships’ (Pettit, 2001: 70). Discourse plays a key role in Pettit’s work, and he 
defines it as ‘a social exercise in which different parties take turns in exchange with 
one another’ or the act of ‘reason[ing] together with others’ (Pettit, 2001: 67). All 
action is caused, to some extent, by aspects of our collective environment, but free 
action comes about as agents influence each other through discourse, rather than 
through manipulation, threat, intimidation or coercion. Through this 
conceptualisation, Pettit’s theory allows us to recognise the effects of power more 
specifically than we could in the work of Barnes. Discursive control and therefore 
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freedom or agency can vary across situations as people find they have different 
relative amounts of relational or social power. Pettit discusses relations of domination 
(for instance as ‘an employee may be dominated by an employer in a tough labour 
market, a wife by a husband in a sexist culture …’ (Pettit, 2001: 78)) and argues that 
freedom can be jeopardised just as effectively by relationships of domination as by 
direct coercion. If a person does not have discursive control in a situation (though 
Pettit is not clear about whether there is an absolute level of control needed or 
whether the level of necessary control is relative to context), then they are not free –
they have no agency. 
The link between discourse and freedom is no accident: ‘We conceive of ourselves 
and one another, not just as intentional systems with beliefs and desires, but as 
subjects who can conduct discourse with one another, and with ourselves, in the 
attempt to shape our beliefs and desires’ (Pettit, 2001: 70).  Just as for Barnes, free 
action is that which could be modified inter-subjectively – by the appraisal and 
reaction of others (though for Pettit, reason plays a more significant role):
The judgment I express [of whether an action which is contrary to a 
shared understanding of reason is free, and therefore if the person in 
question merits the ongoing status of discursive partner] is likely to be 
grounded in two beliefs that my discursive experience of dealing with you 
will normally have supported. First, that had I been able to discourse with 
you at the moment of action, making reason’s claims more salient and 
compelling, then I might have nudged you towards the right action. And 
second, that it is possible to make you aware of having acted contrary to 
reason and that this awareness will tend to elicit an apology and to reduce 
the likelihood of your doing that sort of thing again. (Pettit, 2001: 96)
Pettit acknowledges that rational control (a property analogous to intentionality in 
Colin Wight’s model, discussed in section 5.2, and defined by Pettit as the 
requirement that agents are ‘subjects of intentional states like beliefs and desires’ 
(Pettit, 2001: 35)), and volitional control (analogous to Wight’s subjectivity, and 
defined by Pettit as the requirement that ‘there is nothing about the psychology of the 
agent in virtue of which they are distanced from what they want or think or do and 
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have to look on those attitudes and actions like a helpless bystander’ (Pettit, 2001: 
49)), are necessary for freedom, but neither are sufficient. Freedom or agency is not 
determined by our individual capacities, nor is it a function of our relationship to 
structure. It depends on our relationship to each other. 
5.5 Conclusion
I have identified, within this chapter, insights from post-positivist theories which can 
be used to re-conceptualise agency in IPT.  But all I have offered in the final section 
is a brief sketch of such a re-conceptualisation. This is because the idea of agency 
here is so closely tied up with a concept of responsibility – agency is responsibility, to 
a significant extent, for Barnes and Pettit – that much more needs to be said (and is 
said in Chapter 6) before their ideas can be assessed. 
For now, I will conclude by pointing out the congruity of the conception of agency as 
sociality to the findings of post-positivist ethics. This view shows agency to be a 
genuine possibility, created within and exercised by collectives, without tying that 
agency to any given structures or territory. Collectives could as easily be 
psychological communities, defined by groups of people who ‘participate in a 
common activity and experience a psychological sense of togetherness as shared ends 
are sought’ (Bell, 2004: 11), as communities based in a geographical place. Agency 
as sociality can also account for the dynamism of collective life. Social structures are 
entirely internal to collectives, so susceptible to change by them at any time. 
The relevance of agency as sociality for Frost’s contention that every practice has an 
in-built ethic centres on the notion that agency itself can only exist within the social 
practice of responsibility (this will be explored at greater length in Chapter 6). 
Agency as sociality can explain how the ethics of practices are constituted and 
communicated, and how, via the mutual susceptibility of humans, they exercise 
causal force. This susceptibility also shows why achieving social status and being 
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valued by the collective are so important to supposedly autonomous individual 
agents, and why we must acknowledge that individuals are moved by emotion as well 
as reason. This conception rejects the dichotomous thinking of previous theories to 
offer an account of agency which can explain the relationship of agent to structure 
and individual to community in such a way as to transcend the impasse faced at the 
beginning of the chapter. The following chapter outlines the relationship between 
agency and responsibility if agency is seen as stemming from sociality, and 
contemplates the implications of this relationship for contemporary IPT. 
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CHAPTER 6: A SOCIAL PRACTICE MODEL OF 
RESPONSIBILITY
I concluded Chapter 5 with the observation that the view of ‘agency as sociality’ 
within the work of Barnes and Pettit sees responsibility as closely linked to agency. 
Within this chapter I will substantiate that claim, and outline what responsibility 
might mean, and what some of its implications are, if we are to take seriously this 
new conception of agency. Cosmopolitan liberals see individual agency and, with it, 
any private responsibilities individuals see fit to assume as part of their own pursuit 
of the Good, as existent prior to (optional) participation in collective life. Public or 
social obligation, for these theorists, is for the most part tied up with obedience to the 
law, which is the tool used to regulate liberal societies and ensure that individuals do 
not trespass unnecessarily on the freedom of others. Rights are assigned to mark out 
spheres of freedom, so the most critical type of obligation on this view is the 
obligation of states (and, increasingly, international institutions) to protect the human 
rights of their citizens. Agency and responsibility occur prior to community. 
Communitarians, conversely, see both agency and obligation as being generated 
within static, structural communities or cultures. The ethics of the community are 
transmitted to the individual, and she has responsibilities commensurate with these 
externally defined values. Here, agency and responsibility conceptually post-date the 
establishment of community. If, instead, agency, as suggested in Chapter 5, is a 
collective product of dynamic social interaction – produced at each moment the 
community is constituted rather than before or after such a construction – what does 
this mean for obligation or responsibility? Is responsibility possible under this model, 
given that the notion of the sovereign agent choosing to act according to her own free 
will is rejected entirely? 
In Section 6.1 I outline a model of responsibility as a social practice, which follows 
from the conception of agency as sociality outlined in Chapter 5. I show that seeing 
responsibility in this way accords more closely to the way we live than seeing 
responsibility as the property of isolated individuals. In 6.2, I ask who we are 
169
responsible for under this model, or the scope of our responsibility, and in 6.3, how 
we come by our responsibilities, their source. The final section of the chapter, 6.4, 
sums up the strengths of this new approach to responsibility and responds to some 
possible criticisms of it. Before launching into the new conception, however, a little 
background to more conventional understandings of responsibility would be useful. 
What does it mean to ascribe responsibility? There is significant disagreement about 
this among philosophers. Feinberg (1968) identifies five possible meanings of the 
idea of ascribing responsibility, in philosophy and in everyday discourse. The first is 
a straightforward ascription of causality. Ascriptions of causality often use the 
language of responsibility, without intending to ascribe praise, blame or liability, for
instance, the sentence ‘Person y was responsible for state of affairs a’ means here that 
a happened as a result of y’s actions. The second is an ascription of simple agency. 
Such an ascription describes the way a person has behaved, for instance in ‘Person y 
smiled’, or ‘Person y moved her hand’. There is no causal component as the act being 
described is ‘simple’, that is, it is a singular act with no sub-acts (or separate cause 
and effect) concealed within the description. The third possible meaning of ascribing 
responsibility is to ascribe causal agency. Here, the agent is seen as the author of a 
causally complex outcome, regardless of how many sub-acts intervene between act 
and final outcome, or the author of the closest free act in the causal chain, in the 
language of Chapter 5. So in the case of ‘[h]e turned the key, he opened the door, he 
startled Paul’, an ascription of causal agency would be ‘he killed Paul’ (Feinberg, 
1970: 134). The death of Paul is credited to the action taken by the agent rather than 
the movement of the door or the state of being startled. The fourth is an imputation of 
fault in which agency, simple or causal, is ascribed for a defective or faulty action. 
The final possible meaning is an ascription of liability. In this case, liability is 
ascribed to an agent according to a set of rules or customs rather than according to the 
causal connection between agent and action (though there will often be a causal 
inference in ascriptions of liability). Ascriptions of legal responsibility tend to be 
ascriptions of liability – as outlined in Chapter 3, liberalism legalises responsibility, 
and ascriptions of liability under the doctrine assume causal connections between 
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actions and harm, and establish responsibility if actions were voluntary and 
performed with adequate knowledge of the likely consequences. 
. 
To complicate matters further, these five ascription types can all be made in the 
language of morality, i.e. each can take the form of a judgment and communicate 
praise or blame, but the level of free agency assumed, thus the level of moral 
responsibility which is implied, differs among them. Moral responsibility tends only 
to be ascribed when an agent is judged to have acted freely to bring about an outcome 
(i.e. when she could have acted otherwise, so can be said to have chosen this 
particular course of action) rather than when she was somehow constrained. I 
discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5 the importance of the notion of volition or 
free agency to traditional conceptions of moral responsibility, but suggested that this 
conception was fundamentally flawed. 
So, five possible meanings of responsibility according to Feinberg – causal 
assignability, simple or causal authorship, fault imputability, liability – but all are 
problematic with regards to assumptions of free will, and all are also linked by a 
mistaken focus on the relationship of the actor to the action. The focus on agent and 
action, according to recent work in this area, overlooks the social nature of 
responsibility ascriptions: someone has to make these ascriptions, and that someone is 
in a relationship to the person being held responsible and is not a neutral judge. This 
work, triggered by Peter Strawson’s 1962 essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’, 
concentrates not on the agent judged to be responsible, but on the agent or agents 
making the judgments, and has started to explore the notion of holding responsible. 
Strawson argues that ascribing responsibility is not a process of theoretical or 
objective judgment but a practice which stems from the interpersonal nature of our 
social lives. The attitudes expressed in responsibility ascription according to 
Strawson are naturally occurring ‘participant reactive attitudes’ (1962: 9), which 
result from our participation in personal relationships, in the same way that attitudes 
such as resentment, anger, gratitude, reciprocal love and forgiveness result. The 
function of these attitudes is to express “ … how much we actually mind, how much 
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it matters to us, whether the actions of other people – particularly some other people –
reflect attitudes towards us of good will, affection or esteem on the one hand or 
contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other” (Strawson, 1962: 5). This 
description highlights the interpersonal nature of responsibility ascription as it shows 
that the agent who is judging and the one who is being judged are in a relationship to 
each other, and demonstrates the fallacy of assuming an independent external 
standpoint from which to judge a person’s actions.
Bernard Williams’s (1993a) work supports this view. He argues that there are four 
elements in the construction of responsibility: cause, intention, state and response. 
These can be combined in different ways in different contexts, and all four are not 
necessary for responsibility to be assigned. For instance, responsibility is present 
without cause or intention in cases of legal strict liability, and intent may not be 
present in actions undertaken whilst drunk. These differences cause problems for 
legalised models of responsibility, such as the cosmopolitan liberal model, as these 
models (‘liability models’ in the terminology of Young, 2006: 116-118) rely heavily 
on applying supposedly objective standards in order to find responsible and punish 
intentional agents who caused harm. In fact, the response element of responsibility, 
absent from liberal notions of responsibility (necessarily so, as it threatens the desired 
objectivity of the concept), is the only element which appears to be implicit in all 
situations where responsibility is assigned and thus demonstrates that the concept of 
responsibility contains within it a social component: a recognition that we live 
communally and our actions impact on others.
Strawson’s critique of theoretical conceptions of responsibility (i.e. those that 
concentrate on the objective conditions necessary for correct judgments of 
responsibility) and his argument that the practice of holding responsible is relational, 
have been tremendously influential, and his ideas continue to shape contemporary 
debate on the subject (Eshleman, 2004: 7). In section 6.1 below I explore how his 
ideas have been incorporated into what I, following Barnes (2000: 74), label a ‘social 
practice’ model of responsibility.
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6.1 The Social Practice Model of Responsibility 
The recognition that the concept of responsibility is necessarily social or inter-
subjective follows from the idea of agency as sociality explored in Chapter 5. Barnes 
and Pettit, discussed in that Chapter, both refer to Strawson’s work as they think 
through the implications that their models of agency have for ideas of responsibility. 
In this section I will outline the conclusions they reach, and extend the construction 
of a social practice model of responsibility by incorporating the work of Marion 
Smiley (1992). 
The practice of responsibility, according to Barnes, is necessary for the smooth 
functioning of social life: ‘Social life as we know it requires responsible agents who 
may be held accountable, and to whom it makes a difference that they have been so 
held’ (Barnes, 2000: 74). The practice enables people to ‘co-ordinate their 
understandings, sustain a shared sense of what they are likely to do in the future and 
hold each other to account for the mutually recognised outcomes of what they have 
done in the past’ (Barnes, 2000: 74).  However, an objective standard of 
responsibility from which to derive an absolute list of moral duties is neither 
desirable nor achievable. People are identified as agents in order that they may be 
held responsible, or held to account, for their actions in the context of social life. 
These actions, quite in contrast to the view of action held by liberal theorists, are not 
originated and performed according to the preferences of independent agents but are 
causally influenced by the expectations of others. Barnes, like Strawson, sees 
individuals as fundamentally vulnerable to each other, and argues that they seek 
deference or approval by monitoring the response of others to actions that they take. 
The practice of responsibility uses this vulnerability or susceptibility to ensure that 
social action is co-ordinated: being held responsible forces us to account to each other 
for our (to some extent socially caused) actions, and also accords to us a status which 
is desired. 
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It is these two aspects of Barnes’ concept of responsibility to which I want to draw 
particular attention: the association of responsibility with accountability, and the 
identification of a status of ‘responsible agent’ that is offered to people within social 
practices, and valued highly by those who achieve it. Barnes argues that an important 
feature of voluntaristic discourse (the discursive identification of individuals as free 
and autonomous moral beings, discussed in Chapter 5) is that it involves members 
having to account to one another for their actions, and he identifies accountability as a 
common characteristic of cultures. Accounting, according to Barnes, must be 
mutually intelligible according to shared knowledge and cultural resources such as 
norms and rules, and tends to take the form of showing why the actions taken were 
reasonable or judicious (reasoning also being a social practice rather than an 
independent activity: to rationalise one’s actions is to make them intelligible to others 
within the collective). It is here that ethics finds a place in Barnes’ theory, despite his 
rejection of the idea of an external judge of what is right: to co-ordinate behaviour in 
pursuit of social and individual goals, people collectively develop rules and norms 
which are concerned with what is right and good within their collective. These 
standards are often adhered to, but also frequently debated and assessed. Individuals 
are accountable not to an autonomous or ontologically distinct collective that 
determines an idea of the Good viewed as objective within the community, but to 
each other and to their own, all-be-it socially influenced, ideas of the Good. Ethics is 
central to communal living, but is performative within social practices rather than 
externally given either by nature or by a community.
The second aspect of Barnes’ theory which is worth exploring in more detail is the 
idea that being seen within the social group as a ‘responsible agent’ is important to 
people – they are usually keen to claim responsibility, at least for actions of which 
they are proud. To hold someone responsible, according to Barnes, is to confer upon 
her a dignity and standing within the community. This is why, having rejected 
standard views of sovereign individual agency and objective responsibility, assigning 
responsibility to individuals via voluntaristic discourse should not be seen as unjust or 
unfair. If we deny responsibility to an individual, even where there might be good 
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reasons (perhaps low skills, a disposition to violence, or a disadvantageous position 
within social practices compared to others also held responsible) to do so, we are 
diminishing her social status: ‘responsibility, for all the stresses and difficulties to 
which it may give rise, is in the last analysis a privilege not a burden, and one that 
should be suspended with the very greatest reluctance’ (Barnes, 2000: 120). To be 
treated as a responsible agent, and therefore of value to the collective, is part of living 
a good life. The practice of responsibility gives people a ‘task’ which can add 
structure to their lives and establishes a tangible connection between the individual 
and society. Taking or feeling responsibility can be a burden, but it can also be ‘a 
source of meaning and orientation which satisfies deeply felt existential needs for 
identity and meaningfulness’ (Birnbacher, 2001: 18).
For Barnes, agents are and should be held responsible for those actions which are 
collectively perceived to have been open to influence by the evaluations of others, 
that is, to actions seen as ‘free’ under the model of agency as sociality. To be held 
responsible means to be held to account – expected to be able to show why your 
actions were reasonable or judicious according to collectively developed ethical 
standards (standards which you, through the process of accounting, may reinforce, or 
cause to be re-assessed). To be held responsible in this way is to be afforded high 
deference within the group. The practice of responsibility thus serves both to co-
ordinate cognition and action within social life, but also to offer a status to which 
(most) people aspire. Like the discourse of individual agency, the discourse of 
responsibility is a necessary narrative which enables societies to function rather than 
a claim to objective truth about the world. 
Philip Pettit’s view of responsibility is strikingly similar. He argues that ‘[w]e engage 
with other human beings in a distinctive manner that involves the spontaneous 
attribution of responsibility, and we conceive of freedom as that property of human 
beings, and of the actions performed by human beings, that makes such an attribution 
appropriate under the rules of the practice’ (Pettit, 2001: 13). Following Strawson, 
like Barnes, he sees the practice of responsibility as ‘deeply rooted in the architecture 
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of our psychology, engaging with some of our most robust emotions’ (Pettit, 2001: 
12): a practice ‘written into’ our basic reactions to the way others treat us, which is a 
matter of ‘sensibility and affection as much as it is a matter of cognition and 
judgement’ (2001: 12). 
Pettit analyses the capacities a person must possess in order for us to be ‘intuitively 
disposed’ (Pettit, 2001: 33) towards viewing her as a responsible agent. The first such 
capacity he examines is rational control, asking whether it is sufficient for a person to 
be held responsible that her actions are caused by her beliefs and desires, i.e. carried 
out under the agent’s rational control. He acknowledges that an appearance of such 
control is necessary to being held responsible, but not sufficient, for two reasons. 
First, in order to hold others responsible, we require that they have the capacity to 
reflect on their desires and beliefs in connection to their ideas of what is right. The 
agent needs to have and be able to exercise a sense of ‘ought’ in relation to her 
desires in order for us to hold her responsible. The second reason to reject rational 
control as the sole marker of responsibility is that rational control can be consistent 
with manipulation, coercion or intimidation. Hostile coercion does not take away 
choice or the ability to make a choice – it merely changes our incentive structures: 
‘when the robber says ‘Your money or your life’, you are still left with a decision; all 
that happens is that the option of keeping your money becomes extremely costly’ 
(Pettit, 2001: 45). Using Barnes’ work, we can say that when a person is threatened or 
coerced, though she may be very vulnerable to the person attacking her, her actions 
are not significantly open to influence by the ethical evaluation of others. This finding 
fits with the fact that people are rarely held fully responsible for their actions if they 
are seen to have been coerced.
The second capacity Pettit examines is volitional control. This view states that a 
person is fit to be held responsible if ‘there is nothing about the psychology of the 
agent in virtue of which they are distanced from what they want, think or do, and 
have to look on those attitudes and actions like a helpless bystander’ (Pettit, 2001: 
49). This capacity concerns feeling ownership for our actions, or identifying with 
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them, through having volitional control over our desires. We are free (and so fit to be 
held responsible – demonstrating the mutual constitution of agency and 
responsibility) on this view as long as our first order desires are under the control of 
our second order volitions: as long as we act on desire A because we want to be 
moved by desire A, instead of acting on it because we cannot help ourselves. Here, a 
person who acts on her desire to take drugs because she is addicted to doing so, even 
though she does not want to take them, lacks volitional control, and thus is an 
unsuitable candidate to be held responsible for her consumption. Pettit again 
recognises that the appearance that a person identifies with or owns her actions is 
necessary to being held responsible, but not sufficient, also for two reasons. Firstly, 
there is no good reason to think that our second order volitions are any more 
authentic that our first order desires: ‘If my first order desires, just as such, are 
phenomena that I can view as an onlooker or bystander, without being implicated as 
an author, why can’t the same be true of my second order volitions?’ (Pettit, 2001: 
54). Prizing second order volitions above first order desires in judgements of 
responsibility is entirely arbitrary, as Pettit demonstrates using the example of 
desiring to keep his desk clean. He may have a second order volition to be moved by 
this desire, but it is entirely possible for this volition to feel as alien or inauthentic to 
him as the desire might, for instance if he feels that such a volition is an ‘unwelcome 
inheritance from the past [caused, perhaps, by being taught in childhood that 
cleanliness is next to godliness] that I view with disapproval’ (Pettit, 2001: 54). We 
may just as well be distanced from our second order volitions as our first order 
desires. The second reason to reject volitional control as sufficient for responsibility 
is that coercion does not preclude or reduce volitional control any more that it does 
rational control: ‘my higher-order volition in regard to a situation where I am 
threatened with a physical beating unless I hand over my money may be that I don’t 
get angry and defiant but rather give up my cash. And I will act under volitional 
control so far as I manage to bring my lower-level motivation, and my behaviour, in 
line with that volition’ (Pettit, 2001: 61). Again, in this situation, we will not tend to 
hold an agent to be entirely responsible for her actions, given the constraints she 
faces.
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This brings Pettit to the conclusion that discursive control is the only capacity both 
necessary and sufficient for being held responsible. Unlike rational and volitional 
control, which are concerned only with psychological aspects internal to the person, 
discursive control involves a social dimension. To be fit to be held responsible, a 
person must have a standing relative to others whereby she is susceptible to the 
influence of those others, but is not dominated, pressured, coerced or manipulated. 
Such a conception of responsibility fits, according to Pettit, with the way we conceive 
of ourselves: ‘not just as intentional systems with beliefs and desires, but as subjects 
who can conduct discourse with one another, and with ourselves, in the attempt to 
shape our beliefs and desires’ (Pettit, 2001: 70). To be open to the non-coercive 
influence of others through discourse is paradigmatically what responsibility is about: 
we only assign responsibility to those who we believe are responsive, quite in 
contrast to the liberal view that we are responsible only when we are ruled entirely by 
our own wills. 
In order to achieve the relational capacity necessary to have discursive control, agents 
must be ‘authorized as someone worthy of address’ (Pettit, 2001: 73). This 
authorisation has two aspects. First, to be properly held responsible, a person must 
interact with others – she must be socially active. It is not possible to be authorised as 
worthy of address by an external arbiter or by oneself: authorisation can only come 
within relationships. While it is very difficult, in practice, to conceive of a person 
who has no social interaction, we should remember that liberal views do conceive of 
agency, and through it, responsibility, as possible prior to such interaction. Second, 
the person must be treated by those with whom she engages in a non-coercive, non-
manipulative fashion. Pettit, like Barnes, sees the status of responsible agent as 
necessary to facilitate social interaction and as psychologically valuable. He argues 
that: ‘To be fit to be held responsible for doing something … is to be the sort of agent 
that can be incorporated with others within the practice whereby people hold one 
another responsible, and to act in the manner of such an agent. It is to merit in 
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general, and to vindicate in this particular choice, perhaps the most basic form of 
recognition or authorization that others can offer’ (Pettit, 2001: 24).
Pettit’s account supplements that of Barnes by elaborating the capacities that we see 
as necessary to accord the status of responsible person to others: capacities of 
rational, volitional and, critically, discursive control. It also leads us to think about 
relationships of power between subjects. Pettit notes that domination, as well as 
coercion, manipulation and intimidation, reduces freedom: we are less fit to be held 
responsible if we are dominated within our social relationships, just as much as if we 
are directly coerced. Marion Smiley (1992) has looked at the effects of power within 
the practice of responsibility in more detail, and outlines how political and social 
judgments (rather than the neutral statements of fact) are integral to our ascriptions of 
responsibility.
Smiley, like both Barnes and Pettit, sees responsibility as a social practice – a way of 
judging actions and expressing approval or disapproval of them. She takes a 
pragmatic perspective, wishing to make explicit the social and political considerations 
incorporated into judgments of causal responsibility and moral blameworthiness. 
Smiley argues that to understand moral responsibility we need to see it as relying on 
two particular judgments that are made in any case: firstly, that the harm under 
consideration was a consequence of the individual’s actions and secondly that the 
individual is worthy of blame. That these are judgments is critical here as ascriptions 
of moral responsibility under a liberal individualist view are presented as a discovery 
of fact. This simply cannot be, according to Smiley, as an individual cannot be fully 
metaphysically responsible or blameworthy for the consequences of her actions due 
to the inevitable intervention of moral and political considerations between act and 
consequence. She argues that the causes judged to be the ‘real’ causes of harm tend to 
be ‘those forces that we might be able to control in the future so as to prevent the 
harm in question occurring again’ (Smiley, 1992: 179), for instance, we may seek to 
hold individuals rather than states or larger practices responsible for war-time 
atrocities because we feel that by punishing these people we can prevent or deter 
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future violence. The causes chosen and judgments of extent of responsibility are also 
influenced by politics and the configuration of social roles and power affecting judge, 
judged and victim. In the US, for instance, the government blames urban drug 
pushers for drug addiction in the inner city, social workers blame the government for 
not funding drug rehabilitation centres, conservatives blame declining cultural 
standards and Marxists blame the capitalist system. Even if they agreed on the ‘facts’ 
of the situation they are still likely to disagree on who or what has causal 
responsibility. The ability an agent has to prevent harm and the social role we see 
them as playing influence our judgments: to continue with Smiley’s drug addiction 
example, social workers see the government as very powerful and also as responsible 
for preventing social problems, thus hold it causally responsible for addiction. Free 
market economists, who believe the government should intervene as little as possible 
in society will not see the provision of drug centres (an element of a welfare state) as 
part of the proper role of such a body, even if they agree with the social workers that 
provision would alleviate the problem. These expectations of social roles result partly 
from relations of power within our community. If a group has the power to make 
expectations of a role stick, they probably will. This means as power shifts, so can 
expectations of roles. For instance, manufacturers are now expected in many states to 
rank the health and safety of their workers as equally or more important than their 
business interests. This change in role perception has come about, according to 
Smiley, because of the empowerment of labour unions – as they gained power, so 
they were able to make new expectations of the role of manufacturer stick. 
Finally, our judgments of responsibility are influenced by our perceptions of where 
relevant communal boundaries lie and our position relative to those suffering or said 
to be causing suffering. If the victim is a member of the community of the individual 
judged to have caused harm (itself a subjective decision on the part of the judge) then 
the individual is more likely to be held morally responsible than if not, and the judge 
is more likely to believe that the interests of the victim should have been taken into 
account prior to action. Smiley cites the reason for this as the disproportionate value 
we place upon ‘our’ (national, local, employment- or interest-based) communities and 
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the people we judge to be part of them. She is more subtle than Barnes here, and sees 
that individuals within communities can differ in the values they hold and the relative 
loyalty they have to groups of which they are a part (so status may be more important 
to them in some than others). This argument has clear application in the realm of 
international relations, where borders and communal boundaries are frequently used 
to justify limiting the responsibility ‘we’ have to those outside our communities –
witness the reluctance of the West to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and 
now in the Sudanese massacres in Darfur.
The second type of judgment in the practice of moral responsibility, alongside that of 
causal responsibility, is the judgment of blame. Blame regulates social relations: 
‘blame both creates and sustains order between individuals by letting them know that 
if they do not comply, they will be hurt either by our admonishments or by the 
negative reputation which they develop in the rest of society’ (Smiley, 1992: 242), 
and constructs relationships between individuals and external states of affairs, so 
connecting us to our environments. Again, blame is a judgment rather than a 
statement of fact. We have expectations, shaped by social rules and conventions, of 
what members of communities owe to each other, so blameworthiness is part of a 
relationship rather than the property of an individual, and, to work, the blamer and the 
blamed must see themselves as part of the same community and agree substantially 
on the standards of behaviour expected within it. According to Smiley, two types of 
excuses for action can lessen or avoid blame – ignorance and compulsion. The 
success of these volitional excuses is as influenced by social and political factors as 
the ascription of causal responsibility. No-one is ever possessed of all relevant 
knowledge, thus ignorance is held by all actors by degree, and no-one is ever entirely 
free. Expectations of the extent to which an actor should resist her environment and to 
which she should educate herself come into play here. The recent controversy in the 
US over remarks made by Bill Cosby concerning the blame that parents should
accept for the underachievement of young African Americans is illustrative here.12
                                                
12 For a sample of Cosby’s May 2004 remarks and the debate surrounding them, see 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46717-2004May21.html; 
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There is a great deal of disagreement over how much of their environment people 
should be able to resist. Those who disagree with Cosby argue that the structural 
racism and the resultant poverty faced by young blacks in the US should absolve 
them of blame for poor performance in education, early parenthood and 
disproportionate representation in the prison system. Cosby, by contrast, 
acknowledges the problems faced but feels they can and should be resisted. The 
success of blaming thus depends on our expectations of actors but also on the social 
status of the blamer. The more power such a person has within the community, the 
more likely it is that she can get her ascription of blame to stick, which is perhaps 
why Cosby’s remarks have been the subject of more debate than would have been 
engendered if a less powerful figure had spoken out. This effect can also be seen in 
the success of the Drop the Debt campaign in pinning responsibility to the developed 
world for alleviating poverty through writing off large portions of debt owed by 
developing countries, despite protestations that the condition of the poor economies 
was caused by financial mismanagement and corruption within the indebted states 
rather than by the West. NGOs such as Oxfam have been pressuring governments and 
international institutions on this issue for decades, but only started to see significant 
results when celebrities such as Bob Geldof, Bono and Chris Martin drew attention to 
the issue and persuaded Western publics (and, through them, Western governments) 
that the responsibility of the lenders to cancel the debts outweighed any responsibility 
the indebted should assume for wasting the loaned money.
The practices of causal responsibility and of moral blaming are dynamic, and 
arguments about responsibility can cause us to change our expectations of social roles 
and our views of where communal boundaries lie, which, in turn, influence our 
judgments of responsibility. Smiley illustrates this argument using the example of 
American responsibility for apartheid. During the debate in the US in the 1980s and 
early 1990s about the correct social role of American firms who invested in South 
Africa during the apartheid era, evidence was produced (for instance concerning the 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59055-2004May26.html; 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A7323-2004Jun26; 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24594-2004Jul2.html.
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effect US business involvement had on the legitimacy of the regime, and, on the other 
hand, the effect it had on the employment of black people within the country) and 
arguments were made over whether South African blacks were properly a part of the 
community of concern of American business. Power played its part as well as 
morality, for the two, for Smiley, are intricately linked. She argues that others’ views 
of our moral blameworthiness are influenced by how much we care about them 
blaming us and how much power they have within our community. The divestiture 
movement in state governments and universities therefore had a significant effect on 
the apartheid debate as these bodies has sufficient political power (alongside good but 
not conclusive factual evidence) to alter role and boundary perceptions. The blame 
issued was taken seriously, and served both to reinforce the values and expectations 
upon which the judgment of blame was made, and to cause perceptions of the 
relevant communal boundaries to be re-appraised.
There are clear similarities between the work of Barnes, Pettit and Smiley. All see 
that by holding others responsible we affect their status within the community, and all 
see status as valuable. A desire for recognition is the only way to make sense of the 
practice of responsibility – the practice could not work so would not persist if people 
did not desire the status of responsible agent.13 All also see the ascription of 
responsibility as a functional practice within communities and not an exercise in 
metaphysical fact-finding, and the values, expectations, norms and rules used to hold 
others responsible as internal to the group rather than dictated by an external moral 
arbiter. Smiley argues that ‘our modern notion of moral blameworthiness makes no 
sense in its own terms, [but] it does make sense as a conceptual mechanism for 
internalising judgments of social blameworthiness in the absence of external 
                                                
13 While Barnes, Pettit and Smiley do not reference Hegel on recognition, it should be pointed out that 
Hegel’s contention that recognition ‘designates an ideal reciprocal relation between subjects’ and is 
necessary to and constitutive of subjectivity (Fraser, 2000: 109) is the likely intellectual foundation for 
the importance all accord to status. Hegel’s work has been resurrected recently in an unlikely cause: 
Francis Fukuyama (1992) uses the notion that humans have an innate need to gain recognition from 
others to support his contention that liberal democracy is now the only viable political system – the 
‘final form of human government’ (1992: xi) – as it is the only system in which all citizens are seen as 
equal, so all are fully recognised. This use of Hegel – read through Kojeve – has been heavily 
criticised (see, for instance, Nayar (1992); Hall (1993)) but I return to the view that liberalism is the 
ideal political system in which to foster responsible agency in Chapter 8.
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authority, whether that authority be the political community or God’ (Smiley, 1992: 
18). Like Barnes and Pettit, she also accounts for the persistence of the notion of free 
will, arguing that our idea of free will serves to disguise the social and political 
content of judgments of responsibility, which, if acknowledged, could prevent the 
judgments being internalised and acted upon. For Smiley, who explicitly factors 
power into the practice of responsibility, this means we must see morality as part of 
our political discourse and therefore recognise our views on responsibility should be 
up for debate. However, she does not conclude that power determines ethics – rather, 
that power and morality exist in a dialectical relationship. Our moral judgments are 
grounded in norms and rules and therefore influenced by the distribution of power in 
society, however it is through arguments over those judgments that the expectations 
of social roles and communal boundaries, and so by extension the distribution of 
power, can change. This process is not concerned with more closely approximating 
the norms and rules to an objective or external standard of responsibility, for no such 
standard is available. Rather it involves discoursing with others about the priority of 
our interests, the coherence of our value sets and the implications of our expectations. 
These will change as the contexts in which people act change, but the change is in no 
sense teleological – there is no expectation that the practice of responsibility can be 
perfected over time.
The concept of responsibility that emerges from the work of these three theorists – a 
concept I have labelled the ‘social practice model’ (SPM) – is very different from that 
found in liberalism. For liberals, responsibility is established first and foremost by 
law, with the law being used to structure relationships between individuals such that 
their actions do not unjustly interfere with the actions of others. As noted in Chapter 
3, obedience to the law is all that is needed to fulfil one’s public moral 
responsibilities in a liberal polis. Liberal responsibility, far from being central to 
social life, is legalized, privatized and marginalized. Living ethically (or not) beyond 
what is required by law is essentially a private choice, with the notion of rights 
providing limited public side constraints on what a person can do in order to realize 
her own interests. The contrast with the social practice model of responsibility is 
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pronounced. Under the SPM, responsibility is central to human life: the practice 
defines the way we interact with each other. The SPM conception of responsibility is 
at first glance much more similar to a communitarian conception, in that it accepts 
responsibility as being generated within the social practices from which our agency 
and identity extend, though it rejects the idea that these practices, cultures or 
communities are fixed or external to the actors. These differences will be explored at 
greater length in section 3.4. Before that, I will add some flesh to the bones of the 
SPM by considering the scope and substance of our responsibilities under the model. 
6.2 Responsibility for whom? Responsibility and Social Connection
Traditional views on moral responsibility can give easy answers to the question ‘for 
whom am I responsible?’, or, phrased differently, ‘whose interests should I take into 
account when acting?’, which are generated directly from their conceptions of 
agency. Cosmopolitan liberals conceptualise agency as residing in the sovereign 
individual so see individuals as responsible to themselves to develop and pursue their 
own ideas of the Good and, because the individual is ontologically prior to any 
communal commitments and thus her agency is defined by her humanity rather than 
her community, she is also responsible to all other individuals by virtue of their 
shared humanity. Special responsibilities for those to whom a person is biologically, 
emotionally or geographically close to may be permitted, as a matter of efficiency 
(i.e. if such responsibilities are more likely to achieve justice for everyone than if 
responsibilities were diffused equally for all among all), as long as those 
responsibilities work to the advantage of everyone. Communitarians see our agency 
as arising within our communities, so conceptualise our relevant relationships of 
responsibility to be circumscribed by communal borders. We are responsible only for 
those within our political community: we may be permitted to be charitable to people 
living outside the boundaries of our community, but we are not required to be. I have 
rejected the conceptions of agency underlying both positions as epistemologically 
untenable (Chapter 2), but this leaves us struggling for an answer to the question 
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posed at the start of this section. If we are not responsible for everyone, and we are 
not responsible only for those with whom we share a territorially circumscribed 
community, who are we responsible for? 
Iris Marion Young (2006) has attempted to answer this question in a way which fits 
well (though not perfectly) with the conception of agency as sociality described in 
Chapter 5 and the Social Practice Model of Responsibility which follows from it, and 
offers a position on responsibility that falls between the cosmopolitan liberal and the 
communitarian views. She argues that ‘obligations of justice arise between persons 
by virtue of the social processes that connect them; political institutions are the 
response to these obligations rather than their basis’ (Young, 2006: 102), i.e. 
communitarians are wrong to see responsibility as arising out of the political 
arrangements of bounded communities or nation states, but cosmopolitans are wrong 
to assume that responsibility can be generated merely from shared humanity. Young 
argues that we have obligations for those to whom we are connected by virtue of the 
social processes we engage in, but that these processes (increasingly) extend beyond 
the fixed borders of states. Offering some support to the cosmopolitan position, she 
argues that it is possible for the processes she is concerned with to have global reach, 
and looks at responsibility within the global apparel industry to illustrate her position. 
Young’s conclusion, after examining the structure of contemporary responsibility 
within and outside communities, is that: ‘all agents who contribute by their actions to 
the structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy 
these injustices (Young, 2006: 102). 
Young bases much of her argument on the observation that harm to persons is not just 
caused by other, deviant, individuals, but by the effects of normal social and 
economic processes in which many of us play a part. She describes these processes as 
structural, with structure, according to Young, ‘consist[ing] in the connections among 
the positions [individuals occupy within the structure] and their relationships, and the 
way the attributes of positions internally constitute one another through those 
relationships’ (Young, 2006: 112). The social and economic structures involved in 
186
the global apparel industry are complex (as with most such structures in 
contemporary life). Retailers such as Gap and Nike rarely own the factories in which 
their goods are manufactured. Instead, they contract with long chains of suppliers, 
manufacturers and importers, all of whom are legally separate entities with no formal 
responsibility for the actions of the others. The structures she is concerned with are 
not fixed and immutable: she follows Giddens in arguing that we create and 
reproduce structures though our actions, for instance, within the practice of fashion, 
we feel that we ‘need’ new styles of clothing each season. The expectations (of 
frequent new styles) and consumption decisions (buying these new styles) of a, 
usually uncoordinated, mass of individuals put pressure on manufacturers, and 
through them, factory owners, to produce clothes quickly and at low cost. There is no 
necessity to buy new clothes so frequently, so the structures of the global apparel 
industry – and the resultant suffering of employees who are forced to work in 
appalling conditions – are reproduced by the actions of those who participate in them 
rather than being unavoidable. Young is not, however, claiming that participants 
intend the distant effects of their actions: ‘[s]tructured social action and interaction 
often have collective results that no-one intends, results that may even be counter to 
the best intentions of the actors’ (Young, 2006: 114). 
In making these claims, Young offers us a much more nuanced approach to 
responsibility than either the cosmopolitan liberal or the communitarian position.  She 
does not subscribe to the view that the world is naturally well-ordered, or that there is 
an underlying harmony of interests, arguing instead that the processes or structures of 
everyday life can generate injustices: the normal operation of social structures can 
harm individuals even if many who participate in the structures do not intend this 
harm (a situation I return to in Chapter 7, in a discussion of the responsibility of 
ethnic groups and informal practices for suffering within conflict). However, she also 
recognises that to hold a person responsible for harm she did not intend, resulting 
from an action not widely seen as deviant and with only a loose or contested causal 
link between harm and action, is likely to itself be seen as unjust. 
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Using the idea of social connection, Young differentiates her view of responsibility 
from the more common ‘liability’ model, in which we are concerned to find causal 
contribution and to assign blame. She sees that if you only hold those who are 
directly causally connected to harm responsible (assuming that you can – something 
called into question by the discussion in section 6.1) then you exclude many actors 
from the discourse of responsibility. For Young, ‘[a]ll persons who participate by 
their actions in the ongoing schemes of co-operation that constitute these structures 
[i.e. structures that generate injustices] are responsible for them, in the sense that they 
are part of the process that causes them’ (Young, 2006: 114). The discourse can 
therefore extend to include those people whose suffering cannot be proved to be 
caused by the deviant acts of specific individuals or firms, and those people who act 
in good faith but contribute to harm. Consumers who buy clothing manufactured in
sweatshops, executives at MNCs who make sourcing decisions based on finding the 
lowest prices in competitive markets, investors who do not investigate the ethical 
standing of the firms whose shares they buy, factory owners who claim that the only 
way they can stay solvent given the structures of the industry is to impose sweatshop 
working conditions: all of these groups can be held responsible, but only if we 
divorce responsibility from the notion of blame or moral guilt. All of these groups 
stand in structural relationships to employees in the global apparel industry but they 
are not to blame for the conditions these employees work within in any direct sense. 
Young supports encouraging anyone involved in large scale social processes to 
consider the effects their actions, in the context of others acting the same way, have 
upon distant others and to take responsibility for bringing about change. She does not, 
however, dismiss the liability model completely. She argues that people should be 
held responsible when their individual (or collective) actions can be clearly linked to 
harm, so ‘[h]ired thugs who beat workers in horribly equipped factories’ (Young, 
2006: 120) remain individually criminally responsible and morally blameworthy, but 
responsibility extends outwards to all those connected to the process. 
Young’s conception of responsibility is an attractive one when viewed beside the 
social practice model outlined above. Although she conceptually separates structure 
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from agency, a position I criticized in Chapter 5, her view of social connections 
within structures is close enough to the idea of participation within social practices to 
enable us to use it to think through methods to identify relationships of responsibility. 
We can reject her dichotomous understanding of agent and structure but support her 
attempt to bring harms which do not have easily identifiable causes, or to which 
individual or criminal liability does not apply, into the discourse of responsibility. 
Young also makes a valuable connection between responsibility and justice, arguing 
that when we make judgments of injustice, we are implying that the suffering 
observed is socially caused as opposed to natural or unavoidable. From here, she 
argues that: ‘to make the judgment that poor working conditions are unjust implies 
that somebody bears responsibility for their current condition and for their 
improvement’ (Young, 2006: 115, emphasis in original). I am not sure that we are 
judging that someone does bear responsibility as much as that we feel someone 
should bear it, but this link nevertheless enables us to discern those situations in 
which responsibility should be identified and discharged. 
Her position is more difficult to support when considering the substance of injustice. 
Young defines structural injustice as existing ‘when social processes put large 
categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the 
means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as they enable others 
to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their 
capacities’ (Young, 2006: 114). She does not define what domination consists in or 
what people should not be deprived of, seeming to assume that we will know 
injustice when we see it (although her 2006 piece is only short, and Young has 
developed more substantive accounts of justice elsewhere, especially Young (1990) 
and (2000)). Young does not acknowledge that the people who participate in any 
given global social or economic process are likely to have quite different notions of 
justice. Who is to say that Western notions of fair wages, working hours or factory 
conditions are the epitome of justice? Why cannot we accept that rapid economic 
development at the expense of civil and political rights may bring more opportunities 
– for justice as well as for improved living standards – in the future?
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This implication that the same standard of justice applies to everyone connected by 
large scale processes or practices is where Young’s model differs from the SPM. My 
claim is much narrower – that responsibility for injustice may well reach further than 
territorial borders, but that it has no content until it has been theorized or constructed 
within collectives. The collectives in which responsibility is engendered may not map 
onto the groups of actors involved in any one process, so different ideas of justice and 
responsibility are likely to exist among people who are socially connected to each 
other. Young cannot tell us how to recognize and agree on what constitutes injustice, 
whereas the SPM demonstrates how justices and injustices come to be understood as 
such: the communal structuring of such concepts, and the continual process of 
creating, challenging and reinforcing ideas of justice. The SPM can also acknowledge 
that definitions of justice are just as susceptible to being formed and maintained 
under the influence of power as are ascriptions of responsibility, thus that any 
universal claims of justice or injustice should be interrogated to understand whose 
interests they serve. 
All this is not to say that we are only responsible for those with whom we are in 
broad agreement over the content of the notion of justice. Young’s contention that 
obligations of justice or responsibility are grounded on social relations, and that our 
social relationships and connections extend (increasingly so) beyond territorial 
borders is very persuasive. She also highlights the number of transnational social and 
economic processes that we are implicated in, showing via a model of social 
connection that we are involved in many more ethically significant, extra-territorial 
practices than a communitarian position would tend to acknowledge. What we must 
guard against doing is assuming that all those we may be in a relationship of 
responsibility to have the same idea as us about how and to what end that 
responsibility should be discharged. 
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6.3 Sources of Responsibility: Causes, Choices, Roles and Resources.
The social practice model of responsibility may offer an intuitively appealing 
explanation of how and why we hold each other responsible, but it does little to 
inform us what our responsibilities actually are. Once the foundationalism of 
cosmopolitan liberal and communitarian positions is discarded, we are left without 
any objective way to determine who has what responsibility. Responsibility depends 
on context and on the participants in any given practice – it is generated within the 
collective and is always open to change and review, so it is simply not possible to list 
the specific responsibilities any given actor might have. However, this section will 
argue that we can make some general statements about responsibilities by looking at 
where responsibility can stem from, or the sources of responsibility under the SPM. 
Responsibility can be given and taken, before or after action, and can be connected to 
our causal contribution to events, to our roles and to our resources. Most 
innovatively, on this account of responsibility, responsibility can be chosen: the 
individual or the collective can actively take on or assume particular 
responsibilities.14
In any discussion of the sources of responsibility it should be remembered that, under 
the SPM, responsibility ascription is a dynamic process, as the discussion in section 
6.2 above showed. Individuals engage in discourse with others, and through this their 
agency and responsibility is constructed: they attain the status of responsible agents. 
However, agency and responsibility are not bestowed upon them by forces external to 
themselves. Individuals must be active in the discourse in order to attain the status. 
The sources discussed below will not automatically bestow responsibility upon 
                                                
14 The sources of responsibility discussed in this section differ from the types of responsibility, causal, 
role, liability and capacity, identified by HLA Hart (1968) but are similar enough to warrant 
acknowledgement of his list. Hart’s causal and role responsibility map neatly onto the causal and role 
responsibility I describe in this section. His liability responsibility is not so much a source of 
responsibility as an extension of it: to be liability responsible is to be liable to punishment, praise or 
blame for a something which happened in the past – either due to your role, or due to your causal 
contribution. Finally, Hart’s capacity responsibility refers to the capacity of a person to be held liability 
responsible: their understanding of what law or morality require, their ability to reason about these 
requirements and their control over their actions. I discussed capacity to be held responsible in Chapter 
5.
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actors: the discourse of responsibility will intervene so responsibility will be allocated 
differently depending on the norms and power distribution at play in different 
contexts. 
Traditional conceptions of responsibility concentrate on the causal contribution of an 
agent to an outcome. The SPM questions whether such a contribution can ever be 
established, arguing instead that responsibility arises from inter-subjective discourse 
about norms and standards, and expectations of action within social roles, as well as 
judgements (rather than facts) about causality. However, the notion of causal 
contribution still plays an important part as the source of responsibility in law and in 
many everyday ascriptions of responsibility.
6.3.1 Causal or Connection Responsibility
Smiley argues that statements about the causes of actions are judgments rather than 
declarations of fact. Her argument is persuasive, but it highlights the point that cause 
still plays an important role in the discourse of responsibility. Everyday ascriptions of 
responsibility for simple acts which seem to link directly to consequences are 
commonplace. These ascriptions are seen most regularly in the practices of legal 
systems, and the ascription of responsibility here is almost always accompanied by 
blame. People or corporations (on which more in Chapter 7) are held responsible and 
punished for injuries to others, damage or loss which results from their acts of 
violence, theft, negligence or other deviance. There are also ascriptions of causal 
responsibility in international relations – for instance Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 are felt by many to have led to morally 
objectionable outcomes caused by the aggressor states. However, causal 
responsibility is very difficult to satisfactorily establish as acts and their 
consequences get more complex. Situations where causal responsibility is relatively 
uncontroversial tend to be small scale acts: individual criminal acts or individual 
instances of negligence (though we must still note the role of power in the ascription 
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of responsibility here: the process of ascribing causal responsibility is still a process 
or judgement rather than fact-finding, and most ascriptions are likely to be contested 
by someone, if only by the actor/s held responsible). These situations are rare in 
international relations as the number of agents and variables interacting in the sphere 
is so high, and the causal mechanisms so contested. Ascriptions of causal 
responsibility and blame are difficult to translate outwards beyond the borders of 
discrete communities and upwards to more powerful actors as the causal chains seem 
far too complex. They are also hard to sustain if the acts which are said to have 
caused the consequences are not widely judged to be deviant, as noted by Young 
(2006, discussed in section 6.2 above). Even though the law requires causal links, and 
our everyday ascriptions of responsibility tend to evoke them, the discourse of 
responsibility will be unnecessarily limited if responsibility can only arise for those 
outcomes which identifiable actors have directly and indisputably caused. 
The SPM, because it questions our ability to prove direct causal contributions to any 
harm, can open up the discourse to include responsibility for acts or harms which we 
were in some way connected to, or facilitated. The intuition behind this type of 
‘connection responsibility’ remains causal – the assumption is that we did contribute 
to the harm through our attitudes, actions or inactions (or that if we did not 
contribute, it was by accident rather than by design, for instance, because similar 
attitudes, actions or inactions on the part of others may have been enough to bring 
about the harm without our contribution), but that our causal contribution cannot be 
proven and may not be a result of deviance or disregard of social norms. I discuss 
responsibility for the facilitating conditions of harm again in Chapter 7. 
Responsibility for outcomes on the basis of causal contribution is a type of 
retrospective or ex post responsibility. It is about answering for, or being accountable 
for, something you have or have not done in the past. By contrast, responsibility can 
also be ascribed prospectively, or ex ante. We can have responsibility for somebody 
or something in the future by virtue of our roles, our choices or our resources. I look 
at each source of ex ante responsibility in turn below.   
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6.3.2 Role Responsibility
Role responsibility arises from the roles we play within social practices. Those with 
roles within families, cultures, professions, nations and so on have responsibilities to
those they are positioned in relationship to. Parents have responsibilities for children, 
teachers for students, employers for employees and so on. Young identifies that 
seeing someone as responsible according to her role is very different to seeing her as 
liable for harm: ‘finding responsible [according to a social role or position] does not 
imply finding at fault or liable for a past wrong, but rather refers to agents carrying 
out activities in a morally appropriate way and aiming for certain outcomes’ (Young, 
2006: 119). 
Role responsibility is incurred as people participate in social life, and is thus 
established, like causal responsibility, by the behaviour of the actors themselves. 
Thus, as a citizen, one may have responsibilities to pay taxes and to vote; as a parent, 
the responsibilities to feed and nurture your child; as a soldier to fight for your 
country; as a driver to ensure the safety of your passengers and so on. Collective 
agents can also have role responsibilities: for instance, fighting states have 
responsibilities to prisoners of war and to civilians in enemy territory, firms have 
responsibilities for the health and safety of their employees, communities have 
responsibilities for particularly vulnerable members.
As with causal responsibility, responsibilities within roles are often highly contested. 
There is a great deal of contemporary disagreement over, to name just a few, the 
responsibilities of mothers, particularly with regards to whether they should go back 
to work or stay at home to raise their children, the responsibility of food companies 
for the (generally poor) diets of their customers, the responsibility of the media to 
provide balanced coverage of stories such as the Middle East conflict, the 
responsibility of the UN to intervene in Darfur. Debate over the responsibilities 
which attach to any given role is influenced by power (as Smiley notes: those with 
more power are more likely to be able to make responsibilities ‘stick’) but also by 
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changing conceptions of the function of particular roles within society. In Chapter 7 I 
discuss the changing conception of the proper role of firms, which has led to the 
growth of ‘corporate social responsibility’.
6.3.3 Assumed Responsibility 
Claims of causal and role responsibility may be instigated or agreed to by an actor 
(we may, for instance, be keen to claim causal responsibility for outcomes of which 
we are proud), but they can also ascribed from the outside. Assumed responsibility, 
on the other hand, can only arise from actors themselves – these responsibilities are 
voluntarily adopted and are a creative response to others’ expectations of them. Such 
responsibility may fit with particular roles the actor plays or interests she has, but it is 
not necessitated by them. Highly publicised recent examples of agents assuming 
responsibilities include chef Jamie Oliver, who has taken responsibility for improving 
the quality of school meals in the British state school system, ex-President Bill 
Clinton who has taken responsibility for reducing the global spread of AIDS via the 
Clinton Foundation, and rock singers Bob Geldof and Bono (along with a host of 
other celebrities) who have taken responsibility for ‘making poverty history’ and 
‘making trade fair’. Although their aims are not yet fully realised, each has brought 
about what many see to be improvements to the area of their concern. Oliver secured 
an extra £280m to be spent on school dinners by the British government over the next 
three years; the Clinton Foundation has achieved a drop in the price of AIDS 
medicines and diagnostics from $500 or more a year in 2003 to $150; Geldof, Bono 
and associates persuaded the G8 to cancel the debts of the world’s poorest 18 
countries, and to increase annual aid by $48 billion by 2010.
Other assumed responsibilities cannot claim such success. The UN labelling of 
certain areas in Bosnia as ‘safe havens’ is a poignant example of an institution 
assuming a responsibility (to protect those sheltering in the ‘safe havens’) which it 
failed to discharge. The US/ UK alliance assumed a responsibility to bring safety and 
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stability to the people of Iraq (as well as the responsibilities they incurred as 
occupying powers) – responsibilities which, at present, seem a long way from being 
delivered upon.
The notion of assumed responsibility reminds us that there may be no identifiable 
agent or agents causally responsible for particular harms, and no role responsibilities 
which would alleviate these harms. The working conditions of sweatshop employees, 
as discussed by Young, have complex causes and no clear responsibilities exist to 
improve them. Any change is likely to come from agents assuming responsibility, 
which may then gradually become incorporated into the expectations of particular 
roles. We can see such a process happening, for good or ill, in the changing 
expectations of the US and UK public regarding the role of celebrities in political and 
economic debate. Those with acting, singing or sporting skills are increasingly 
expected to have something profound to say on world issues (witness the presence at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2006 of Michael Douglas, Angelina 
Jolie, Brad Pitt, Pelé and Peter Gabriel, alongside the ubiquitous Bono), and to devote 
time to campaigning for charitable causes. 
Assumed responsibility is a very powerful source of obligation because 
responsibilities are more likely to be discharged if the agent genuinely feels 
responsible for whatever it is she is to be held responsible for. In order to feel 
responsible, it helps if our responsibilities are commensurate with our identity. I 
suggest in Chapter 8 that a culture of taking responsibility commensurate with 
identity and interests is both desirable and discernable in the contemporary global 
system. Private sector moves towards corporate social responsibility, including the 
adoption by firms of mission statements which refer to specifically ethical standards, 
changes in organisational policy and the increased interest in joining bodies such as 
the Ethical Trading Initiative, suggest such a culture. In the field of International 
Relations, this trend can be seen in concerns over the ethics of foreign policy, in the 
increased tendencies of states in the 1990s to pursue ‘humanitarian’ goals and in the 
success of initiatives such as Jubilee 2000 which resulted in G7 states writing off 
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$110bn dollars of third world debt. These developments will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter 7. 
6.3.4 Resource Responsibility 
Causal, role and assumed responsibilities usually adhere to parties implicated in or 
benefiting from the situations to which they refer. The final source of responsibility 
concerns the resources of an agent, and can be invoked in situations in which the 
actor has little or no interest and does not seem to have substantially caused.  To be 
held responsible in this situation is to be judged to have the special capacities, such as 
wealth, talent or opportunity, necessary to assist, regardless of your connection to the 
suffering you are being asked to alleviate. Responsibility here is linked directly to 
social power, and an assumption underlies the position that as the resources of an 
individual or institution increase, so does its responsibility. This idea has been 
discussed recently by a number of scholars (see, for instance, Barry, 2003; Brown, 
2004b; Kroslak, 2003; Miller, 2001) and seems tremendously innovative as it starts to 
ask whether actors are capable of bearing moral responsibility in particular situations 
rather than whether they deserve to do so because of prior actions or duties. Links can 
also be seen to the idea of assumed responsibility, which captures the desirability of 
resource-based responsibility but acknowledges that it is easier to make such 
responsibility stick if the actor in question chooses the obligation and it reflects her 
primary interests and identity. The celebrities who take responsibility for social 
change are often both extremely wealthy, and highly capable of generating media 
attention. The resources that they have are useful in achieving the goals of the causes 
that they support. However, unless the responsibility is actively chosen, it is not clear 
how this type of resource-based responsibility arises in specific situations: many 
actors – particularly collective actors such as wealthy states and successful firms –
have an abundance of resources, but none has sufficient surplus resources to alleviate 
all suffering, leaving us with further decisions to make on what counts as surplus and 
which actors should distribute how much and to whom. Assigning resource 
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responsibility, more than any other type of obligation, is about who has the power to 
make the ascriptions stick.
The sources of responsibility identified here show that the SPM has a much richer 
concept of responsibility than does the liability model focussed on within liberalism. 
In the final section of this chapter I reiterate the key features of the SPM, highlight its 
particular strengths, and respond to likely critiques of the model. 
6.4 The Social Practice Model: A Review
The SPM sees the practice of responsibility as necessary to social life, because 
through the process of ascribing responsibility and accounting to one another, we co-
ordinate our interactions and structure our expectations of each other. Responsibility 
here is social because of the necessary sociality of agency, established in Chapter 5. It 
is a practice, rather than a state of being, because responsibility is performative: it 
only arises as people interact with each other and makes no sense without a social 
context. It is also therefore, and given the nature of agency, an inevitable and central 
feature of human life. 
The SPM introduces the notion of status to discussions of responsibility. The practice 
of responsibility is seen as offering actors approval or recognition from the collective, 
which all of the theorists analysed here view as valuable to living a fulfilling human 
life. Responsibility gives individuals an identity and a standing within their 
communities, and also threatens sanctions if they do not act responsibly. If 
individuals do not comply with societal rules and norms, they risk being hurt by the 
negative reputation they will gain, and the subsequent reduction in their status.
The idea that responsibility is about conforming to an external moral code or 
accounting to an objective judge is rejected by the SPM. The practice of 
responsibility is about being responsive to others – having the social standing and 
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personal characteristics necessary to being open to the non-coercive influence of 
others. As such, the judges of responsibility are just as socially embedded as the 
judged. The SPM theorises responsibility as inherently political: there is no neutral 
position outside of practice from which to judge the behaviour of others, and power 
will always be a factor in the ascription of responsibility.
There are a number of advantages to conceptualising responsibility in this way as 
opposed to accepting the constraints of more traditional concepts. I examine below 
the three strengths I believe to be most important.
6.4.1 Strengths of the Social Practice Model 
6.4.1.1 Rejection of Dichotomies 
This model of responsibility is a logical extension of the conception of agency as 
sociality outlined in Chapter 5. At the end of that Chapter, I noted that the once we 
see agency as necessarily social, we are free of the theoretical stalemate between 
agent and structure, and between individual and community. Neither agency nor 
structure exists prior to interaction, as both come about through human sociality. We 
are not sovereign, volitional creatures with agential powers as part of our pre-social 
nature, but instead are discursively identified as agents, and are mutually susceptible 
to social influence. That said, our agency is not fixed within any given collective. As 
we all inhabit different roles within different collectives, so responsibilities vary 
between actors. Neither agency nor responsibility is determined by a static, pre-
existing community, and all actors take part in a wide range of (constantly evolving) 
social practices and collectives, each of which will bring their own (constantly 
evolving) responsibilities.
The collectives that individuals constitute within the SPM are not seen to be 
territorially bound: they are not ‘communities’ as the communitarian would usually 
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understand them (i.e. nation states). The SPM recognises that, as practices take place 
across as well as within national boundaries, responsibility cannot be contained 
within existing political units. This does not mean that it extends across all 
individuals, as the cosmopolitan would argue. Rather, particular responsibilities come 
about as we engage in common social (including political and economic) activities 
with others, though there is no guarantee that all participants in any practice will 
concur on what those responsibilities are. Consideration of what they may be, via 
attempts to ascribe responsibilities to actors within the practice, is a fundamental part 
of social life.
Using Young’s vocabulary, the SPM is not ‘isolating’ (Young, 2006: 119). A liability 
model of responsibility seeks to isolate perpetrators: to separate out the guilty from 
the innocent. This model lets us see varying levels of responsibility. We can hold the 
‘hired thugs’ individually criminally responsible while also seeing that responsibility 
for those who work in sweatshops might extend to the multinational companies who 
commission the goods and the consumers who buy them (actors who could 
previously hide behind claims that they were helpless in the face of economic or 
market structures). The absolute divide between innocent and guilty, seen as so 
problematic within the discussion of the ICC in Chapter 4, is dismissed, and the 
relationships between the actors in social processes are interrogated.
The final implication of the denial of the dichotomy between agent and structure and, 
in particular, the rejection of the liberal account of agency, is that agency is not 
limited to being a property of the individual. I explore the agency and responsibility 
of groups in Chapter 7. 
The SPM offers a more convincing explanation of how responsibility works than 
either the liberal or communitarian positions. It can account for the persistence of the 
doctrine of free will and of the association of responsibility with judgments about the
causes of outcomes, deviance and blame, but it can also encompass the flip side of 
responsibility: ex ante responsibility that arises within the roles we play. The SPM 
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demonstrates why some practice of responsibility features in all human interaction, 
but also why the substance of notions of responsibility differs among groups and over 
time. Finally, a move away from concentrating on the relationship between 
individual, intentional action and outcome (seen within liability models of 
responsibility) lets us see that the actions we do not take, the situations we stand by 
and allow to happen, and the outcomes we do not intend can all have significant 
effects upon the world and should all be included in the discourse of responsibility. 
6.4.1.2 Recognition of the Dynamism of Responsibility
Cosmopolitan liberalism sees our moral agency and responsibility as pre-social facts 
about individuals, and therefore static over time (once maturity has been reached), 
and our moral obligations as fixed by an external, universal moral code or natural law 
(from which the concept of human rights is drawn). The SPM, in contrast, sees 
neither agency nor responsibility as pre-formed, and, given its understanding of ethics 
as originating in interaction, does not subscribe to the idea of absolute or universal 
moral rules. Agency and responsibility arise in social environments and can vary 
depending on circumstance and social role. They are context based, context sensitive 
and inescapably dynamic.
This does not mean that responsibilities are entirely fluid and impossible to identify. 
The discourse of any given collective (which might include families, civil society 
organisations, firms, territorially based groups such as the French or the Europeans, 
the international community) provides fixed points of reference to judge 
responsibility and action against. All views of responsibility are not equally valid and 
the SPM does offer us a way to judge between them, by referring to contemporary 
discourse, norms and shared understandings within collectives. But, unlike in the 
communitarian view, the practices of collectives which we use to judge 
responsibilities against are also themselves open to question and change. There is no 
assumption made that current social practices are inherently valuable or have 
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embedded ethics that are consistent with human flourishing. Young (2006: 120) 
identifies the tendency within liberalism to see the ‘background conditions’ of social 
structures as fair, or at least morally acceptable, with responsibility only arising when 
these background conditions are deviated from. This reflects the underlying belief in 
a ‘harmony of interests’ or naturally well-ordered world I discussed in Chapter 2. In 
fact, ‘[m]ost of us contribute to a greater or lesser degree to the production and 
reproduction of structural injustice precisely because we follow the accepted and 
expected rules and conventions of the communities and institutions in which we act’ 
(Young, 2006: 120). Examples of the accepted norms that Young sees as contributing 
to sweatshop injustice are the fashion system, the trend towards firms spending more 
on advertising that on pay and working conditions, and the high levels of 
unemployment in the areas where sweatshops abound, which mean that there are 
always spare labourers who are willing to accept employment in appalling conditions. 
The SPM requires that existing practices, norms and roles are challenged rather than 
reified, with responsibility being extended to cover all social behaviour rather than 
just that judged to be deviant.
Responsibility for deviance is associated with blame and guilt, and is therefore 
something we try to avoid. Such ascriptions of responsibility promote only 
defensiveness or scapegoating rather than changes in behaviour. But extending 
responsibility to encompass all of our behaviour does not mean extending blame to 
everyone, or casting us all as sinners: ‘[t]he point is not to blame, punish, or seek 
redress from those who did it, but rather to enjoin those who participate by their 
actions in the process of collective action to change it’ (Young, 2006: 122). 
Responsibility is a positive concept – to be afforded the status of responsible agent is 
something to be desired. As mentioned in section 6.3.1, responsibility can be forward 
looking as well as backward looking, and prospective responsibility seems to offer 
many more possibilities for progress than retrospective. It is less prescriptive than ex 
post responsibility, which focuses on specific acts, because ex ante responsibility is 
concerned with ongoing practices and bringing about certain states of affairs. The 
responsible agent, within her social context, has a great deal of scope to design her 
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responses to circumstances for which she is held responsible. Our responsibilities as 
consumers of clothing products may be discharged via campaigning, boycotting 
certain products or firms, spreading information, instigating public debate, donating 
money, persuading firms to change their practices, supporting poor workers and so 
on. Each actor’s social roles, interests and resources will vary – some will have 
celebrity power to gain media attention, some will have financial power to donate 
money, some will have persuasive power to change minds, some will have business 
acumen to offer alternatives etc - so their responses should vary. The range of 
acceptable variance will be limited by the collective, as actors hold each other 
accountable for their choices in discharging responsibilities. 
6.4.1.3 Expansion of the Possibilities for Justice
Once we acknowledge that responsibility is not an objective property to be 
discovered, and loosen its association with blame, we can see that responsibility can 
be created for situations which trouble us. Sometimes no-one is to blame for harm. 
Situations which many feel to be ethically unacceptable do not always result from the 
failure of individuals or institutions to obey the law or respect each others’ rights, or 
from malicious intent. They can be the unintended consequence of multiple 
unconnected actions, all of which were morally acceptable according to dominant 
social codes – as Young’s example of sweatshops shows. The SPM  shows us that 
new responsibilities can arise in response to new harms, and explains the method by 
which they do so. It encourages the assumption of responsibility by actors – taking 
responsibility instead of waiting for it to be given – and gives a role to ethical 
imagination, allowing for new ethical practices such as corporate social 
responsibility, discussed in detail in Chapter 7, or humanitarian intervention to be 
created as norms and shared understandings about social roles (of firms and of 
sovereign states, in the examples here) develop.
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The scope of harm is also opened up by the SPM. Liberalism focuses on deviant and 
illegal acts, so much of the debate about responsibility in international relations 
concerns acts of violence or atrocity against individuals. Seeing responsibility as part 
of a broader pattern of social interactions enables us to ask what our responsibilities 
might be for economic harm resulting from the normal workings of the market, or for 
harms of omission – to think about our ethical impact on the world more holistically.
Finally, the potential to deal with harm is increased by the social practice model 
because it takes power into account when examining the allocation of responsibility. 
Power (political, social and economic) is an inevitable component of the practice, 
fully acknowledged by the SPM (particularly in the work of Smiley (1992)), but the 
model can also show how power can be used constructively. The ideational or 
material resources an actor possesses can help to determine the responsibility it is 
ascribed by the collective, with powerful agents pressed to bear more responsibility. 
The inclusion of material resources is important as it emphasises the fact that to 
properly perform the role of responsible agent, we are likely to need material as well 
as discursive status: poverty can limit ethical agency by denying to the actor a range 
of possibilities to decide between. To use Young’s sweatshop example again, it 
would be unfair to hold the people who volunteer to work in sweatshops responsible 
for supporting the system if such work was the only option open to them to generate 
an income. The greater our wealth, the greater are our opportunities to choose to act 
ethically. In terms of international relations and political power, we can see the 
attempt to generate new norms of resource responsibility (or, in the case of Great 
Powers, to revive old ones – see Brown (2004b)) in claims that the US or the 
Permanent Members of the Security Council have greater obligations to enforce 
peace, security or human rights norms than less powerful states. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that the cosmopolitan liberal conception of responsibility both 
limits the scope of responsibility and serves the interests of the powerful. I used the 
work of Schmitt and Polanyi to explain how the workings of the free market can be 
used to disguise political interests, destroy society and so liberate powerful 
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individuals from any sense of responsibility for the suffering which results from 
policies promoting ‘freedom’. I also criticized the rights model of responsibility 
central to liberalism and cosmopolitanism, as it lacks universal assent and cannot 
generate the obligations necessary to achieve its goals. Cosmopolitan international 
law has shifted responsibility for individual welfare from the sovereign state to an 
international institutional regime, but that regime is far from arriving at a common 
view of what its responsibilities are, let alone discharging them. Major human rights 
abuses are taking place in the Darfur region of Sudan as I write – abuses which have 
been identified as genocide by the US – yet the international community cannot agree 
who (if anyone) has the responsibility to halt these abuses. The supposedly universal 
standards on which the system is founded are of little help in determining where 
responsibility lies in times of crisis. I would add here that the rights model of 
responsibility seems very limited compared to the social practice model. Rights act 
only as side constraints on self-interested behaviour, and the rights model encourages 
agents to view themselves as recipients of justice rather than bearers of responsibility 
for bringing about justice (a Kantian version of this criticism is also made by O’Neill, 
1996). Rights talk tends to be self-focused, legally phrased and about fixed 
entitlements; responsibility as a social practice is other-focused, locates responsibility 
at the centre of social life and encourages ethical entrepreneurship and imagination –
a distinction I discuss again in Chapter 8.
6.4.2 Challenges to the Social Practice Model
The social practice model of responsibility refutes many assumptions within 
traditional moral philosophy and political theory. It sees responsibility as formed 
within relationships rather than as an objective quality of an actor which can be 
measured and judged. It also denies that free will or volition, conventionally 
understood, is necessary to responsibility. The key challenges to the SPM are likely 
to concern its questioning of the existence of a universal moral code, a neutral or 
external position from which to judge responsibility and a naturally occurring balance 
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between responsibility and harm. I argue below that the SPM can respond to each of 
the challenges likely to be made to it, beginning with the criticism that the model is 
just a version of relativism.
6.4.2.1 Rejection of Objective or Metaphysical Conception of Responsibility
This objection to the SPM concerns the status of ethics in general. Cosmopolitan 
liberalism argues that there are universal standards of normative judgement, founded 
on the innate value of the individual, so by implication there are absolute answers to
questions of responsibility. The cosmopolitan is able to assert confidently that we are 
all in part responsible for every other human being (in the sense of having a duty to 
take their rights into account when we act) by virtue of our shared humanity. The
SPM can offer no such universal claims. If responsibility is discursively created 
within numerous social practices rather than founded on claims to moral truth, it 
follows that conceptions of responsibility will vary within and between these 
practices. There will be disagreement over what our responsibilities are in the same 
way that there are cross-practice disagreements over which moral codes or religious 
teachings we should follow.  There is also, under the SPM, no external standpoint 
from which to judge whether someone is responsible: the judge is always in a 
relationship to the judged and it is not possible to critique standards of holding 
responsible from the outside of the practices they arise within.
This lack of objectivity and universality does mean that we cannot categorically label 
the actions of others rights or wrong. But no theorist that I am aware of in any 
theoretical tradition has managed to find a moral code or value that all people in all 
cultures at all times could agree was universally valid and objective. Wishing for such 
security (and criticising those models which dispense with it) cannot bring it about, 
and asserting universal values in the face of disagreement seems to hamper rather 
than strengthen universalist ethics.
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The lack of objectivity does not indicate a relativist or subjectivist position, with no 
grounds on which to compare or criticise practices of responsibility. The social 
practice model assumes that our values are formed in practice with others, and that 
we will actively debate ethical standards, consider the consistency of values across 
social practices that we participate in or roles that we act out, try to understand 
alternative viewpoints and seek to persuade others of our points of view. It is 
persuasion or influence (along with social power) which will determine which 
standards are accepted rather than conformity to an external moral standard. Given, 
this does not allow us to make easy decisions when we judge that responsibilities 
which we might regard as particularly basic and important (such as the responsibility 
of a state not to massacre its citizens) are not being properly discharged. It is hard to 
justify violent interference in the affairs of others (for instance, humanitarian 
intervention) on this model, but not impossible. The collectives in which we create 
responsibility are not necessarily territorially bounded, and there is no basis for any 
one culture to claim precedence in defining responsibility within any given territory. 
All of the practices that take place upon the territory have some claim to ethical 
significance, so the rejection of certain standards of responsibility by a government or 
other territorial power is not the end of the discussion. Also, through technology and 
globalization, national boundaries are losing their ethical significance, and one can 
make an argument that there is a nascent global ethical discourse, seen in activities 
such as the negotiation of the Rome Statute and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
There may be common (though not objective) standards of individual and state 
responsibility in international relations emerging through such projects. If there are 
not, then at least we can ask whether those who we judge to be suffering agree with 
our assessment and would welcome our action.
Another aspect of this challenge is the complaint that the SPM takes a 
consequentialist view of responsibility, holding actors responsible because it is useful 
to do so rather than because it is correct. This seems to empty the idea of responsible 
agency of any content, as we are held responsible on the basis of some greater good 
instead of on the basis of something we have done or omitted to do. This is an 
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understandable concern, but impossible to satisfy. There is no metaphysical quality of 
being responsible: we are only responsible in practice. Of course responsibility works 
better to manage social life if actors feel that they deserve the praise or blame that 
they receive, but this feeling of desert comes from the correspondence of a particular 
instance of holding responsible to the larger practice rather than correspondence to a 
truth about the actor. 
6.4.2.2 Rejection of Zero Sum Model of Responsibility
‘“I suffer: someone must be to blame for it” – thus speaks every sickly sheep’ 
(Nietzsche, 1887, III section 15, quoted in Williams, 2003: 440). Nietzsche is 
criticising here the idea that we can find a responsible party for all ills. Yet the view 
that responsibility is equal to harm is understandably popular. The assumed harmony 
of interests underlying liberalism suggests a belief in what Lerner (1980) calls a ‘Just 
World’. Lerner’s work suggests that we are biased towards believing that people are 
to blame for their misfortunes and deserve credit for their successes, and that the 
moral order is in harmony with the natural order. This ‘moral accounting’ view of the 
world protects those who assign blame ‘from the possibility that wrong can randomly 
and arbitrarily enter into our world.’ (Williams, 2003: 440). The SPM challenges this 
position as it recognises that there is no guarantee that all harms will be covered by 
practices of responsibility and no natural moral equilibrium. Causal contributions 
cannot be adequately established except for very simple action-outcome chains, if 
then, and harms themselves are constructed and experienced socially, so there is no 
reason to think that sufficient responsibility can be discovered to alleviate all 
suffering.
Yet the SPM is somewhat more optimistic on this score than it may initially appear. It 
recognises that responsibility will not naturally be equal to suffering or harm – but 
does not rule out (and could even encourage) the creation of responsibility much 
greater than harm. It is theoretically possible to have a surplus not just a deficit of
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responsibility (even though we appear to have something of a deficit at present). The 
model also, by questioning the extent to which we can find the causes of actions – in 
the actions of volitional individuals or at all – and by rejecting the automatic 
connection of responsibility with blame, can support actors taking responsibility in 
areas where it is lacking. Garrath Williams notes that indeterminacy (as well as the 
political and moral considerations identified by Smiley) intervenes between 
intentions, acts and consequences, so ‘[p]recisely because the result of acts or 
omissions really is contingent – without necessary relation to the ‘will’ behind the 
deed – we need to respond to, and for, what we have helped to bring about’. 
Responsibility is expanded beyond harm directly caused, to include taking 
responsibility for those situations or outcomes we are implicated in or connected to.
All this is not to suggest that tragic situations cannot occur. Responsibilities are not 
objective and may not be co-ordinated, so can clash. Sometimes there is no right 
answer to a moral dilemma – any way of acting would be wrong or irresponsible, 
according to some practice that you are engaged in, or would result in suffering. Frost 
(2003b: 482) describes actors facing these dilemmas as in a ‘lose-lose’ predicament, 
and gives the example of a battlefield meeting of brothers fighting for opposing 
armies, responsible to their military codes, the causes they believe in and each other 
as brothers. There is no action either could take which would fulfil all of his 
responsibilities, but no clear way to decide between them. Frost sees the concept of 
an ethical agon (a duel or competition) between ethical choices as at the heart of our 
notion of tragedy, between which no compromise is possible as each has a valid 
claim on the actor. Frost’s work concurs with the view that our responsibilities do not 
necessarily fit into some overall ethical architecture, but even here, there is some 
hope of progress. A study of such clashes between the ethics of different practices can 
prompt us to reassess the arrangements which gave rise to the tragic dilemma – to 
begin a process of what Catherine Lu (2004: 507) calls ‘moral regeneration’. 
Responsibility can be reassessed, and, because it has no metaphysical properties, it 
can be recreated within practices to better enable social life.
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6.5 Conclusion
The social practice model is imprecise and indeterminate. Studying the way that 
responsibility arises in a project such as this cannot tell us what our responsibilities 
are – only participation in specific practices can define responsibilities and standards 
for their discharge. Responsibility on this view is complicated, contextual and inter-
subjective. It is located neither in the individual nor in the community, but in the 
social interactions of diverse actors. That presents some difficulties when theorising 
responsibility – it is hard to say anything concrete about the concept, as actual 
responsibilities differ in different contexts – but the social practice model is the most 
convincing way to explain how responsibility actually works. It seems to fit with how 
we behave across very different social groups:  discursively identifying each other as 
agents, holding ourselves and others accountable according to shared, evolving social 
norms, and seeking status within our practices by showing others that we can be 
trusted to discharge the responsibilities ascribed to, or assumed by, us in our various 
roles and actions.
In the following chapter, I explore who the ‘we’ I have been referring to might be. 
Once agency is seen to arise socially rather than being the property of individuals, 
and the sovereignty of the individual herself is called into question, the discourse of 
responsibility opens up to include a new range of actors who potentially have ethical 
significance: collective actors, or formal and informal groups.
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CHAPTER 7: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
My argument so far has concentrated on individual agency and responsibility – the 
limits of a liberal individualist conception of agency and the elaboration of a social 
practice model of responsibility which explains how responsibility works through the 
individual being held accountable by the collective as if she was an autonomous 
agent, despite agency being inherently social. Yet everyday ascriptions of 
responsibility often concern groups - we speak as if institutions such as the UN and 
its member states, firms and NGOs are moral agents. The US and UK as collective, 
institutional actors are currently held responsible by many observers for the suffering 
experienced by Iraqis during the recent invasion. The UN is frequently cited as 
responsible for acting to prevent atrocity in the Darfur region of Sudan. Multinational 
corporations like Gap and Nike are held responsible for the welfare of the labourers 
who manufacture their garments. Al Qa’eda is blamed for acts of terrorism and 
Oxfam is praised for raising awareness about global poverty. We also ascribe agency 
to informal bodies such as nations or ethnic groups – the Hutus in the Rwandan 
genocide, the Serbs in the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Germans in the Second 
World War – and hold them responsible for harm, and we call on the international 
community to alleviate poverty and global inequality. Most distant of all from the 
concept of the liberal individual as the archetypal agent, practices such as capitalism, 
nationalism and war are also blamed for the suffering that results from their exercise.
A prodigious amount of work on collective responsibility has been undertaken in 
political theory and International Relations recently, and I cannot hope to do justice to 
its findings in one chapter. My aim therefore is to consider the implications of the 
social practice model for the idea of collective responsibility, before discussing 
examples of the ascription of responsibility to particular groups. I will use the trend 
towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to demonstrate that conceptions of 
responsibility, in this case corporate responsibility, are evolving rather than static. I 
will then spend some time examining the responsibility of informal groups and 
societal practices, using the case study of the violence which accompanied the break-
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up of the former Yugoslavia, to outline which agents may feasibly be held 
responsible for the resultant harm, and the benefits of doing so. CSR is a case in 
which a broad range of actors – the media, NGOs, publics, governments, international 
institutions and firms themselves – have participated in the discourse of 
responsibility, and the voluntary assumption of obligations has been accepted by 
many as a progressive way to promote the public good. In the case of informal 
institutions such as ethnic groups, the discourse has been much more limited. 
Academics have examined the issue, and the language of responsibility is used with 
reference to these groups in everyday discourse, but little has been done to confront 
the responsibility of informal institutions by other actors in international relations. I 
suggest that this is a mistake, and that acknowledging the role that groups play in the 
life of individuals is imperative to generating a more inclusive conception of 
responsibility. I do not attempt to define precisely under what circumstances certain 
groups should be held responsible because there is no external standard of ‘holding 
responsible’ to which I could refer. The responsibility of groups, as with the 
responsibility of individuals, is contextual and arises as individuals interact rather 
than being dictated from an Archimedean point. However, I believe that the 
importance of groups to our ethical life can be established in general terms, and I 
conclude by arguing that acknowledging groups as actors within the practice of 
responsibility opens up opportunities to alleviate harm that individuals alone could 
not hope to prevent.
7.1 Agency & Responsibility beyond the Individual 
The subject of collective responsibility is enjoying something of a renaissance in 
International Relations at present (for a selection of recent thinking in this area see 
Erskine (2003)). Work has been undertaken to ascertain whether and how groups can 
be held responsible for harm, and the debate has focused on the characteristics of 
groups that might make them fit to be held responsible, and on how responsibility 
should be distributed across the members of a group.
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Liberal individualism, as previously discussed, sees responsibility as residing with 
individuals, and rejects the idea that groups can be responsible on either 
methodological or normative grounds. Methodological individualists argue that 
agency is individual and that actions supposedly taken by groups can be 
disaggregated into the actions of individuals (who should be held individually 
responsible for them). Responsibility, for individualists, is necessarily linked to 
agency and intentionality, and they argue that groups cannot function as agents in 
themselves, and certainly cannot act intentionally. H. D. Lewis (1948), J. W. N. 
Watkins (1957), Anthony Quinton (1975), J. Angelo Corlett (2001) and Jan Narveson 
(2002) take this position, seeing intentional agency and voluntariness as essentially 
properties of individuals and therefore individuals as the site of responsibility: ‘The 
basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that is all there is – nothing else 
can literally be the bearer of full responsibility’ (Narveson, 2002: 179). Individualists 
such as H. D. Lewis (1948) and Steven Sverdlik (1987) also object to collective 
responsibility for normative reasons. They claim that to hold groups responsible is 
not fair on those individual group members who did not contribute directly to harm, 
as they associate responsibility with blame. On the other side of the coin, liberal 
international lawyers sometimes oppose collective responsibility as it dilutes 
individual responsibility or allows individuals to evade obligations.
Recent work has challenged the methodological individualist position by identifying 
agential characteristics in groups. Toni Erskine (2003) argues that the key attribute 
necessary for moral agency is deliberative capacity, or the ability to access and 
process information about causes of action and their likely consequences, then act on 
the basis of this deliberation. As long as institutions have this capacity, they can be 
regarded alongside individuals as having moral agency, or being ‘vulnerable to the 
ascription of duties and the apportioning of moral praise and blame in the context of 
specific actions’ (Erskine, 2003: 6). Erskine uses Peter French (1984) to discuss 
collective agency. French differentiates between an aggregate collectivity, which is 
effectively just a sum of its constituent parts, for instance a crowd or a mob, and a 
conglomerate collectivity. This type of group is more than a sum of its parts: it has an 
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identity and capacities separate to those of its members and its actions cannot be 
disaggregated into the actions of the individuals who constitute it. French sees the 
conglomerate collectivity as having ‘internal organizations and/ or decision 
procedures’, as well as a set of rigorous and enforced standards of conduct for its 
members and a set of defined roles which have organizational power attached to them 
(French, 1984: 13-14).  These features of conglomerates make them capable of 
purposive action and therefore independent moral agency. French names ‘the 
Democratic Party, the Congress, the Rolling Green Country Club, the faculty of Yale 
University, the Gulf Oil Corporation, the Honeywell Corporation, the U.S. Army 
[and] the Red Cross’ (French, 1984: 13) as examples of conglomerate collectivities. 
Erskine adds to French’s work by outlining the following characteristics that a 
institution must display to be considered as a candidate for moral agency: ‘an identity 
that is more than the sum of its constituent parts and, therefore, does not rely on a 
determinate membership; a decision making structure; an identity over time; and a 
conception of itself as a unit’ (Erskine, 2003: 24). She adds states, transnational 
corporations, transnational NGOs, the IRA, the PLO, the UN and the Catholic Church 
to French’s examples of the type of organizations which qualify as conglomerate 
collectivities. Erskine notes that institutions can have more sophisticated capacities 
for information gathering and processing, deliberation and action than individuals, 
and therefore may be able to bear heavier burdens in terms of moral duties than their 
members.
This approach to moral agency is enterprising and important. It identifies the features 
of groups which lead us to regard them as capable of taking action, and rejects the 
liberal notion that agency can only be a property of individuals possessed of a ‘free 
will’ and intentionality. However, it does this by showing how groups can be 
analogous to individuals rather than by questioning the assumption of individual 
agency itself. The social practice model takes the challenge to methodological 
individualism further: it rejects the idea that we can disaggregate the actions which 
lead to harm and trace all harm back to intentional or purposive action and questions 
the ontological distinction between individual and group; agent and structure. 
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That agency is not restricted to individuals, and is in fact inherently collective, is one 
of the most critical implications of the SPM. Individual agency is a story told for 
social reasons: to enable and co-ordinate collective life by communicating our 
expectations of each other and thereby causally affecting each others’ actions. There 
is nothing here to suggest that individual agency is the only story which can be told, 
and, as mentioned above, the language of agency and responsibility is often used to 
refer to groups. The SPM sees that collective agents can possess agency in the same 
was as individual agents: the status of agent, and the expectations of responsibility 
that accompany it, are discursively created through voluntaristic discourse. Members 
of groups leverage their own agency by acting together with others, sometimes 
through formal or conglomerate institutions, and sometimes in informal aggregates. 
The second aspect of the collective responsibility debate concerns the correct 
distribution of responsibility. If a group is held responsible, should responsibility be 
distributed within the group, and if so how? Is it meaningful to talk about a group 
being responsible if we do not also regard its individual members as liable? Does 
responsibility differ between different members according to their causal contribution 
to harm? Joel Feinberg (1968) argues that group members can only be held 
collectively responsible if they contributed to harm or share a fault with those who 
caused harm (meaning that their lack of contribution to the harm was accidental 
rather than intentional), but is willing to admit that responsibility can exist at the 
group level in these cases. Larry May (1992: 37-40) distinguishes between collective 
and shared responsibility, arguing that: ‘[w]hen a group of people shares 
responsibility for a harm, responsibility distributes to each member of the group. 
When a group is collectively responsible for a harm, the group as such is responsible, 
but this does not mean that all, or even any, of the members are individually 
responsible for the harm’ (1992: 38). This type of distinction is rejected by the SPM, 
as it suggests that the group is ontologically separable from its members. The theory 
of agency as sociality sees that agency is both derived from the collective, and often 
exercised collectively. There is no such thing as the really existing group, just as there 
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is no such thing as the really existing structure: both are the products of the inter-
subjective interaction of (socially constructed) individuals. The model therefore sees 
responsibility within groups as shared, which means, according to Young, that each 
member of a group has ‘a personal responsibility for outcomes or the risks of harmful 
outcomes, produced by a group of persons. Each is personally responsible for 
outcomes in a partial way, since he or she alone does not produce the outcomes; the 
specific part that each plays in producing the outcome cannot be isolated and 
identified, however, and thus the responsibility is essentially shared’ (Young, 2006: 
122). Responsibility is personal, rather than individual, as it arises from our 
participation in social life rather than our ontological characteristics as agents.
By opening up the discussion of responsibility we can respond to some of the 
criticisms of the cosmopolitan liberal conceptions of agency and responsibility, which 
see individuals as agents and responsibility as discharged through a legally enforced 
system of rights. This latter view concentrates on the relationship between the 
individual and the state, and on restraining the activities of the state, so overlooks our 
practice of ascribing responsibility to both formal and informal groups. It also focuses 
our attention on the small number of people who can be proved to have broken the 
law and caused suffering, instead of asking everyone who is connected to a harm to 
consider their contribution to it. The social practice model incorporates a wider 
conception of agency, plus it allows us to bring considerations of the facilitating 
conditions of harm into the discourse by dismissing direct and demonstrable causal 
connection as a necessary condition of responsibility.
7.2 Formal Organisations
If collective responsibility is seen as possible at all, it tends to be seen as a property of 
formal institutions. These institutions have decision-making structures, well-defined 
roles for their members, internal standards of conduct which discipline member 
behaviour, and identities which are both separate to the identities of their members 
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and persist over time. These characteristics make them analogous to sovereign 
individuals, as they suggest that formal institutions such as the Democratic Party, 
Microsoft and the Catholic Church can form intentions and pursue courses of action 
which are more than the sum of the intentions and actions of their members (see 
Pettit, 2001: 106-114 for an explanation of how this is possible). In previous chapters, 
however, I have argued that the appearance of sovereignty or freedom of the 
individual is actually a measure of the susceptibility of individuals to each other. 
Formal organisations are analogous to individuals in this way too, making them good 
candidates for agency and responsibility under the social practice model: they are 
susceptible to expectations, constrained by roles and practices, and act for reasons of 
status or reputation. English School and international society theorists (see, for 
instance, Bull (1995); Wheeler (2000)), along with constructivists (such as Finnemore 
& Sikkink (1998); Wendt (1999); Risse et al (1999)), describe how states act 
according to these pressures, and below I argue that firms are also susceptible to these 
concerns. I outline how corporate behaviour through the 1990s altered in line with 
changing expectations of the role of the firm in society.
Much recent work in this area has concentrated on formal organisations such as the 
UN and its member states, and asked whether they can be morally responsible for 
harm in the international sphere (for instance, Erskine (2003); Erskine (2004); Brown 
(2004b)). This takes us beyond a limited consideration of individuals, but there are 
other actors who also, and increasingly, impact on international relations. NGOs have 
begun to receive attention as actors in their own right, and their influence on the field 
is pronounced. The number of registered international NGOs grew through the 1990s 
to reach more than 37,000 by 2000 (UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service with 
Gretchen Sidhu, 2003: viii), many claiming to act as a kind of ‘global conscience’. 
Organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam work directly in the field to relieve 
suffering, and also lobby governments and international organisations on behalf of 
those they treat to promote the observance of human rights treaties and humanitarian 
law. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty monitor the behaviour 
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of governments and businesses and apply pressure by gaining media coverage of 
alleged human rights abuses. NGOs like these have had a series of notable effects on 
the international scene: The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, a coalition 
of more than 1,400 NGOs in 90 states that was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1998, was instrumental in the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997. The Jubilee 2000 Campaign 
for developing world debt relief collected 25 million signatures across the world and
influenced Western governments and international financial institutions so heavily 
that $30bn in debt was cancelled. The Coalition for an International Criminal Court 
was in large part responsible for the success of the 1998 Rome Conference and Treaty 
that established the International Criminal Court. Due to their success in galvanizing 
public opinion and applying pressure, human rights groups have won a leading role in 
influencing many inter-governmental organisation activities. They help to design and 
often to staff the human rights operations that now accompany UN missions, and 
monitor the implementation of peace agreements or UN Security Council resolutions 
in the field. Of course the term NGO can also cover criminal and terrorist groups, and 
these groups have had rather different effects on international relations, most notably, 
the actions of Al Qa’eda on September 11th 2001 instigated a war between ‘terror’ 
and the most powerful military in the world. 
NGOs (of the Oxfam and Amnesty variety) tend to hold others to account rather than 
being the subject of ascriptions of responsibility themselves. Many support the 
promotion of individual criminal responsibility (the effects of which were criticised 
in Chapters 3 and 4), however NGOs have also recognised the importance of 
commercial actors to individual welfare. Prior to the 1990s, multinational 
corporations asserted that their correct role in global trade was to stay neutral and 
avoid getting involved in the politics of the regimes of the states they were operating 
within, and governments tended to support this. Western corporations sourced cheap 
raw materials and labour from states ruled by unpleasant regimes, with no real 
criticism from the governments who collected tax on the corporations’ profits. In line 
with the liberal concentration on the relationship of the individual to her state, and the 
concept of the public/private divide, firms were able to avoid difficult questions about 
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their social impact at home and abroad. The section below catalogues the changing 
power, role and responsibility of firms in the last fifteen years, and shows, firstly, that 
the effects of firms on individual lives necessitate a role for them in any discussion of 
responsibility, and secondly, that conceptions of responsibility change, and specific 
new responsibilities are created, eliciting responses from agents (in this case firms) 
who are eager to retain their social status).
7.2.1 Business Power and Corporate Social Responsibility
Firms are increasingly consequential actors in international relations, and conceptions 
of agency and responsibility which focus on the individual and her relationship to the 
state risk overlooking the impact of business in both domestic and international 
arenas. To give a broad indication of the size of these firms, in 2005, the market 
capitalization (i.e. stock market value) of each of the top ten companies in the world 
exceeded the gross domestic product of 157 of the UN’s 191 member states, 
including Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Israel and Singapore. Each of the top two 
companies on this measure – General Electric and ExxonMobil – were larger than 
175 UN member states, including China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. 
Looking only at revenue rather than market capitalization, the two largest 
corporations by turnover – Wal-Mart Stores and BP – each produced more revenue in 
2005 than 166 member states produced as GDP, including Denmark, South Africa 
and Argentina (Financial Times Global 500 website, 2005, International Monetary 
Fund website, 2006; Fortune Global 500 website, 2005). These corporations have a 
significant effect on many aspects of many lives. Wal-Mart Stores, for example, 
employs over a million people in the US, dominates a network of 61,000 US 
suppliers, supporting a further three million supplier jobs, and has enormous impact 
on product pricing, labour practices and the communities it operates within (White, 
2005a; Wal-Mart Stores website, 2006). The size and power of these firms is 
unprecedented, and as such they must be taken into account alongside states, let alone 
individuals, when considering agency in international relations.
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Firms are not just increasing in power domestically. They have phenomenal 
transnational influence and interests. A relatively low percentage of the assets 
(32.4%), sales (16.7%) and employees (23.5%) of Wal-Mart Stores, the world’s 
largest corporation in terms of revenue, are foreign (defined as residing or taking 
place outside the state in which the firm’s headquarters are located), compared to 
their rivals in the Fortune Global 500. 79.3% of the assets of BP, the world’s second 
largest corporation, are foreign, along with 81% of its sales and 81.3% of its 
employees. The story is similar with Exxon at number three: 64% of its assets are 
foreign; 70.3% of its sales and 65.1% of its employees. The Royal Dutch/ Shell 
Group is at number 4, and 64.9% of its assets are foreign; 63.7% of its sales and 
62.4% of its employees. Of the top ten largest corporations in the world, 
DaimlerChrysler has the smallest percentage of foreign assets at 18.2%, and Wal-
Mart has the smallest percentage of foreign sales at 16.7% and of foreign employees 
at 23.5%. (Fortune Global 500 website, 2005; Anheier, Kaldor et al, 2005/06: 318-
322). Given the size of these firms, even percentage figures of under 25% make for 
tremendous global influence via their decisions over where to invest, where to 
manufacture or employ service personnel and where and at what price to sell their 
goods and services.
Concurrent with the growth of business power has been the birth of the concept of 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, defined by the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as ‘business’s commitment to contribute to 
sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local 
community, and society at large to improve their quality of life’ (WBCSD website, 
2006). CSR requires that firms attempt not just to maximize profit, but also to care 
for the environment and promote social justice. Profit, People and Planet are talked 
about as a firm’s new ‘triple bottom line’. The principle behind the movement is that 
firms are not just accountable to their shareholders, but to all of their ‘stakeholders’, 
or the people and environments that they affect. The stakeholders of a business 
include its customers, suppliers, employees, the communities in which the firm 
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operates and the physical environment it affects, as well as its shareholders. The 
changes that firms make to display good corporate citizenship (a concept which has 
been developed by the CSR movement to encourage the view that firms have a social 
as well as profit-driven role) are for the most part voluntary: CSR seeks to control 
firms through public discourse and expectation rather than through formal regulatory 
mechanisms. This movement marks a fundamental reassessment of the role of the 
firm in social life and is a clear example of the social practice model of responsibility 
in action. As the size and impact of corporations has changed, so have societal views 
on their roles and responsibilities. The movement has been growing since the 1960s, 
but really took off in the 1990s, as people became disillusioned with the ‘Greed is 
Good’ corporate philosophy which seemed to lead to a decline in welfare for many of 
the victims of corporate raiders and capricious investors, and the attitudes and 
behaviour of both firms and publics towards corporate responsibility can be seen to 
have changed substantially. This change is not linear or teleological: the 1980s desire 
for profit at all costs was itself significantly different from the ‘philanthropic 
capitalist’ approach taken to business in the nineteenth century by the likes of Titus 
Salt and George Cadbury. 
Changes in public opinion and behaviour can be observed in media, attitude and 
buying studies. There is an high and growing level of coverage of corporate ethics 
and responsibility in the American, European and Asian media (SustainAbility 
website, 2006). Media interest in Corporate Social Responsibility increased by 192% 
in the year immediately after the collapse of Enron (Echo Research analysing press in 
the US, UK, Germany, France, South Africa and China, September 2002, quoted on 
Business in the Community website, 2006).  35% of Americans thought, in 1999, that 
companies should focus on trying to exceed lawful requirements, set higher ethical 
standards and build a better society for all, with 90% agreeing that large companies 
should do more than just focus on making a profit (MORI website, 2006a). 80% of 
British adults believe that large companies have a moral responsibility to society, and 
44% (up from 28% in 1998) say that the social responsibility of a firm is very 
important when they decide whether to buy a product or service (MORI website, 
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2006b). Attitudes seem to be similar outside the US and UK: 72% of those surveyed 
in 21 countries in 2005 believed that companies were completely responsible for not 
harming the environment, 71% thought they were completely responsible for 
ensuring a responsible supply chain, 47% for increasing global economic stability,
44% for helping to reduce the rich-poor divide, 43% for reducing human rights 
abuses, and 41% each for solving social problems and preventing the spread of 
disease/ AIDS (GlobeScan website, 2006). 78% of employees would rather work for 
an ethical and reputable company than receive a higher salary according to a 2001 
study by The Cherenson Group (CSR Europe website, 2006).
Opinion on ethical purchasing is also clear: 66% of respondents from 22 countries in 
a global 2003 survey said that they would pay more for products that were socially 
and environmentally friendly, with figures tending to be even higher in advanced 
Western states (2003 CSM Monitor, cited in Anheier, Kaldor et al, 2005: 466). This 
opinion translates into consumer spending decisions. The Fair Trade Federation, an 
American association of fair trade wholesalers, retailers, and producers whose 
members are, according to its website, ‘committed to providing fair wages and good 
employment opportunities to economically disadvantaged artisans and farmers 
worldwide’, reported that the total retail value of fair trade products in North America 
in 2005 was predicted to reach $358.9m, from $125.2m in 2001 (Fair Trade 
Foundation website, 2006). In the UK, the Fairtrade Foundation – set up to provide 
certification to products sourced from producers in developing countries who receive 
a ‘fair’ financial return, i.e. a return which ‘covers the cost of sustainable production 
and living but also gives a premium to [producers] to allow them to invest in business 
development, plus social or environmental projects’ – reported that the total UK retail 
value of Fairtrade products has leapt from £16.7m in 1998 to £195m in 2005 (cited in  
‘How Consumer Power Sparked a Fair Trade Revolution on our High Streets’ The 
Guardian, March 8th, 2006).
Public opinion has also been channelled into NGO activity. By the mid 1990s, major 
campaigns by Amnesty International in the UK and Human Rights Watch in the US 
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were underway to make human rights the ‘business of business’ and persuade 
corporations to assume economic and social responsibilities commensurate with their 
power and influence, especially in the field of human rights. These campaigns, and 
the consumer pressure which accompanied them, resulted in firms such as Gap, Nike, 
Reebok and Levi Strauss drastically improving the working conditions in their 
overseas factories and incorporating internationally recognised human rights 
standards into their business practices. Pressure was also exerted on oil firms, with 
high profile campaigns publicising the activities of British Petroleum in Colombia, 
Mobil Oil in Indonesia, Total and Unocal in Myanmar and Enron in India, all of 
which were said to be contributing to serious human rights abuses. In 1993 the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria mobilised tens of 
thousands of people against Shell and succeeded, through innovative use of the 
internet, in making the situation an international issue. They forced the world’s 
leading oil company to temporarily stop production, though the Nigerian government 
responded by arresting, imprisoning and sometimes executing Ogoni activists. By the 
end of the 1990s, a group of multinationals, including Shell, BP-Amoco and the 
Norwegian state oil company Statoil, announced policies that included a focus on 
human rights. 
Public discourse and NGO activity on corporate responsibility has led to changes in 
law and to the establishment of international initiatives to promote CSR. Countries 
including Denmark, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia and South 
Africa have all passed laws to make some form of environmental or social reporting 
mandatory. The UK Government was the first to establish a Minister for CSR. In July 
2005, Kofi Annan appointed Professor John G. Ruggie to be Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General on business and human rights, with a mandate which 
includes identifying and clarifying standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with 
regard to human rights; and developing materials and methodologies for undertaking 
human rights impact assessments of the activities of transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises. The UN is also pressuring firms to take heed of the triple 
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bottom line by launching the Global Compact initiative in 2000, which aims to bring 
firms together with governments, UN agencies, labour and civil society to support 
global social and environmental principles. The Compact ‘seeks to promote 
responsible corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the 
challenges of globalization … [to] help realize the Secretary-General’s vision: a more 
sustainable and inclusive global economy’ (UN Global Compact website, 2006a). 
Firms have responded to this reassessment of their responsibilities and many have 
actively assumed self-defined obligations to society. At 29th March 2006, more than 
2500 firms from 90 countries had joined the Global Compact.  This includes 106 of 
the world’s 500 largest companies (ranked by market capitalization in the Financial 
Times Global 500) which together employ close to 10 million people, have a market 
capitalization totalling around $4.9 trillion and account for approximately $3.5 trillion 
of global revenues (UN Global Compact website, 2006b). More than half of the 
Global 250 corporations issued corporate responsibility reports in 2005 (Entine, 
2006).  94% of company executives surveyed by Ernst & Young in 2002 believed the 
development of a Corporate Social Responsibility strategy can deliver real business 
benefits (CSR Europe website, 2006). 
While thousands of executives have responded to calls for increased responsibility 
and assumed obligations on behalf of their businesses, firms who have been most 
successful in implementing CSR seem to be those who have adopted initiatives which 
are closely aligned with the firm’s identity and resources, supporting the argument 
made in Chapter 6 in favour of assumed responsibilities. For instance, Unilever, the 
59th largest corporation in the world by market capitalisation, selling predominantly 
food and personal products, works with UNICEF to cut childhood mortality through 
nutrition and hygiene projects via the Partnership for Child Nutrition; aims to educate 
200 million people in India about basic hygiene through the Lifebuoy ‘Swasthya 
Chetna’ (‘Health Awakening’) programme; and set up the Marine Stewardship 
Council with the World Wide Fund for Nature to ensure the long-term sustainability 
of global fish stocks. These projects are not about philanthropy – they serve business 
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interests (increasing sales of Unilever products or securing the supply of key raw 
materials into the future) as well as community interests. Similarly, Ben & Jerry’s 
built a very successful business (bought by Unilever in 2000 for more than $325m) in 
large part through promoting an ethical brand image, achieved through initiatives 
such as the ‘Caring Dairy’ project in Europe which establishes user-friendly 
guidelines and tools for farmers to bring continuous improvement in the 
environmental, social and economic aspects of dairy production; through making 
grants of at least $1.1m per annum to projects which support their values and through 
sourcing 59% (by value, in 2004) of their ingredients and packaging from suppliers 
whose values are aligned with theirs, such as creameries who do not use milk from 
cows treated with Bovine Growth Hormone and carbon-neutral nut suppliers. Finally, 
Google, the 48th largest corporation in the world by market capitalization in 
December 2005, after going public the previous August, lists ‘You can make money 
without being evil’ as one of their operating principles. They run ‘TechnoServe’, a 
scheme to support young entrepreneurs in Africa and Latin America, and PlanetRead 
which aims to improve literacy in India. These businesses, and many others like 
them, have assumed responsibilities commensurate with their identities, expertise and 
material capabilities, and appear to be both benefiting the communities in which they 
work and the shareholders to whom they are more traditionally accountable –
Unilever, for instance, paid 1.6 billion Euros to its investors in 2005. CSR Europe 
backs up this contention, stating that 68% of the empirical studies published between 
1972 and 2000 show a positive relationship between corporate social performance 
and financial performance. These studies include an analysis in 2000 of ‘stakeholder 
superstars’ such as Coca Cola, Proctor & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson, which 
indicates that companies who consistently try to take their stakeholders (rather than 
just shareholders) into account outperformed the Standard & Poor 500 by more than 
twice the average between 1985 and 2000, giving total shareholder returns of 43% 
versus an average of 19% (CSR Europe website, 2006). 
Support for the trend towards Corporate Social Responsibility is far from universal, 
and I am not making the categorical claim here that it is the right strategy for firms to 
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pursue. In 2004, Christian Aid, the organisation credited with inspiring much of the 
debate on CSR, published a report stating that ‘CSR is a completely inadequate 
response to the sometimes devastating impact that multinational companies can have 
in an ever-more globalized world – and … it is actually used to mask that impact.’ 
(Christian Aid, 2004: 2). Christian Aid therefore supports significantly more stringent 
regulation of corporate behaviour rather than the current reliance on the voluntary 
assumption of responsibility. The Economist magazine published a much-quoted and 
highly controversial survey of CSR, entitled ‘The Good Company’, in January 2005 
that was extremely critical of both the principle of such responsibility (as it argues 
that a narrow focus on profit is the best way to serve the public interest; that firms are 
accountable to their shareholders alone, even if they should take into account the 
interests of stakeholders when making decisions; and that governments are best 
placed to structure and intervene in markets in the public interest rather than firms) 
and of the practice of CSR, asserting that many CSR initiatives fail to promote either 
public interest or profit. The anti-CSR position is supported (for very different 
reasons) by academics such as Joel Bakan, author of The Corporation: The 
Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (2004) who sees CSR as a way for 
corporations to disguise their relentless capitalist greed, and Elaine Sternberg, author 
of Just Business: Business Ethics in Action (2000) who argues that firms should 
respect the property rights of their owners by maximizing long term shareholder 
value, subject to ordinary decency (e.g. honesty in business dealings) and distributive 
justice (for instance, promoting employees on merit) rather than engaging in the 
fashionable practices of CSR. 
This dissent shows that the responsibility of firms is the subject of active debate – in 
political, academic, business and public forums – which supports the conception of 
responsibility described in Chapter 6. Responsibility is dynamic and evolving rather 
than static and fixed by universal standards. Firms are increasingly being held 
responsible for their societal and environmental impacts, and they are responding by 
taking responsibility both for reporting these impacts and for attempting to change 
aspects of them. The rise of CSR in Anglo-Saxon countries may also be a response to 
226
the mistaken focus on individualism and the separation of economics and society: 
Blowfield and Frynas argue that CSR may have been a necessary corrective in the US 
and UK as these states lack the kind of ‘longstanding social contract whereby 
business has social obligations to employees or wider society’ that is found in states 
across Asia, Africa and continental Europe (2005: 501). Whether or not the rise of 
CSR can be linked to the poverty of liberal individualism, the facts and figures in this 
section give a clear example of the creative, discursive practice of responsibility in 
contemporary international relations. 
7.3 Informal Groups
Holding formal groups such as firms responsible accords with the way we use the 
concept of responsibility and seems both uncontroversial and useful once the 
requirement of an individual agent is dropped. When we admit that the desire for 
status and a good reputation seems to motivate organisations as well as individuals, 
we realise that, through discourse and the communication of expectations, we can 
utilise the resources of these agents to help confront harms that individuals cannot 
impact on alone. Yet formal bodies are not the only entities to which responsibility is 
fixed in everyday discourse. We also ascribe agency to nations or ethnic groups – the 
Hutus in the Rwandan genocide, the Serbs in the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, the 
Germans in the Second World War – and hold them responsible for harm. Equally, 
practices such as nationalism and war are blamed for suffering. In this section I 
consider the implications of the SPM for the responsibility of informal groups, and 
the identities and practices within them. 
Whereas the enhanced responsibility of firms has become established through 
contemporary discourse, the responsibility of informal groups has not received as 
much public or academic attention. Assigning responsibility to these groups is much 
more challenging as they are in no way analogous to the sovereign individual upon 
whom our current system is predicated. Informal collectives such as ethnic groups or 
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‘the international community’ do not have the formal decision-making structures 
which make the analogy to individuals possible, nor do they have collective 
intentions, so most work on collective responsibility rejects the idea that informal 
groups can be moral agents (and therefore subject to ascriptions of moral 
responsibility). There is also discomfort at the idea of blame being distributed on the 
basis of identity rather than action – liberalism relies on the law to manage 
responsibility, and many commentators are understandably opposed to the idea that 
courts could find individuals guilty and punish them for outcomes that they had no 
direct causal contribution to. However, the SPM does not require autonomous, 
intentional agency, nor does it see responsibility as necessarily linked to law or to 
blame, so there is room for informal groups to act and to be held responsible. 
The groups under discussion here have an identity that is more than the sum of the 
identities of their constitutive parts and this identity persists over time, at least while 
the group is still in existence. The groups may be unorganised and uncoordinated, but 
their membership is not random: all participants are linked by common interest, 
behaviour or history, and this link forms an aspect of their identity. As members of 
the groups, participants behave socially, and their actions take significance and gain 
weight from being performed against the context of the group. Thus, mobs of 
genocidaires in Rwanda and cross border groups of consumers who buy a particular 
product can be seen as informal groups, as well as interest, ethnic, national or gender 
groups. The two types of informal group which have most relevance to the study of 
responsibility in international relations are ethnic or national groups, and the 
collective referred to as the ‘international community’. These groups may have some 
kind of formal decision-making institutions or processes available to them, or said to 
represent them (territorial governments in the case of national and some ethnic groups 
and the organs of the UN for the international community) but the informal groups 
themselves still exist and have effects outside these structures. The next section 
considers the responsibility of informal groups and their constituent identities and 
practices, using examples from the conflict that accompanied the break-up of the 
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former Yugoslavia to illustrate the argument. Whether or not it is useful to hold these 
groups responsible is the subject of section 7.3.2. 
7.3.1 Responsibility for Violence in the Former Yugoslavia
Throughout the 1990s, the Republics and Provinces of the former Yugoslavia were 
engaged in often violent struggles to establish power and independence (see Gow 
(1997) and Daadler & O’Hanlon (2000) for histories and discussion of the various 
conflicts). Responsibility for the atrocities which occurred has been the subject of 
much political, academic and media debate, with the UN Security Council 
establishing the ICTY in 1993 to hold individuals legally responsible for grave 
breaches of the Geneva Convention, violations of the laws and customs of war, 
genocide and crimes against humanity committed during the conflicts. As well as 
individual responsibility being assigned through international law in the conflicts, 
some theorists have argued that organisations such as the UN should bear some of the 
moral burden (see, for instance, Lang (2003a); Gow (1997); Daadler & O’Hanlon 
(2000)). But what of other actors? Should our debates about responsibility for such 
violence spread beyond individual politicians, individual soldiers and formal 
institutions? 
Virginia Held (2002) looks at the responsibility of ethnic groups for ethnic conflict. 
She resists defining the groups too definitively, but explains that they are not just 
collections of people who support a particular policy, for instance ethnic cleansing. 
They have an identity and continuity over time and a communal life. She uses May 
(1992) to argue that groups do have moral agency in ethnic conflict as it is attitude as 
well as action which contributes to harm. Ethnic hatred, the attitude shared by 
substantial portions of ethic groups who can be held responsible, is morally 
blameworthy because even though such hatred is rarely against the law (and may 
even be protected by laws of free speech), it significantly increases the risk that harm 
will occur as it generates a climate in which such harm is more acceptable. This view 
accords with the arguments made by Barnes, Pettit and Smiley about status: if 
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members of a group foster a climate of ethnic hatred, then acts to harm the ethnic 
other may raise one’s status within the group and thereby bolster self-esteem. The 
group’s attitudes alter the environment in which the individual acts. If we share in the 
creation of such attitudes, then we share in the moral responsibility for the harm that 
results. Policies of ethnic violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide are only sustained 
by ethnic hatred, as demonstrated in the case of the former Yugoslavia. Following the 
dissolution of communism, the institutions which bound Yugoslavia together as a 
state disappeared, and political elites began to look for new power bases. Lacking 
organising factors such as trade unions or political parties due to years of communist 
rule, dormant national identities were mobilised by political leaders in both Serbia 
and Croatia (it is worth noting here that even though Held regards the Serbs as an 
ethnic group, and they certainly perceived themselves as such during the conflict, in 
fact Serbs and Croats share a similar ethnic heritage). These identities both created 
and reflected nationalist feeling. The leaders were certainly manipulative in their use 
of identity: Milosevic generated fear among Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia that 
they would become a mistreated minority if these territories were allowed to self rule. 
However, Serbian communities allowed this fear to turn into ethnic hatred and 
continued to support the government who was generating the messages. Held 
therefore believes that Serbs as a group should take responsibility for Serbian 
violence in Bosnia and Kosovo as they were receptive to Milosevic’s messages. I 
would add that Croatians should also be held responsible as they were equally as 
responsive to Tudjman’s ultra-nationalist messages as the Serbs were to Milosevic. If 
their hate-speech had not found an audience, the political leaders would have stopped 
using it. The attitudes of the respective communities certainly seem to have allowed 
and enabled the violence which accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia. Prior to the 
conflict, many of its inhabitants thought of themselves as Yugoslavs rather than 
Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and so on. Intermarriage was frequent – for instance, around 
12% of marriages in Bosnia and Serbia and 17% of marriages in Croatia were 
heterogamous between 1980 and 1982 (Savezni Zavod Statistiki, 1961-1988, 
Demografska Statistika. Belgrad: SZS. Cited in Botev, 1993) and the populations in 
general lived in peace under the federative system. Yet through the 1990s nationalist 
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feeling grew to the point where campaigns of massive ethnic cleansing (including an 
estimated 700,000 Muslims ‘cleansed’ from Serb-dominated areas of Bosnia and 
800,000 Albanians from Kosovo by the Serbs, and 200,000 Serbs from Krajina by the 
Croatians) and atrocities including the establishment of detention and rape camps 
became politically possible. 
David Miller (2004) considers in more detail whether and how nations can be 
collectively responsible. He describes a nation as ‘a community of people who share 
an identity and a public culture, who recognise special obligations to one another and 
value their continued association, and who aspire to be self governing’ (Miller, 2004: 
243). They therefore exhibit the characteristics of ‘informal groups’ outlined above: a 
nation may include the formal institution of a state (or perhaps more than one) but is 
not limited to it and can therefore be an agent in and of itself. Miller uses Tony 
Honoré’s (1999) conception of outcome responsibility to consider the responsibility 
of these groups, which holds an entity responsible for the predictable or reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of its actions. Outcomes therefore do not have to be 
intended – just foreseeable under normal circumstances. Miller argues that nations 
can validly be held responsible if they display the characteristics of either ‘like-
minded groups’ or ‘co-operative practices’. Like-minded groups are ‘groups who 
share aims and outlooks in common, and who recognise their like-mindedness, so 
that when individual members act they do so in the light of the support they are 
receiving from other members of the group’ (Miller, 2004: 251). A mob is a good 
example of this type of group. Individuals seem to experience a contagion effect and 
behave differently than they would alone. Therefore, for Miller as for Held and May, 
everyone who contributed to the attitude of the mob can be held responsible for the 
violence that results, even if only a minority of the group actually behaved in an 
aggressive way. The norms established and values held by the collective contribute 
causally to the behaviour of the minority, as they appear to offer social status to those 
who take action in support of them. Miller gives the example of violence and racism 
against blacks in the postbellum American South as another case in which the 
collective has responsibility. The white community are collectively responsible for 
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the harm to blacks as they all participated in the community and so helped to sustain 
the climate of opinion which tolerated racism. 
Nations also share the characteristics of like-minded groups in so far as they share a 
common identity and public culture. But before ascribing responsibility, Miller 
argues we need to be reasonably sure that their collective actions (though political 
channels or group actions which reflect some element in the national culture) are a 
reflection of their shared beliefs and values. Where the nation is self-governing and 
democratic, this reflection can be assumed, thus ‘the more open and democratic a 
political community is, the more justified we are in holding its members responsible 
for the decisions they make and the policies they follow’ but even in an autocracy 
national responsibility may be justly ascribed (Miller, 2004: 262). In considering Serb 
responsibility for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, Miller notes that the Serbian population 
had no direct control over Milosevic and his armies, but argues that the extent to 
which Milosevic shared their national values imposed responsibility upon the nation, 
as did their lack of effort to be united in opposition (given that divides between the 
opposition parties helped Milosevic to stay in power). However, he also argues, 
somewhat opaquely, that people cannot be held responsible for beliefs and values that 
they possess as a result of sustained propaganda rather than the ‘normal’ processes of 
socialisation. It is clear from the history of the conflict that the Serbs meet the 
conditions to be considered as a like-minded group – the growing ethnic hatred 
displayed by the group certainly allowed the violence, but the place to draw the line 
between values and attitudes created by propaganda rather than ‘normal’ socialisation 
is much less obvious.
Miller and Held both contend that in general it is not possible for members of a 
national or ethnic group to dissociate themselves from the politics and practices of the 
group to avoid collective responsibility. For Held, even those who publicly dissociate 
themselves from group practices almost certainly still benefit from them (for instance 
postbellum whites in the US benefited from segregation even if they did not support 
it) and therefore share in the responsibility for the results of the practice. For Miller, 
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whole nations, including any dissenting minorities who disagree with national 
policies, can be held responsible even if they are not part of the same like-minded 
group. This is possible if the nation is a ‘co-operative practice’ in which individuals 
gain benefits from membership (such as political participation), substantially share 
the beliefs and values which constitute the national culture and have a fair 
opportunity to influence the policies of the group. Effectively, like Held, and similar 
to Young’s position on responsibility as social connection outlined in Chapter 6, 
Miller is arguing that those who benefit from the community should share the 
responsibility for any harm it causes. This may seem unjust if we take a liberal, 
legalistic view of responsibility – that a direct and intended causal contribution must 
be made to any outcome for which we are to be blamed. The SPM however can allow 
for people to be responsible in degrees, so those who dissociate themselves from 
policies that harm may be less liable than those who do not, but no-one who 
participates in the group is entirely without responsibility. Also, the SPM suggests 
that while blame may be appropriate to assign retrospectively, all members of the 
community can be held prospectively responsible, without blame being implied, to 
reflect on their practices and change their attitudes and policies to prevent harm 
recurring.
Discussion of the social practice model in Chapter 6 showed that the agency of 
individuals is both allowed and constrained by the collective. Frost (2003a) outlines 
how actual or perceived pressure from others within the group can limit agency: if the 
agent does nothing to advance the values of the practice they are engaged in, for 
instance the practice of being a good Serb, they risk being ejected from it and thereby 
having their status removed. Attitudes develop in support of the practice, because the 
individual finds status within it. The practice of nationalism, and with it ideas of what 
it meant to be a good Serb or Croat, became a defining feature of the groups in the 
former Yugoslavia. The morality embedded in this practice was damaging - a point 
returned to in the discussion of the practices of state sovereignty and war below.
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Practices, therefore, create agency and responsibility for the actors within them, but 
can also be the subject of responsibility. Responsibility is created by being assigned 
ex ante to individuals based on their participation in the practice concerned. Those 
individuals with roles within families, cultures, professions, nations and so on have 
responsibilities to those they are positioned in relationship to, defined by the 
expectations which attach to participants. The SPM, particularly the work of Smiley, 
is sensitive to the way that power works within these practices to define 
responsibilities. The ethics which dominate a practice are likely to be those that serve 
the powerful within the practice, which in turn supports Frost’s contention that the 
embedded ethics of all the different practices we act within are unlikely to be 
consistent with one another (as power will be distributed differently across groups). 
There is no guarantee of a moral ‘harmony of interests’ – as noted in Chapter 5, Frost 
sees the arguments within and between practices, on who is responsible for what and 
how best to behave, as the quintessential content of ethics. The lack of an externally 
given moral architecture provides another good reason to hold groups responsible: the 
ethics embedded within practice really are just the creation of the collective, and as 
such the collective must bear responsibility for them. The group is the only actor that 
can change its ethics: because determining and evaluating moral responsibility is part 
of political discourse within the collective, so shifts in both expectations and in power 
can change conceptions of responsibility embedded in social practices. The change in 
the conception of the social responsibility of firms brought about by the CSR 
movement (discussed in section 7.2.1 above) provides evidence of the possibilities 
here.
Linked to practice is identity, for the identity of individuals is intrinsically bound up 
with their group membership and performance of the practices of the group. As 
attitudes develop in relation to the social roles we play within practices, over time 
they become constituents of identity. That identity is important to individual ethical 
action has been established by (among others) Kristen Monroe (2003), who 
researched the motivations of 15 Germans and Poles who rescued Jews during the 
Holocaust. She found that their actions were driven by their identities and their views 
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of themselves in relation to others, and not by religion or the liberal application of 
reason as is often assumed. None of the rescuers in Monroe’s study seemed to face an 
agonistic choice between behaviours, even though their actions necessitated them 
breaking moral rules such as telling the truth. These rescuers did not weigh up pros 
and cons or risks and rewards of action, and they did not consider the ‘objective’, 
external principles of religion or reason. Rather, their identities limited the range of 
choices they saw as open to them, with the rescuers seeing themselves as acting out 
of a kind of moral ‘sense’ rather than making choices. Monroe argues that this sense 
is developed as agents incorporate ethical principles, through the processes of 
socialisation and maturation, into their adult identities. Like Barnes, Pettit and 
Smiley, she regards self-esteem as a basic human need and cites recent work in moral 
psychology by Colby and Damon (1993) and Blasi (1993& 1995) which suggests that 
if our behaviour strays too far from our self image or identity, we experience 
cognitive dissonance which motivates us to bring our behaviour back into line. Of 
course this process can work both ways. If identities are consistent with violence 
towards some groups or persons, then it may be more difficult than we currently 
appreciate for individuals to refrain from harming others, because they are not 
making a choice to harm, but acting in accordance with their moral sense. As the 
practice of nationalism developed among Serbs and Croats through the 1990s, 
national identities were mobilised and radicalised within the groups. On the basis of 
the arguments made by Monroe, these identities are likely to have brought about 
behaviour in line with the practice of ethnic hatred, with individuals acting out of a 
moral sense determined by socialisation into the practices of the group. That this 
behaviour is seen as acceptable within the groups is evidenced by the enduring 
support among Croatian nationalists for the actions of, for instance, retired General 
Mirko Norac and General Ante Gotovina, and Serbian residual support for Slobodan 
Milosevic and others such as Streten Lukic, all charged by the ICTY on counts of 
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war, with 
Milosevic also (until his death) standing trial for genocide. If groups are not held 
responsible for the socialisation which produces violent identities, then responsibility 
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may be felt nowhere, as the individuals involved are unlikely to be asked to account 
for their actions, and will feel no incentive to change them. 
The other informal group which receives a great deal of attention within international 
relations, and is assumed in ordinary discourse to have agency, is that labelled the 
‘international community’. Appeals for the international community to act are 
frequent, usually when reports surface of atrocities such as the genocide in Rwanda, 
the ethnic cleansing and genocide in former Yugoslavia and the actions of the 
Janjaweed militia in Darfur, and those who hold power within the group also see it as 
having agency: Kofi Annan argued in a 2005 Report that: ‘if national authorities are 
unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the 
international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help
protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations’ (Annan, 2005:
Paragraph 135). Bill Clinton, in a speech to Rwandans at Kigale airport on 25th March 
1998, stated that: ‘[t]he international community, together with nations in Africa, 
must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy as well. We did not act quickly 
enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to 
become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their 
rightful name: genocide’. 
The international community usually acts through the formal organs of the United 
Nations and other inter-governmental associations, but the norms and values 
generated by the community provide sufficient context for action for the community
to be considered as a collective agent in itself. Like national and ethnic groups, the 
international community does not have a formal decision-making structure, but its 
members (most often conceived as those states with the resources to assist: 
predominantly the US and Western European states) do act in the light of others’ 
opinions of them and do to some degree respond to status or reputation pressures. 
They are also capable of acting as a collective outside the structures of the UN, as 
with the ‘coalitions of the willing’ who bombed Kosovo in 1999 and invaded Iraq in 
2003 (see Brown (2003b) for discussion of the agency of such coalitions). These 
coalitions acted after the UN system failed to generate the results desired by the most 
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powerful members of the community, and their actions have had far-reaching (if 
somewhat contradictory) effects on international conceptions of responsibility. The 
action NATO took against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999 was not sanctioned by 
the UN (it was never put to a vote as it was expected that either Russia, China or both 
would veto UN military interference without permission from the sovereign 
government in an internal armed conflict) nor was it clearly in accordance with 
international law, but was justified by the US and the UK as upholding Security 
Council resolutions on behalf of the international community. This action 
represented, according to Nicholas Wheeler (2001), a watershed in the development 
of a new norm or practice of humanitarian intervention. This practice had been 
developing within the community of states since the beginning of the 1990s 
(following the intervention of the international community into Iraq to establish ‘safe 
areas’ for the Kurdish population), with ideas of responsibility being debated 
frequently during the fifteen years since that initial intervention. Following the failure 
of the international community to intervene in the genocide in Rwanda, and its 
willing intervention in Kosovo, the Canadian government set up the independent 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to try to 
generate consensus around the principles and process of humanitarian intervention. 
ICISS Co-Chair Gareth Evans, at the launch of the ICISS report, The Responsibility 
to Protect, explained the main conclusion of the Commission’s work as follows: ‘… 
sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable 
catastrophe. However, when they are unable or unwilling to do so, that responsibility 
must be borne by the broader community of nations’15. 
The actions of the international community through the 1990s demonstrate its agency 
outside the formal structures of the UN. The action taken by a ‘coalition of the 
willing’ in Iraq in 2003 may have reversed this trend, as there has been a profound 
loss of trust in Western (particularly US) motivation which is likely to mean claimed 
humanitarian motives for future interventions are questioned much more aggressively 
                                                
15 Quoted in ICISS press release dated 18th Dec 2002. Available at http://www.iciss.ca/press2-en.asp 
(accessed 18th Feb 2006).
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than they were over action in Kosovo. However, as with Corporate Social 
Responsibility, the fact that there is dissension over the proper role of the 
international community supports the social practice model conception of 
responsibility. The community is increasingly perceived to be an actor in its own 
right, and judgments of its responsibility in international relations can be seen to 
change over time. Up until the 1990s, the community was not seen as an actor of any 
significance (except perhaps during the Congress System following the Napoleonic 
Wars and the Concert of Europe period, but even in these periods, the international 
community was a small, fixed group of powerful states – see Brown, 2003b) and 
states, along with a few formal international organisations such as the UN, were seen 
as the agents of international relations. The fall of communism led to increased 
perceptions of the ‘international community’ as a collective with potential agency, 
and therefore responsibility, in its own right.
Other practices of the international community are not as progressive as the practice 
of humanitarian intervention is often seen to be. David Campbell (1998a) has 
examined the links between identity and the practice of nationalism in the Bosnian 
war. He argues that the traditional practices of international society, and not just the 
practices of the national groups within the former Yugoslavia, were ‘complicit in and 
necessary for the conduct of the war itself’, explaining that ‘inscribing the boundaries 
that make the installation of the nationalist imaginary possible requires the expulsion 
from the resultant “domestic” space of all that comes to be regarded as alien, foreign, 
and dangerous’ (Campbell, 1998a: 13). All who uphold and enforce the norms of 
state sovereignty are implicated in the practice of nationalism, because international 
society as a whole accepts that ‘the national community requires the nexus of 
demarcated territory and a fixed identity.’ The norms of the international community, 
on Campbell’s account, helped to ‘fix’ national identities in the former Yugoslavia 
when the identities of its inhabitants had been, prior to the conflict, much more 
flexible and inclusive. The practice of sovereignty also limited the range of options 
seen as possible by the international community to end the conflict. Bosnia had never 
been a nation in itself, and non-nationalist forms of political life could not be 
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envisaged, so the peace efforts were directed at partitioning the territory along 
existing national lines. As with attitudes within ethnic groups, the practice of state 
sovereignty within the international community provides a context for action which 
all members should take responsibility for even if they are not directly implicated in 
specific harms that result from it. 
Another practice of the international community which is necessitated by the 
discourse of sovereign statehood is that of war – a practice which is evident as a 
backdrop to most atrocities within the international system. Shaw (2003) examines 
the relationship between the practice of war and that of genocide. They are 
traditionally seen as distinct, with war portrayed as a legitimate activity of states: 
often necessary and sometimes noble. Shaw argues that genocide, by definition 
illegitimate and criminal, is actually a form of war, produced by the same forces 
within modern society that so frequently produce war: state power, economic 
organisation, ideology and the mobilisation and participation of the population. In the 
twentieth century, warfare ‘in the hands of the most advanced liberal states, 
repeatedly degenerated into little more than the deliberate mass slaughter, first of 
soldiers, then of civilian populations’ (Shaw, 2003: 25). These slaughters were not 
contrary to the social practice of war, but the inevitable and predictable consequence 
of it under modern conditions, according to Shaw. However, the argument is not that 
war causes genocide. Rather, war (itself now enabled by industrial capitalism, the 
profits of which are often used to buy arms) makes it easier for leaders to extend 
‘enemy’ or ‘other’ ideology and propaganda to include social groups rather than just 
armies, and from there to widen the use of armed force to include targeting these 
groups as such. Other practices also contribute. Shaw sees the language of slaughter 
as embedded in culture and ‘indulged’ (2003: 119) in television and film, and the 
mass media as the ‘principle means whereby society is mobilised for killing’ (2003: 
120). This is particularly visible when the media is state-controlled, as it was in 
Milosevic’s Serbia and in Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide. Shaw does 
recognise an irony in conceptualising genocide as a form of war: it is often only force 
that can stop such action (as the NATO support for the Croatian and Bosnian armies 
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did in Bosnia, the NATO bombing did in Kosovo and the energised RPF fighting did 
in Rwanda). Thus the practice of war may sometimes be legitimate, but its very 
existence provides the conditions of possibility for genocide.
Responsibility for conflict and atrocity in the former Yugoslavia does not lie with the 
attitudes, identities and practices of ethnic groups, or of the international community, 
alone. Both individuals (particularly the political leaders who controlled the resources 
of the warring Republics and provinces and who fanned the flames of ethnic hatred, 
and the military commanders who ordered and organised the crimes discussed) and 
formal institutions such as the governments and parliaments of the parties involved, 
the UN and NATO bear some of the responsibility and some of the blame. Anthony 
Lang (2003a), for instance, asserts that the UN must be held at least partly 
responsible for the massacres at Srebrenica, as it had assumed the responsibility to 
protect those who came to the UN declared ‘safe-havens’. Constructing these areas 
implied it would defend the population, which it then failed to do. Lang also notes the 
personal responsibility of Yusaki Akashi (Special Representative of the Secretary
General and Head of Mission in former Yugoslavia) and General Bernard Janvier 
(Military Commander of the UN forces in the territory) but argues that their actions 
were significantly shaped by the institutional culture of the UN. The argument of this 
section does not preclude responsibility for the violence in the former Yugoslavia 
from being assigned to individuals or formal organisations, but rather claims that 
without acknowledging the facilitating roles played by informal groups and practices 
we cannot fully understand that violence, so will struggle to prevent similar suffering 
in the future. The behaviour of individuals and institutions took place within social 
contexts provided by informal groups and their practices, which motivated particular 
behaviours and amplified individual contributions.
Within the discussion of CSR I noted the effects that widespread debate about ethics 
and social roles can have upon actions. As our judgements of responsibility change, 
so actors are incentivised (through a desire for status, linked, in the case of formal 
institutions such as firms, to a desire for commercial success) to change the way they 
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behave. Omitting to discuss the responsibility of informal groups by defining 
responsibility as a property of individuals, or, at most, individuals and formal groups 
directly analogous to them, has real, tangible effects. No pressure is felt by those 
whose attitudes provide the facilitating conditions for harm, and undue faith is placed 
in the law to tell us whether what we think and do is ethically acceptable. 
The benefits of the communal assumption of responsibility may be seen in the case of 
German guilt for atrocities committed during the Second World War. In contrast to 
the Serbs and the Croats, the whole German nation has taken responsibility for the 
horrors of the Nazi period, not least the Holocaust. In a speech to the Israeli 
Parliament in Jerusalem on 1st February 2005, German President Horst Koehler 
stated: ‘I want to underline that the responsibility for the Shoah [Holocaust] forms 
part of the German identity. That Israel can live within internationally recognised 
borders, free from fear and terror, is an incontestable maxim of German politics’ 
(Koehler, 2005). In a speech in Berlin on 25th January 2005, German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder declared: ‘[t]he overwhelming majority of Germans living today 
do not bear guilt for the Holocaust. But they do bear a special responsibility’ 
(Schroeder, 2005).  The German state has changed a number of times since the war, 
and most individuals who were involved are dead, so if responsibility had been 
ascribed only to those bodies, it would now have lapsed. The action by German 
leaders, supported by large sections of the German community, to take responsibility 
for the atrocities has led to a nation whose governments since 1949 have had unique 
and steadfast concerns within Europe to combat anti-Semitism and to develop ethical 
foreign policies. The nation endures as the state changes and individuals die, thus the 
responsibility, and through it the concern for Germany’s ongoing behaviour in the 
international system, lives on.  
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7.3.2 Objections to the Informal Group as Responsible Agent
Does it make sense to hold informal groups responsible for outcomes such as the 
violence in the former Yugoslavia? There are various objections to doing so. The first 
would be the liberal individualist response: informal groups are neither rational nor 
intentional, so do not qualify for moral agency. As argued in the previous chapter, the 
social practice model questions whether individuals and formal institutions would 
qualify under these criteria themselves, so offers an alternative view of agency and 
responsibility that recognises the social construction of all moral agency and the 
social foundations of all judgments of responsibility. On this view, rationality and 
intentionality are not necessary to moral responsibility.
A second objection is that the groups, practices and identities discussed are structural 
features of an agent’s environment and so cannot be seen as moral agents themselves. 
On this view, structure acts as an external, independent constraint upon agency but 
cannot be morally responsible for outcomes. Structures have no agency (moral or 
otherwise) in a strictly dichotomous ontology, so cannot have responsibility. 
However, the conception of agency as sociality and the social practice model of 
responsibility see agency and structure as existing on a continuum. Informal groups 
and their associated practices are the creations of collectives, and they exist and are 
recreated only through communal action. It may make sense for individuals to treat 
the practices and identities of groups as influences external to themselves in their 
private behaviour, but the collective, as authors of these influences, cannot do so – as 
argued in Chapter 5, structure is internal to the collective that creates and sustains it. 
The collective, or informal group, is morally responsible for any influence it has upon 
outcomes not because it has any kind of collective intention, but because it exercises 
collective agency. This is not the sum total of the actions of sovereign individuals, but 
an agency generated by the necessary sociality of individual action. No co-ordination 
mechanism is necessary (as it might be if we were looking for the responsibility of 
formal institutions) and most informal groups act together with little active reflection. 
However, reflection may be exactly what is required because practices and 
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expectations of social roles do affect the status of individuals within the group, so 
construct and constrain their agency. 
To ascribe responsibility to these factors is not to remove it from individuals: it 
actually works to increase responsibility upon them. Under a liberal individualist 
model individuals are able to avoid responsibility by citing structural constraints. 
Once we see individuals as sharing responsibility for creating the constraints, 
alongside others in the collective, we can ascribe responsibility on the basis of their 
social participation. This responsibility may differ between individuals on the basis of 
the power they exercise within the relevant group: the extent to which an individual 
can influence or resist the constraints imposed may determine how much 
responsibility she is accorded. For example, the moral responsibility of Slobodan 
Milosevic for atrocities committed by Serbian forces remains high due to his formal 
and informal power within the community, but responsibility is added to all those 
who engaged in nationalist discourse or allowed it to flourish. A positive (rather than 
zero) sum of responsibility is generated to best ensure that such atrocities are not 
repeated in the future.
A third objection to holding informal groups responsible concerns the role of 
voluntaristic discourse in the practice of responsibility. If the SPM is correct, social 
life only works if moral responsibility is conceived as the property of individuals. It 
may be preferable to continue the practice of holding individuals (and organisations 
analogous to them) responsible even though there are many arguments to suggest this 
is mistaken, as moving the discourse of responsibility to cover informal groups may 
either give licence to individuals to behave in immoral ways or do damage to them as 
agents. However, this objection misunderstands the relationship between the 
individual and the collective in the SPM. Individuals create and sustain groups and 
practices through their inter-subjective interaction or collective agency. Holding a 
collective responsible, as outlined above, does not take away from the discourse of 
individual responsibility, but supplements it, as the individual and the collective are 
not ontologically separable. Communities, like organisations, empower their 
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members and give them access to resources they would not otherwise have: ‘[i]nsofar 
as communities enable individuals to do more harm than they could do otherwise do, 
communities also create more responsibility for those whose lives are woven into the 
fabric of the community itself’ (May, 1992: 4). Certainly seeing informal groups as 
moral agents would require new expectations of the roles of their members to be 
generated to avoid the feeling that responsibility has been switched to an entity 
outside the control of any individual thus lessening the moral burden upon them. The 
individual would still be treated as a responsible agent, but that responsibility would 
be broadened to include shares in the responsibility for collective action or inaction. 
All those who participate in groups and practices should feel responsible for them as 
part of the collective (rather than as private individuals) and thereby motivated to 
reflect upon or change their participation, leading in time to a change in practices. 
This approach generates power and agency for the group. Acting together, the group 
can pressure individuals to change their behaviour by conferring status onto those 
who do. 
The final objection to holding informal groups responsible concerns the position of 
the agent judging to those being judged. An implication of the work of Barnes, Pettit 
and Smiley (following Strawson) is that there is no point external to interaction from 
which to judge responsibility. If we are not participants in a group or practice, can we 
say anything about responsibility within it? There are two responses to this. The first 
is to acknowledge that those outside the group may not be able to make judgments of 
responsibility within the group, but still hold that they can ascribe responsibility to the 
group as a whole. From there, the group may be better able than external observers to 
apportion responsibility within itself. 
The second response is to question the extent to which any of us are outside the 
informal groups which have agency in international relations. We are all implicated in 
the practices of nationalism, sovereign statehood and its defence by war. We may 
even be in the process of becoming members of the same status group or community 
of concern, if globalisation is rendering national boundaries ever less significant. 
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Certainly the statistics cited in section 7.2.1 suggest that we have a common identity 
as stakeholders in the practice of global capitalism. If this is the case, our perceptions 
of responsibility will change as our views of where the boundaries of our 
communities lie evolve, and we may come to see ourselves in an enlarged collective 
as sharing responsibility for much more than most are currently prepared to accept.
7.4 Conclusion
Using theories which see responsibility as a practice rather than a metaphysical 
property of individuals enables a new view of moral agency and responsibility in 
international relations. The recognition of the social character of individual behaviour 
opens up the idea of responsibility to formal groups such as NGOs and firms, and to 
unstructured multi-actor units such as ethnic groups and international society. These 
actors should be included in the discourse of responsibility as they have a profound 
power to affect our well being. The resources and identities of formal and informal 
institutions generate capacities which are more than the sum of the capacities of the 
individual agents who act within them, resulting in outcomes which would be 
impossible for individuals to achieve alone. Groups act as a kind of force multiplier 
of human agency – leveraging individual power (for good or ill) through access to the 
material and ideational resources of the institution: ‘[i]n advanced technological 
societies, much greater evil is done by groups of persons than by discrete individual 
persons’ (May, 1992: 53).
Conceptualising groups as responsible agents does not relieve individuals of 
responsibility. Rather it accords responsibility to individuals in a more nuanced and 
appropriate way – it acknowledges that they are embedded within more and less 
formal social relationships, but requires that action taken socially is also the subject 
of responsibility. Responsibility cannot be eluded on this view by claiming that free 
will was not present, or was lessened by the influence of others, as individuals all 
participate in creating the seemingly structural factors which compose this influence. 
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The individual is required to acknowledge the responsibilities attached to the formal 
roles she plays within states, firms and other organisations and to the less structured 
roles she plays within informal groups, and through this to consider the full range of 
her ethical effects upon others. 
Holding both formal and informal groups morally responsible encourages group 
members qua members to take responsibility and to tackle issues that individuals 
within the group cannot approach alone. We can (and do) hold such groups 
responsible without knowing how responsibility should properly be ascribed among 
the members of the group and without believing that all individuals within the group 
are equally to blame. While recognising the social context of events such as the 
violence in the former Yugoslavia in a more explicit way may not result in the 
successful ascription of responsibility from judges outside a community, it may 
encourage those who, through their action or inaction, allow the context to develop to 
take responsibility. Cultures cannot be altered by individuals alone, but they can be 
changed by the collective agency of the communities in which they arise (as 
demonstrated by the slow but sure rejection of apartheid in white South African 
culture, the defeat of anti-Semitism in post-war Europe, and the increasing support 
for notions of corporate responsibility around the world). Seeing ourselves as 
responsible within an organisation or community, regardless of whether we have 
contributed directly to harm, is an important step towards assessing or changing the 
norms and assumptions upon which our social life depends. 
In the final chapter of this work I will consider the ethical approach and social 
arrangements which are most conducive to a more encompassing and empowering 
discourse of responsibility: a discourse which encourages the ongoing assessment and 
improvement of existing norms rather than the reification of the cosmopolitan liberal 
assumptions which limit our conception of responsibility and, through this, our 
possibilities for justice.
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CHAPTER 8: THE FUTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY: 
VIRTUE, LAW AND THE REHABILITATION OF 
POLITICS
I began this work by documenting the increasing popularity of the concept of 
responsibility, and the concomitant dissatisfaction with the progress of the human 
rights regime. Politicians, international organisations, NGOs, firms and publics have 
all started to use the vocabulary of responsibility to confront social problems and to 
alleviate what they perceive to be suffering. However, despite an increase in interest 
in responsibility in international relations, we have not yet seen sufficient analysis of 
the concept in International Relations. I therefore aimed to begin such an analysis, 
arguing that our understandings of agency and responsibility are central to our ethics, 
and that the principal conflicts within international political theory can be seen to be 
conflicts over interpretations of these concepts. 
The story of twentieth-century international ethics has largely been the story of the 
growth of cosmopolitan liberalism at the expense of communitarianism. The focus of 
ethical innovation has been upon the individual, through the human rights regime and 
its promotion via international law and international legal institutions such as the 
ICC. This position has much appeal: it challenges the relevance to ethics of (often 
arbitrary) geographical borders, and promotes the welfare of all human beings rather 
than buttressing the power of those in control of the coercive apparatus of the state. 
However, the individualist concept of agency that cosmopolitan liberalism is founded 
upon is highly problematic. Individualism assumes that we are autonomous beings 
who can cause events in the world around us but who are not ourselves caused, who 
flourish in the pursuit of our own interests and projects, and who should therefore be 
as free as possible from the interference of others. The idea of rights was developed 
in support of the idea that the individual agent exists and has value prior to interaction 
with others, and to protect the individual from the most significant threat to her 
freedom: the arbitrary power of the state. I criticised this view of agency, and 
proposed instead a model based on human sociality, which shows that agency is 
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created within collective practices in which we discursively recognise each other as 
autonomous in order to hold each person accountable for their actions, and through 
this, to co-ordinate our social lives. This view can explain both our experiences of 
free will (we see actions as free when we believe they could have been causally 
influenced by the evaluations of others, rather than when they are caused by physical 
processes, phobias and the like) and our sense that collective life or sociality is 
important to, and in some way constitutive of, the individual rather than something 
we participate in instrumentally in order to further our own interests. The status of 
agent, on this model, shifts from being based on the (supposedly) innate 
characteristics of human individuals, assigned prior to interaction, to being based on 
societal evaluations of each person’s (inevitably socially influenced) behaviour.
The individualism of cosmopolitan liberalism leads to particular and limited 
conceptions of responsibility. In order not to encroach on her freedom, relatively little 
is expected of the individual, beyond refraining to interfere in the affairs of others. 
Law is the tool used to control obligation in liberal societies, and it provides a set of 
rules which individuals should obey to guarantee the broadest possible freedom for 
all. Morality beyond the law is a matter of personal taste, and the individual is not 
required under liberalism to make positive contributions to the welfare of others. 
Legal processes lead to responsibility being equated with blame, with the focus being 
on finding the deviant individuals responsible for intending and causing specific 
harms. I argued that this view leads to much suffering in international relations (in 
particular economic suffering such as severe poverty) falling outside the discourse of 
responsibility, because it does not result from the intentional action of individual 
agents. Conceptualising responsibility as liability under law also does not capture the 
rich ways we use the idea in everyday life, so I outlined instead the social practice 
model of responsibility. This model shows how we use the practice of responsibility 
to reflect our attitudes to others, and through this attempt to influence their behaviour. 
We hold each other responsible by requiring that each person accounts for their 
behaviour, or makes it intelligible to us with reference to collectively developed 
ethical standards, including expectations of the ex ante responsibility we incur in 
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performing our social roles. This process does not just take place inside law courts: it 
is an integral part of our social lives. To be responsible is primarily to be afforded the 
status of agent within the collective, and not necessarily to be to blame for any 
specific action. Responsibility is a dynamic inter-subjective construct, not bound by a 
universal moral code or within any territorial borders. It is refined and developed 
within collectives (themselves always evolving, and not tied to any specific 
geographical space) to meet the needs of new contexts. I outlined the changing 
expectations of the roles & responsibilities of firms, the sovereign state and the 
international community to demonstrate how the practice of responsibility works. 
The main findings of the research support post-positivist positions in international 
political theory, and do so (perhaps controversially – post-structuralists would almost 
certainly reject the type of argument I have used here as it suggests that humans have 
some kind of instinct towards living socially) by using research from social 
psychology as well as from sociology to provide explanations for how agency and 
responsibility ‘work’ that are more plausible than the mainstream theories. 
Foundational claims about the individual and the community, inherent in both 
cosmopolitan liberalism and communitarianism, are rejected, and agency and 
responsibility are recognised to be created within social practices – the interactions 
between individuals – rather than being natural attributes of people or of 
communities. The building blocks of responsibility (and through this, agency) are 
reactive emotions and attitudes rather than objective rules: the purpose of the social 
practice of responsibility is to communicate our attitudes to others, and thereby 
attempt to influence their behaviour, in order to co-ordinate our social lives. This 
lends significant support to pragmatism, and to Richard Rorty’s claim that suffering 
and cruelty are more likely to be reduced if we concentrate on changing people’s 
attitudes to each other through a process of ‘sentimental education’ than if we 
continue to try (and fail) to ground our ethics on universal foundations (Rorty, 1993). 
My research also supports post-positivist ethics by recognising that the collectives in 
which agency and responsibility are constructed are not necessarily located in any 
particular territory. Groups connected by beliefs, by interests, by attitudes, by 
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experiences and by activities can accord status to their members, just as groups
connected by location can. Membership of Al Qa’eda, or Amnesty, or the Catholic 
Church; participation in global efforts to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS or to slow 
the destruction of the environment; believing that humans have rights; being a 
diplomat, a mother, or an academic – all these may be as (or more) important to our 
social identities and obligations as our citizenship in a particular state. Debates over 
responsibility in contemporary international relations take many forms, such as 
consideration of who, if anyone, is responsible to intervene in Darfur, who is 
responsible for ensuring the stability of Iraq, and what responsibilities the media has 
for inciting violence with the publication of cartoons offensive to many Muslims. 
Debates in the international sphere also concern what it is to be a responsible 
corporation and what responsibilities wealthy nations, firms and people have for 
alleviating poverty in the developing world. All of these debates have territorial 
aspects, but cannot seriously be categorised as discussions between bounded cultures 
or communities. Equally, they demonstrate deep disagreements over the nature of 
responsibility in each case, so suggest that there is no common global or 
cosmopolitan view.
My research does offer support to post-positivist IPT, but it also recognises the limits 
of post-positivist approaches. Post-positivism still tends to uphold the dichotomy 
between agent and structure, individual and community, which the conceptualisation 
of agency as sociality rejects. I argued that structural features of our environments are 
the creation of people acting socially rather than existent apart from human 
interaction. Structures may be outside the control of any particular individual, but 
they are wholly internal to the collectives which create and sustain them. This opens 
up the possibilities of responsibility by showing that all practices, cultures, 
constraints and structures can be questioned and challenged. The research presented 
here also accords with our experience of responsibility as dynamic within limits. The 
discourse of any given collective provides fixed points of reference in which ideas of 
responsibility develop, accounting for the gradual and deep changes we have seen in 
conceptions of the responsibility of the sovereign state or the firm in the last twenty 
250
years. In identifying the limits of change as well as the possibility of it, the social 
practice model shows that all views of responsibility are not equally valid, and we can 
judge between them by referring to norms and shared understandings in the 
collectives they refer to. The norms and shared understandings must themselves be 
seen to be contingent and likely to favour the powerful rather than assumed to reflect 
a moral harmony, and judgements of responsibility must be recognised as fallible and 
subject to revision as circumstances change, but the judgements can be made 
nonetheless. Responding to others and creating, challenging and maintaining the 
standards by which we hold each other accountable for our actions across different 
practices are at the heart of ethics. 
To conclude my research, in this final chapter of the thesis, I start to outline the 
broader implications of conceptualising agency as sociality and the social practice 
model of responsibility. Clearly, nothing necessarily follows from my analysis in 
terms of holding specific agents responsible for particular acts or outcomes. Agency 
and responsibility are internal to practices so no generalisations can be made outside 
those practices. However, we may be interested to know how the social practice 
model of responsibility can work best to co-ordinate our social lives, and, if so, there 
are some general implications for our current practices which can be identified. I 
consider two implications in particular, one regarding agency and one responsibility. 
The key implication of the SPM for agency is that ethical agency is about much more 
than simply following rules or laws. Responsibility is a necessary component of our 
socially constructed agency – holding people to account is the reason why we identify 
each other as autonomous agents – so responsible agency is integral to our social 
lives. However, the model rejects the foundationalism of cosmopolitan liberalism and 
communitarianism, leaving us without any universal morality or objective set of rules 
with which to guide our behaviour. The model seems to make responsibility both 
more central to the way we live and more taxing. The implication of this is that our 
agency needs to change: to better cope with the demands upon us, we need to develop 
ethical character in preference to searching for moral rules. This suggests looking 
again at ‘virtue ethics’, a normative tradition which takes a ‘whole person, whole life’ 
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approach to ethics instead of subordinating responsibility and separating it from the 
pursuit of self-interest. This is the subject matter of section 8.1. 
In Chapter 7, I covered one key implication of the SPM for responsibility: I argued 
that the model broadens out our notion of responsibility to include consideration of 
how people act in formal and informal groups. The model suggests that because 
agency is necessarily social in character, and because acting together multiplies the 
effects of each person’s agency, so responsibility must be accepted for the suffering 
that our communities facilitate, through attitudes, action or inaction. The second 
implication of the model, and the one I will cover in some detail in this chapter, is to 
do with the nature of responsibility. In the current international ethical architecture, 
responsibility is legalised. Systems of obligation are governed by legal institutions 
such as the ICC, and cosmopolitan liberals support the increasing legalisation of the 
system in order to solve the ‘problem’ of politics (as politics, particularly the politics 
of sovereign statehood, is seen as having a tendency to turn violent). The SPM 
implies that this view of responsibility is limiting: legalising responsibility, 
conceiving of it principally in ex post  terms, and looking for deviant individuals to 
blame for discreet acts narrows the opportunities we have for alleviating suffering. I 
do not deny that law and liberal institutions can play important roles in society, and I 
consider what these roles are in section 8.2, but I do contend that they cannot work 
alone. Without universal values to refer to, and in a world in which the causes of 
harm are ever more difficult to trace, I argue, in section 8.3, that politics and the idea 
of political responsibility need to be rehabilitated. Politics, or the negotiation between 
different views of responsibility and of how to live socially, is necessary to ethics 
under the SPM.
8.1 Ethical Action: Virtues versus Rules
The first implication of the new conceptualisations of agency and responsibility is 
that acting ethically, which is now seen as central rather than peripheral to human 
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social life, will be easier to do if the agent is less concerned with following rules (as 
claims to universal standards have been rejected) and concentrates instead on 
developing certain qualities of character. Our responsibility under the SPM is 
understood to be much more extensive than it is under cosmopolitan liberalism, but 
significantly less structured. There is no assumption of an underlying harmony of 
interests, to be realised by individuals obeying the law, and no objective ‘right’ 
answer to ethical dilemmas. I concluded Chapter 7 by arguing that we are responsible 
for a great deal more than just the actions we intend to carry out. The social nature of 
our agency means we can be held responsible (though not necessarily that we will be 
held responsible) for the full range of our ethical effects upon others, whether the 
effects result from our exercising agency alone or in concert. Responsibility is 
extended to all aspects of our social relationships, but we have no objective rules to 
tell us how to discharge it. Also, we are participants in the practice of responsibility 
rather than passive bearers of obligation: we engage in the practice by seeking status 
for ourselves and awarding status to others, and by creating, challenging, refining and 
reinforcing the collective standards to which we refer when holding each other to 
account. To engage most productively in this practice, and to make decisions on how 
best to perform our roles and live our lives socially, we need to develop ethical skills 
and sensitivity to think through our impacts on others, and to shape collective rules or 
standards as well as apply them. The ‘virtue ethics’ approach best promotes this type 
of agency16.
Virtue ethics sees the character of the agent (rather than the content of moral rules or 
the determination of consequences) as most important guide to ethical action, and 
asks fundamentally different kinds of questions to ‘rule following’ or deontological 
approaches. Instead of asking ‘what should I do?’ when faced with a moral problem, 
virtue ethics asks ‘how should I live?’ or ‘what sort of person should I be? The 
creation of an ethical character is regarded as contributing to human flourishing, or 
even, on some Aristotelian essentialist accounts, necessary to it (see, for instance, 
                                                
16 For more detail on virtue ethics, see: Anscombe (1958); Crisp (1996 & 1997); Foot (2001 & 2002); 
Hursthouse (1999); MacIntyre (1981); Nussbaum (1987, 2000 & 2001a); Swanton (2003); Williams 
(1985 & 1993a).
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Hursthouse, 1999 and Nussbaum, 1987). Critical to such a character are the 
possession of virtues such as honesty, generosity, courage and integrity which guide
behaviour, as well as the possession of phronesis or practical reason, which is the 
capacity to perceive the morally salient features of a situation. While the virtues 
which any particular collective values may differ, phronesis will be of benefit to the 
agent in all collectives. It involves maturity in ethical agency, through sensitivity to 
context, an understanding of the likely consequences of action, and an ability to 
perceive ‘what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in 
life’ (Hursthouse, 2003: 4). 
This approach to ethics has its basis in Greek philosophy, particularly that of 
Aristotle, and differs substantially from the Judeo-Christian ethics embedded within 
liberalism. A Judeo-Christian world view sees the world as created and ordered by a 
benevolent God for the overall good of mankind. Thus, anything that takes place 
within the world can be explained by reference to divine goodness and justice, or, 
post-Enlightenment, to ‘reason’, even if it is not always clear quite how. Anything 
that happens to humans is in some sense their own fault or for their own good. This 
sentiment appears in liberalism in the belief in an underlying moral equilibrium or 
harmony of interests in human affairs. The Greeks did not see the world in these 
terms. They saw that bad things could happen to good people, and developed ethical 
approaches in response to this. Aristotle in particular held that human flourishing 
required external conditions that the agent’s goodness could not by itself secure - so 
simply acting virtuously could not by itself guarantee happiness. In order to show and 
experience friendship, love and so on, we are vulnerable to rejection and loss, brought 
about by people or events over which we have no control17. The social practice model 
of responsibility has much in common with this view: we are inescapably vulnerable 
to others as our status depends on them, and suffering can result from the normal 
operation of the world – it does not require agents to deviate from moral codes.
                                                
17 See Nussbaum (1986) for a much more substantial discussion of the development of Greek ethics.
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The benefits of this approach once the liberal view of responsibility has been rejected 
are significant. In an imperfect world, with no underlying harmony and no objective 
rules of behaviour, we need to develop sophisticated ethical skills – to be certain 
kinds of people – to function well as responsible agents. Virtue ethics is all about 
context, the situatedness of ethical issues and the development of the moral wisdom 
to make good choices in changing circumstances. It does not rely on rules to try to 
answer moral dilemmas before they arise, and instead recognises that more good can 
often be done by using ethical judgment and acting selectively, rather than by seeking 
to apply particular principles in every case. Brown (2003a) defends this position in 
relation to humanitarian intervention, using the analogy of choosing which homeless 
people to give money to in order to demonstrate that the only non-arbitrary universal 
rule that can be formulated in these kinds of circumstances is not to act. If we cannot
agree on a set of rules to use to decide when to intervene in a sovereign state to stop 
human rights abuses, and we are unwilling to give up the idea that ethical action must 
by guided by moral rules, then we have to infer a rule not to intervene. Brown argues 
that it is preferable for us to develop an ethical sensitivity and the strength of 
character to act selectively in those contexts where we can relieve some (though 
almost certainly not all) suffering, rather than trying to find absolute moral rules, and 
the findings of this thesis support his claim.
Virtue ethics also helps us to cope with the sheer volume of responsibility we can 
incur on the SPM in contrast to our limited obligations under liberalism. Young 
argues that ‘in a world with many and deep structural injustices, most of us share 
more responsibility than we can reasonably be expected to discharge.’ (Young, 2006: 
126). If we are held responsible (though not to blame) for all of our ethical effects 
upon others, then, given that we cannot solve all of the problems that our attitudes or 
behaviour cause, contribute to, influence or allow, we need strategies for choosing 
how to act to best discharge at least some of our responsibility. Developing character 
traits such as honesty and generosity, and skill in practical reasoning, can help us to 
understand our ‘ethical footprint’ on the world. Calculating our ethical footprint, (an 
idea inspired by the ‘carbon footprint’, or the measure of the impact our activities 
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have on the environment in terms of the amount of green house gases produced, 
measured in units of carbon dioxide – see http://www.carbonfootprint.com/) should 
include consideration of the impacts we have on other people and on our 
environment, in all of our different roles in formal and informal groups and in the 
practices we participate in, in order to judge our net contribution to the communities 
we are a part of. Virtue ethics encourages us to contemplate this contribution, to 
explore our opportunities to act differently in the future, to consider the range of 
resources we have available to utilise and to be imaginative in responding to 
situations which trouble us. Agents who develop social virtues and practical reason 
can act together to challenge features of our societies seen as structural and not open 
to change – as we have seen with the creative responses to sweatshop practices, 
poverty, Third World debt and corporate power documented within the thesis. Agents 
have spread information, asked questions, attracted attention, instigated debate, 
applied political pressure, altered their purchasing habits, donated money and come 
up with alternative ways of doing business in response to new thinking about 
responsibility. They did not, for the most part, act to fulfil a set of legal obligations, 
or to put right damage they themselves had intentionally caused, but instead exercised 
collective and imaginative agency to alter the social structures which arose from 
collective practices. 
Virtue ethics sees ethical character and behaviour as an integral part of human 
flourishing, linked to all aspects of our inherently social lives, instead of something in 
conflict with, or constraining upon, our natural desires or self interest. Flourishing, 
including the development of socially-defined virtues or excellences of character, is a 
life-long task, which encompasses all aspects of human lives. Bernard Williams 
described ethics as being about ‘living a whole life well’ which neatly captures this 
approach (The Guardian, 13th June 2003). It compliments the view of agency as 
sociality and the social practice model of responsibility by showing how people can 
best function as responsible agents in a world without universal moral rules. Virtue 
ethics also resonates with the SPM because it dismisses the idea that there are moral 
judges who can make statements of universal moral truth, or speak for particular 
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cultures or traditions. It allows no special positions for interpreters of moral rules –
everyone has the capacity to develop ethical character, attitudes and functioning, and 
thus all should have a voice in the discourse of responsibility. The status of 
responsible agent is open to all. Finally, and unlike cosmopolitan liberalism, virtue 
ethics recognises the importance of our social relationships to our flourishing. 
Agency and freedom come from an active engagement in the community, rather than 
protection from it. In the next section, I consider what kind of institutions best enable 
our agency within communities.
8.2 Cosmopolitan Liberal Institutions and the Law
There are two separate issues to cover when thinking about the role of institutions in 
the practice of responsibility. The first is which institutions to support – in this case, 
should we favour cosmopolitan liberal institutions such as constitutional democratic 
government, human rights, liberal freedoms and the law? Or are other institutions 
better suited to fostering the practice of responsibility? The second issue is the extent 
to which responsibility should be institutionalised. I deal with each in turn, but 
consider law, as the most critical institution in the liberal conception of responsibility, 
separately in section 8.2.1. 
If human life is inherently social, and we are disposed to engaging in practices of 
responsibility, no particular institutions may be necessary to enable these practices. 
The SPM does not suggest that a society based on slavery or apartheid cannot be 
stable (and in fact many have been throughout history) as long as the ethics of the 
society reflect the reactive attitudes of the population. However, given the 
characteristics of the practice of responsibility, it is likely that some institutions more 
than others, reflecting some particular values, will facilitate a rich social practice. To 
what extent do cosmopolitan liberal institutions provide the conditions for the 
practice of responsibility to flourish? Perhaps surprisingly, given the criticism of 
conceptions of agency and responsibility in the doctrine which inspired this thesis, 
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the institutions promoted by cosmopolitan liberalism may be more supportive of the 
SPM than they initially appear. 
Institutions play a key role in liberal and cosmopolitan liberal theorising. John Rawls 
(1971) sees institutions as necessary to social life: without institutions to adjudicate 
on claims, there can be no justice. Martha Nussbaum (2000) also sees institutions as 
necessary to flourishing: liberal institutions guarantee to all citizens a range of 
options to give them the greatest freedom and opportunity to develop the full range of 
their capabilities and thereby live a flourishing human life. Simon Caney (2005a), 
David Held (2004) and Thomas Pogge (2002) have all recently proposed elaborate 
cosmopolitan institutional structures to bring about global justice. The institutions all 
tend to favour are those most closely associated with liberalism: law and the rule of 
law (i.e. rule by democratic constitutional government), a human rights regime,
provision of education and some level of healthcare, and a broad range of guaranteed 
freedoms: of speech, expression, religion and contract. These institutions may be 
grounded on a mistaken conception of the individual agent, but this does not 
automatically preclude them from being useful in facilitating responsibility as a social 
practice. In order to exercise our social agency and act as responsible agents, we are 
likely to need certain freedoms – to learn, to interact, to discourse, to respond to 
others – which we may best be able to achieve within a liberal polity. Philip Pettit 
(2001: 152-174) notes the importance of the state in supporting the freedoms 
necessary to enjoying our discursive status, and argues that democracy (both electoral 
and contestatory) is necessary to support discursive freedom, as the greatest threat to 
our status is to be dominated by others. He argues: 
[S]o far as a state is democratic … to that extent it will be non-arbitrary 
and will not compromise the freedom [as fitness to be held responsible] of 
its members. Its coercive laws and decrees and other initiatives will 
condition people’s choices, as natural limitations do, but that state will 
not compromise people’s freedom in the manner of a dominating 
presence. (Pettit, 2001: 178-179) 
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Barnes also supports liberal institutions, arguing that the liberal account of how best 
to order society is highly plausible, but only because the liberal account of the 
individual agent is not: ‘the modern liberal state … allows leeway for the exercise of 
the formidable self-organising powers of social agents, mediates between the groups 
and collectives arising from their exercise, and remains responsive to a remarkable if 
imperfect degree to the needs and demands of all of them’ (Barnes, 2000: 183). 
The cosmopolitan liberal conception of the individual sees her as having a range of 
rights, and the doctrine proposes institutions to support these. While I have argued 
that a discourse centred only on rights is too isolating, the social practice model of 
responsibility does not dismiss them altogether. Larry May explains why: 
When individuals recognize that they often share agency or subjectivity 
with the members of their group, when they recognize that their 
individual actions have repercussions on the lives of these others of both a 
direct and indirect sort, then they should also come to a recognition of the 
connectedness of their lives with other lives in their group. The 
interdependency that exists in communities, once recognized, makes the 
members less self-centred and more interested in the interests of others. In 
inter-connected, interdependent groups, one of the prime responsibilities 
is to maintain the harmony of the group. And one of the chief ways this is 
accomplished is through the display of respect for each member of the 
group. Acting in a way which degrades other members disrupts the 
harmony of the self. Indeed, given the strong connection between 
individual and group agency or subjectivity, harming others may literally 
harm the self. (May, 1992: 170-171)
If rights are a good way to display our respect for others, then they can be supported 
by the SPM. However, the social practice of responsibility is likely to function best 
when rights are recognised alongside responsibility rather than alone (as rights alone 
do not seem to be working to ensure respect, as discussed in Part One, plus, ascribing 
the status of responsible agent is also a way to respect others) and when economic 
and social rights are promoted alongside political and civil rights. The status of 
responsible (and therefore free) agent, according to Pettit, requires ‘an environment of 
choice that makes significantly numerous and distinct options available. If their 
options were restricted to a few or only trivially different alternatives, whether by 
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natural limitation or as a side-effect of social arrangements, then we might be loath to 
say that they were free persons’ (Pettit, 2001: 66). We can tentatively conclude 
therefore (and this is an area where more research would be fruitful) that the political 
arrangements which are most likely to support both the material and discursive 
conditions of responsible agency may well be some version of the institutions 
proposed by cosmopolitan liberals (though not for the reasons they suppose).
The other issue to consider when looking at institutions and responsibility is how 
institutionalised responsibility should ideally be. Barnes makes a strong argument 
that indicates that the problem with liberal institutions is not their character but the 
level of responsibility we transfer onto them. As noted in Chapter 3, he argues that 
modern differentiated societies rely heavily on institutional responsibility and in 
particular on institutional responses to social problems. This is suboptimal as the 
people who staff the institutions do not feel the responsibility themselves – liability 
rests with ‘employers, employers’ insurers, or government agencies’ (Barnes, 2000:
94) rather than with the individuals who inhabit the institutional roles. Incentive to 
discharge the responsibilities is consequently low compared to the strong reciprocal 
pressure that is created to behave ethically according to the standards of the group 
when we are held responsible in close-knit social networks – friendships, familial or 
kinship relationships and so on.  The transfer of responsibility to impersonal 
institutions can therefore lead to a weakening of important social bonds: ‘as the price 
of lapses in the meeting of individual responsibilities is more and more paid by 
institutions, the collective interest in their strong enforcement is radically weakened 
… [w]here responsibilities are attenuated, interdependence is weak and the strength 
of commitments is correspondingly low’ (Barnes, 2000: 96 & 97). The liberal model 
of transferring ex ante responsibility to institutions in order to free the individual 
means that the social practice of responsibility is less able to do its job of enabling 
social life.
Institutions – particularly liberal institutions – can facilitate social life, provide the 
material and political environments in which to develop a rich social practice of 
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responsibility, and be an efficient way for individuals to co-ordinate their actions and 
magnify their agency. However, they are not required for the practice of 
responsibility to function (thus no-one outside a practice is justified in imposing them 
on others against their will), plus, reliance on them to discharge obligations can 
weaken the practice of responsibility. If free agency depends upon responsibility, then 
the effort to make the individual freer by taking responsibility away from her is 
counterproductive, if to do so threatens the overall practice as Barnes suggests. For 
the SPM to work optimally responsibility needs to be felt by individuals in their 
everyday lives – they need to be active in collectively holding each other to account 
and developing standards to use to do this. Responsibility is performative within 
practice, and to encourage responsible agency we need to allow agents to feel and 
discharge responsibility. How we devolve responsibility away from institutions is not 
clear – it is another area in which research on the conditions under which the social 
practice of responsibility can best function would be useful.
8.2.1 Legality and Responsibility
The institution most central to cosmopolitan liberal management of responsibility is 
the law. Domestic and, increasingly, international law and legal institutions are used 
to define responsibilities, to ensure that they are discharged and to punish those who 
renege on their obligations. Law, rather than politics, is tasked with managing 
responsibility as it is seen by liberals as a neutral and objective tool to adjudicate 
between interests. However, I argued in Chapters 3 and 4 that legalising 
responsibility has significant drawbacks. 
When responsibility is managed principally using legal means, it tends to narrow the 
meaning of the concept. Young (2006) has identified that the ex post ‘liability’ 
conception of responsibility prevalent in legal models, which aims to identify the 
agent who voluntarily and knowledgeably caused a harm, and to find her guilty or at 
fault for that harm, limits the states of affairs which can be included in liberal 
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discourses of responsibility. Few harms in the international sphere can accurately be 
traced back to the voluntary and informed actions of individual ‘criminals’ or even 
individual agents, therefore much suffering is excluded from the discourse of 
responsibility. She also notes that conceptualising responsibility as liability 
encourages scapegoating and defensiveness more than genuine attempts to assist 
those harmed. I argued in Chapter 7 that there is a further drawback to the legalisation 
of responsibility which concerns collective agency: if we concentrate on finding the 
individuals who directly caused harm, we may fail to hold responsible all of those 
agents who facilitated, encouraged or allowed the harm, so doing little to prevent 
similar actions in the future. 
Legalising responsibility requires a kind of formality in allocation which social 
attributions of responsibility do not. Agents and circumstances have to be very 
precisely defined in order to justly blame and punish wrongdoers, and defining the 
individual agent has proved highly problematic. I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 the 
difficulty that international law has in conceptualising the individual agent in the 
international sphere. The move from state civil agency to individual criminal agency 
is fraught with conceptual difficulties that tend to be glossed over by supporters of 
international law. The Rome Statute which established the ICC sees the individual as 
both pre-social perpetrator and as socially embedded victim – a dichotomous 
conception that may not trouble practitioners but should concern international 
political theorists. Not only is it internally contradictory, it also encourages us to see 
the conflicts in which atrocities commonly take place in simplistic terms of good and 
evil. Again, if we do not sensitively allocate responsibility to all involved – and this 
necessitates a good understanding of the context of each situation and of the 
contribution made to outcomes by the attitudes and actions of the collectives which 
the perpetrators are members of – then there is little chance of preventing such events 
in the future. Law is good at punishing people, but not so good at prospective 
prevention: when responsibility is equated with guilt or blame, there is little incentive 
for anyone who is not directly implicated in harm to take responsibility for helping to 
ensure that the past is not repeated.
262
The final drawback of the legal regulation of responsibility stems from the liberal 
conviction that law is a neutral and objective tool which should be used in favour of 
subjective, power-driven politics. When law is seen as the solution to the problem of 
politics, then the effects of power upon law tend to be denied. I noted in Chapter 3 
that war crimes trials are inevitably political, and argued in Chapter 4 that they will 
remain so at the ICC. Law cannot be divorced from the interests of power, and 
attempting to deny this only leads to the role that power plays being hidden from 
view. 
All of this is not to say that law does not have a role to play to facilitate the social 
practice of responsibility. On the contrary, I believe it can play a crucial role. Law 
documents and formalises norms and standards of accountability within collectives, 
and facilitates orderly relationships between agents (see Reus-Smit (2004) and 
Yasuaki (2003) for discussion of international law as embodying shared 
understandings). It can constrain agents by requiring that they justify their actions 
according to the vocabulary of the law (see Wheeler (2004) for an analysis of this 
function of the law in terms of the effect of international law upon state military 
action). The criminal law can also help to prevent harm through shaping the value 
system of a society and encouraging the subjects of the law to come to believe that 
the actions the law prohibits are actually wrong (though, as I argue in Chapter 4, the 
conditions necessary for law to function this way may not be present at the 
international level).
Daniel Warner sees a more fundamental role for law in the practice of responsibility: 
he argues that law builds the collectives in which the practice takes place: 
[T]he law and the very process of organising can be seen as that which 
forms the community or group … the self-conscious recognition of 
authoritative processes, by individuals or states, changes the individual or 
state and represents the values of the society in question. By consciously 
recognising and obeying rules, individuals and states become part of a 
larger whole. That is, the very process of recognition is that which makes 
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the larger whole and changes the random group into a collectivity’. 
(Warner, 1991: 79)
Philip Allott has a similar view of the importance of law. He argues that law is a way 
that society constitutes itself: ‘Law carries the structures and systems of society 
through time. Law inserts the common interest of society into the behaviour of 
society-members. Law establishes possible futures for society, in accordance with 
society’s theories, values and purposes.’ (Allott, 2002: 290). Allott goes as far at to 
suggest that international law can constitute a collective of ‘all-humanity’ (Allott, 
2002: 297) if it is allowed to do so – suggesting that law could create the global 
community of humanity that cosmopolitan liberals assume.
Even if it cannot constitute such a community, law may have other roles to play in the 
social practice of responsibility. International criminal trials can become symbolic 
public acts or events which allow a community to mourn its dead and attain some 
closure (though Truth Commissions may be more likely to lead to these outcomes –
see Minnow (1998)). Trials could also provide a virtual school room for the 
sentimental education called for by Richard Rorty (1993): a public forum in which 
cross-cultural norms can be created and debated, in the hope that individuals will 
begin to act in accordance with them as if members of a genuine global community. 
Osiel (1997) supports this view of international trials, arguing that such trials, ‘when 
effective as a public spectacle, stimulate public discussion in ways that foster the 
liberal values of toleration, moderation, and civil respect’ (Osiel, 1997: 2). The 
evidence he offers for this is not entirely convincing, and the reactions to the trials of 
Milosevic and others at the ICTY suggest that trials are by no means guaranteed to 
promote the values of toleration and respect rather than intolerance and prolonged 
hatred, but there may be some validity to this claim. The trial of Saddam Hussein, and 
the reaction to it among Iraqis, will be instructive to watch in this regard. 
The new international legal system also has specific benefits in terms of encouraging 
public debate about responsibility in some of the instances of harm discussed in the 
thesis. The first Prosecutor at the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, is interpreting his 
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mandate broadly. He has been collecting evidence of crimes in Darfur and has 
recently reported his findings to the UNSC (Ocampo, 2006). His investigators have 
established a ‘Darfur crimes database’, which lists thousands of alleged murders and 
the displacement of two million people. Sudan’s refusal to co-operate with the Court 
may make it very difficult for trials to take place, but Ocampo’s work (and the 
extensive media coverage it is receiving) is ensuring that both the Sudanese 
government and the members of the UNSC feel continued pressure to work to resolve 
the situation in Darfur, whether through legal, political or military means. 
Ocampo has also set his sights on corporations, and is attempting to influence their 
behaviour in conflict zones, despite there being no provision to prosecute collective 
or corporate actors within the Rome Statute. Powerful evidence is now available 
linking business and conflict. Companies may provide money, resources, 
infrastructure, products or services that facilitate human rights violations in the 
context of armed conflict. In many African countries, including Angola, Sierra Leone 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) diamonds have been, and continue 
to be, linked to human rights abuses either by insurgent groups or government forces 
(see http://www.amnestyusa.org/diamonds/index.do for more information on ‘conflict 
diamonds’). In 2005, Human Rights Watch produced a report, “The Curse of Gold”, 
showing the direct relationship between the success of rebel groups in the DRC and 
their control and exploitation of gold mines. They give examples in the report of the 
effect of corporations on conflict, including: 
AngloGold Ashanti, one of the largest gold producers in the world, 
started exploration activities in the Mongbwalu gold mining area [in 
1993] … AngloGold Ashanti representatives established relations with 
the FNI, an armed group responsible for serious human rights abuses 
including war crimes and crimes against humanity, and who controlled 
the Mongbwalu area.  In return for FNI assurances of security for its 
operations and staff, AngloGold Ashanti provided logistical and financial 
support – that in turn resulted in political benefits – to the armed group 
and its leaders. (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 2).
Most contemporary conflicts in Africa are about the exploitation of natural resources 
to some degree, and therefore corporations have a key role to play. Ocampo aims to 
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encourage these actors to act responsibly by publicising their behaviour. In a press 
release soon after Ocampo was elected as Chief Prosecutor, his Office stated that:
The fighting taking place in Ituri seems to be the outcome of ethnic strife 
and of the struggle for local power, intertwined with national and regional 
conflicts. All of these aspects of the situation are fuelled by the way 
natural resources are exploited … Various reports have pointed to links 
between the activities of some African, European and Middle Eastern 
companies and the atrocities taking place in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo ... There is general concern that the atrocities allegedly committed 
in the country may be fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources 
there and the arms trade, which are enabled through the international 
banking system … [T]he Prosecutor believes that investigation of the 
financial aspects of the alleged atrocities will be crucial to prevent future 
crimes and for the prosecution of crimes already committed. If the alleged 
business practices continue to fuel atrocities, these would not be stopped 
even if current perpetrators were arrested and prosecuted. (Office of the 
Prosecutor, 2003).
The Prosecutor recognises the role that firms can play in conflict, and is seeking ways 
to target corporate actors who support the commission of atrocities. However, the 
Court can only prosecute individual executives, under Article 25 of the Statute, who, 
for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, aid, abet or otherwise assist a criminal group in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission. Ocampo is relying on 
his high media profile to generate public debate and pressure for change over the 
responsibility of shareholders, other executives and customers of corporations for 
facilitating, funding or allowing the actions that a few individual executives may be 
held legally responsible for.
Ocampo has recognised that there are limits to what the pure process of law can 
achieve, and is pursuing justice and accountability more through the media than 
through the new Court. This is a creative way to use his office, which acknowledges 
the importance of public perceptions, politics and power. He has also been astute in 
announcing, on February 10th 2006, that his office will not investigate alleged war 
crimes committed in Iraq by Coalition forces: he recognizes that the ICC is most 
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likely to be a success if the US can be brought back into the discourse of international 
law. The relationship of law to politics is a new and fruitful research area in IPT (see 
Reus-Smit (2004) for exemplary work in this area), and, in the next section of this 
chapter, I suggest that an appreciation of what politics can offer in terms of 
responsibility is overdue. This is not to discard law: the process of making, amending 
and applying law is itself part of the practice of responsibility. However, given the 
lack of universal principles on which to found an objective set of international laws, 
and the effect of law in shutting out particular kinds of responsibility, we must 
supplement law with politics. 
8.3 The Necessity of Politics
A key feature of what Judith Shklar calls legalism (‘the ethical attitude that holds 
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of 
duties and rights determined by rules’ (Shklar, 1986: 1)), is its deprecation of politics. 
Shklar argues that politics is regarded by legalists (a category that cosmopolitan 
liberals are likely to fall into, as my argument in Part One indicates) as ‘not only 
something apart from the law, but as inferior to law. Law aims at justice while 
politics looks only to expediency. The former is neutral and objective, the latter the 
uncontrolled child of competing interests and ideologies’ (Shklar, 1986: 111). Yet I 
have made clear throughout this work that law and politics cannot be disentangled so 
easily, and that law, if used alone, stifles the social practice of responsibility. 
Cosmopolitan liberalism tends to privatise, legalise and individualise responsibility, 
but the practice of responsibility works best when it takes place in public, when 
collectives hold themselves responsible for change and when responsibility is 
distanced from guilt or blame. Public debate and collective accountability make 
politics and political action necessary, and the presence of power inevitable.
Philip Pettit and Marion Smiley both acknowledge the importance of power in 
ascriptions of responsibility. Pettit argues that to be free is to be given the status of 
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responsible agent, and that freedom is impossible if we are dominated by our state or 
by other agents, i.e. if they hold arbitrary power over us. Smiley notes that 
judgements of ex ante and ex post responsibility will each depend in part on the social 
or political power that the judge has to make the ascriptions ‘stick’. The law can 
control the exercise of power to some extent, but it cannot change the fact that agents 
in every society are differentially powerful. An important question to ask is therefore: 
how can power be utilised within the social practice of responsibility? 
The most interesting contemporary work which can help to answer this question is, in 
my view, new research on Arendtian ideas of agency and responsibility. Hannah 
Arendt’s notion of agency is highly complementary to the conception of agency as 
sociality. She saw that one could not be an agent in isolation – agency requires the 
existence of others to engage in discourse with (Arendt, 1956: 234 & 236-243, cited 
in Lang & Williams, 2005: 225), and that this discourse takes place in the space 
between individual and community. The nature of human discourse is political, and 
Arendt saw no reason to try to change this, because she saw politics as the highest 
form of human action. We enact ourselves as agents through political interaction 
(Lang & Williams, 2005: 223) – through inter-subjective communication and 
negotiation over interests. This performative view of agency leads to a conception of 
responsibility that can help us to see the constructive role that power can play in the 
social practice model. 
According to Arendt, power arises when people exercise agency together or ‘act in 
concert’ (Arendt, 1999: 233). But responsibility also arises from our social 
interactions. She argues that we must accept collective responsibility for the actions 
of the communities we live in: 
This taking upon ourselves the consequences for things we are entirely 
innocent of, is the price we pay for the fact that we live our lives not by 
ourselves but among our fellow men, and that the faculty of action, 
which, after all, is the political faculty par excellence, can be actualised 
only in one of the many and manifold forms of human community. 
(Arendt, 1987: 50)
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Larry May echoes this position: ‘[a]s members of communities … we derive various 
benefits, which change the scope of our responsibilities. The shared responsibility we 
should feel for the harms perpetrated within our communities is precisely the cost we 
incur by being members of those communities.’ (May, 1992: 183). This responsibility 
is not moral or legal guilt but ex ante, specifically political, responsibility. May and 
Arendt both see that acting together can create power to alleviate the most serious 
harms that we cause or allow: ‘Seeing one’s own moral status as interrelated with that 
of one’s group members will negate the tendency to ignore the most serious moral 
evils, those which can only be thwarted by the collective efforts of communities’ 
(May, 1992: 161-162). However, this acting together to thwart moral evils is unlikely 
to happen if responsibility is equated with guilt. Arendt argued that collective guilt 
leads only to sentimentality, not to action, and that we should therefore de-link 
responsibility and blame, and direct collective action to the future to prevent the 
outcomes our collectives are responsible for from happening again (Schaap, 2001: 
756-758).  
Iris Marion Young has used the Arendtian idea of forward looking collective 
responsibility to think through the problems of responsibility outside and across 
territorially bounded communities. She argues that the reason theorists such as Arendt 
see dense and demanding responsibilities between co-nationals is not to do with 
territory, but because ‘the processes and structures in which [co-nationals] are 
embedded more tightly connect them, and the consequences of their actions affect the 
more local others than those far away’ (Young, 2004: 376). Young therefore applies 
Arendt’s ideas to actors in the global processes and structures of the twenty-first 
century. She contends that in order to make the institutions and practices our 
collectives generate more just, we must ‘join … with others in collective action’ 
(Young, 2006: 123) because individuals alone cannot make a real difference. The 
necessity of collective action to confront the harm we are implicated in due to our 
social connections to those harmed leads Young to see much responsibility as 
‘ultimately political responsibility’ (Young, 2006: 123). ‘Political responsibility … is 
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necessarily a shared responsibility both because the injustices that call for redress are 
the product of the mediated actions of many, and thus, because they can only be 
rectified through collective action’ Young (2004: 387). This political responsibility 
must be borne by collectives who increasingly (though not often intentionally) 
influence and harm those territorially distant from them.
By politics, Young is referring to ‘the activity in which people organize collectively 
to regulate or transform some aspect of their shared social conditions, along with the 
communicative activities in which they try to persuade one another to join such 
collective action or decide what direction they wish to take it’ (Young, 2004: 377). 
Discharging responsibility involves engaging in discourse about our practices and 
trying to persuade others that some outcomes are wrong and can and should be 
changed through collective action. According to Young, following Arendt, this 
discourse is inherently political, and participation in it creates the power and agency 
needed to bring about transformation. Power, and the political negotiation of 
interests, is not only impossible to divorce from ethics, but is necessary to ethical 
social life. Our political participation within collectives – negotiating our interests, 
defining our expectations of social roles and sociable behaviour, drawing up laws, 
and to holding each other to account – is the very action which engenders the power 
of these collectives to bring about change in line with developing ideas of justice. 
8.4 Conclusion
Once we recognise agency and responsibility as inherently social and inter-subjective, 
a whole range of new possibilities for human communal life can be imagined. 
Nothing is necessary and nothing impossible. The practices of war, of state 
sovereignty, of capitalism, are just (very entrenched and seemingly highly functional) 
practices that we use to manage our relationships. They are the creations of humans 
acting socially, and can be changed, as we have seen with the redefinitions of the role 
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of the state in the Responsibility to Protect process and the firm with the advent of 
corporate social responsibility.
However, there is still much work to do. The nature and scale of harm in the 
contemporary world is such that causal responsibility is not equal to it and the human 
rights regime is not preventing it. Our ideas of responsibility need to be expanded 
beyond strict legal considerations of what we have directly caused to include political 
responsibility for what we can potentially influence. There is good reason to think 
that this change is coming. I documented in Chapter 1 the growing realisation of the 
limits of the human rights regime, and outlined in Part One the reasons why the 
regime is so limited, based as it is on the cosmopolitan liberal conception of the 
sovereign individual agent. There is an increasing awareness that human flourishing 
is not brought about by mutual disinterest – by leaving one another alone to live 
isolated, self-interested, individual lives – but by achieving status in a social 
environment. Freedom, that most valuable commodity, requires more than one’s 
‘rights’ to be respected: to be free is to be afforded a certain status – that of 
responsible agent – by others.
Practice seems to be moving ahead of theory here, and a new discourse of 
responsibility is competing with the discourse of rights. The biggest ever anti-poverty 
campaign was formed under the banner of ‘Make Poverty History’ in 2005, with a 
view to holding the world’s wealthiest states responsible for alleviating the suffering 
of the world’s poorest people. This movement recognises the utility of power in 
bringing social change, campaigning under the slogan: ‘[t]hey have the power and we 
can make them use it’ (Make Poverty History website, 2006). States have responded 
to this with unprecedented levels of debt cancellation and promises of aid. Firms are 
also feeling a new responsibility for their contribution to social life, and increasing 
numbers are responding to calls to improve their social and environmental impacts by 
assuming responsibilities aligned with their identities.  
271
International political theory is struggling to keep up with these developments, 
because neither of its principal approaches to these issues, cosmopolitan liberalism 
and communitarianism, can adequately account for our experiences of agency or 
practices of responsibility. Within this thesis I have started to re-think the notions of 
agency and responsibility in IPT, in order to move past the impasse reached in 
mainstream theorising. An improved understanding of these notions is valuable in 
and of itself, but also, as I have shown in this final chapter, such an understanding 
offers us significant opportunities to move beyond the impossible dreams of 
cosmopolitan liberalism. Accepting that responsibility is about more than following 
rules or laws and assigning blame should motivate agents to develop social virtues 
and practical reason, enabling them to act together to challenge supposedly structural 
features of our world that we perceive to be causing harm. Accepting that politics is a 
necessary part of ethics should persuade us to concentrate less on making pre-
political statements about supposedly universal standards and to turn our attention 
instead to how best to create and utilise the power to bring change. Finally, 
understanding that responsibility is a social practice, central to every human life, 
could lead us towards a world in which we each recognise and assume responsibility 
to genuinely promote the welfare of others, knowing that to do so – to act responsibly
– is to flourish ourselves.
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